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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the relationship between initial loss events and the 
corporate governance and earnings management behaviour of these firms. This is 
done using four years of corporate governance information spanning the report of an 
initial loss for companies listed on the UK Stock Exchange.  An industry- and size-
matched control sample is used in a difference-in-difference analysis to isolate the 
impact of the initial loss event during the period. 
It is reported that, in general, an initial loss motivates an improvement in corporate 
governance in those loss firms where a relative weakness existed prior to the loss and 
that these changes mainly occur before the initial loss is announced.  Firms with 
stronger (i.e. better quality) corporate governance have less need to alter it in 
response to the loss. 
It is also reported that initial loss firms use positive abnormal accruals in the year 
before the loss in an attempt to defer/avoid the loss — the weaker corporate 
governance the more likely is it that loss firms manage earnings in this manner.  
Abnormal accruals are also found to be predictive of an initial loss and when used as 
a conditioning variable, the quality of corporate governance is an important 
mitigating factor in this regard.   
Once the loss is reported, loss firms unwind these abnormal accruals although no 
evidence of big-bath behaviour is found.  The extent to which these abnormal 
accruals are subsequently unwound are also found to be a function of both the quality 
of corporate governance as well as the severity of the initial loss. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
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The separation of ownership from control leads to goal divergence between 
managers and shareholders.  Originally outlined by Smith (1776), discussed by Berle 
and Means (1932) and laterally attributed to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency 
theory explains how managers in the modern corporation can use accounting 
discretion to achieve their own interests to the detriment of the shareholders’.  The 
classic agency perspective resulting from the separation of management and 
financing involves an inherent conflict.  Managers have incentives to take actions to 
increase/avoid decreasing their own utility even if their actions reduce the returns on 
capital invested by the financiers.  This problem manifests itself in numerous ways, 
including the sub-optimal allocation of capital, the consumption of perquisites by 
management as well as the manipulation of financial statements to achieve 
performance targets.  The latter has been confirmed in studies (Burgstahler & Dichev, 
1997; Degeorge, Patel & Zeckhauser, 1999; Dechow, Richardson & Tuna, 2003; 
Burgstahler & Eames, 2006; Myers, Myers & Skinner, 2007) which highlight 
discontinuities in the earnings distribution and in the earnings change distribution 
around zero (i.e. loss avoidance) and other metrics.  Discontinuities are interpreted as 
evidence of earnings manipulation to meet or exceed targets.  Although earnings 
management can also be beneficial to shareholders, it clearly benefits management 
while the firm bears the cost of conducting it.  Therefore the optimal level of earnings 
management is higher for managers than for shareholders.    
 
Shareholders use several mechanisms (internal and external) to monitor management 
in an effort to minimise the principal agent problem and to align the interests of 
management to their own.  Together these mechanisms make up a firm’s corporate 
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governance structure.  With the number and frequency of worldwide corporate 
scandals since the turn of the century, corporate governance has come into sharp 
focus and has emerged as one of the most significant research topics in the business 
discipline.  Internal mechanisms include, inter alia, the structure of the board, the 
chair, gender diversity, ownership concentration; external mechanisms include 
government regulation, competition, debt covenants, the managerial labour market 
and the market for corporate control.  Should any manager be tempted to manipulate 
financial information for personal reward, their ability to do so will be determined to 
some extent by the corporate governance structure in a company.  Because shareholders 
have little control over the external mechanisms, it is the internal mechanisms that 
must be organised to achieve adequate protection from management misbehaviour.   
 
The financial accounting system provides an important source of information to the 
corporate governance mechanisms that help alleviate the agency problem.  A 
fundamental objective of corporate governance research in accounting is to provide 
evidence on the extent to which information provided by financial accounting 
systems mitigates agency problems.  The use of accounting information in this 
manner can be either explicit or implicit.  For instance, accounting measures are often 
used to directly assess management performance, while accounting measures also 
indirectly impact on other performance metrics such as share price.  In addition to 
constituting an important input into the governance process, financial accounting 
information is itself a product of the governance process — produced by management 
in the knowledge that this information will be used as an input to the corporate 
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governance process. In this context, corporate governance and accounting become 
intertwined.  Sloan (2001) puts it succinctly: 
“The study of corporate governance is concerned with understanding the 
mechanisms that have evolved to mitigate incentive problems created by the 
separation of the management and financing of business units.  Financial 
accounting provides financiers with the primary source of independently verified 
information about the performance of managers.  Thus it is clear that corporate 
governance and financial accounting are inexorably linked.” 
 
The extant literature has evolved to address the role of financial accounting 
information contingent on the operation of specific governance mechanisms, and vice 
versa (Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Erhardt, Werbel & Sharader, 2003; Dechow, Sloan & 
Sweeney, 1996; Prencipe & Bar-Yosef, 2011).  The evidence from these studies is 
mixed, largely due to the fact that the two (financial accounting and corporate 
governance) are endogenously determined.  Careful experimental design is required 
to establish a clean causal relationship between the two (i.e. Bhagat & Black, 2002; 
Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2010).  Using a troubled, crisis or otherwise significant 
event as a change agent is one way to ensure that causality can be argued in only one 
direction (McConnell, Servaes & Lins, 2008; Farber, 2005).  Kosnik (1987) argues 
that the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms is better gauged when a 
firm is underperforming.  That poorly governed companies are more likely to have 
adverse accounting outcomes is supported by the evidence.  Studies by Dechow et al. 
(1996), Beasley (1996), Uzun, Szewczyk and Varma (2004), and Sharma (2004) 
show an association between fraud and weak governance and Peasnell, Pope and 
Young (2005) and Song and Windram (2004) who report a relationship between 
corporate governance and enforcement actions by the Financial Reporting Review 
Panel (FRRP) in the UK.   
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When a crisis occurs corporate governance is expected to change.  While some 
research has been done relating to management changes in response to poor 
performance (Strahan, 1998; Livingston, 1997), there is a paucity of evidence 
pertaining to corporate governance changes at firm level in response to 
underperformance.  The lack of research could be because nowadays corporate 
governance is viewed as inherently sticky and generally uniform in response to codes 
of governance best practice — a feature of corporate governance that is likely to 
obfuscate results (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson & Neal, 2010).  The little research 
that has been done pertains mainly to responses in firms’ corporate governance to 
accounting shocks including financial fraud (Farber, 1995); earnings restatements 
(Srinivasan, 1995) and the disclosure of internal control material weaknesses 
(Johnstone, Li & Rupley, 2011).   
 
This study is concerned with the reporting of an initial loss as a crisis situation and 
change agent1.  Incurring a loss can be a significant negative event in the life of a 
firm.  While it is possible even for firms reporting a profit to fail to achieve the 
required rate of return demanded by its shareholders, there is little doubt that loss 
firms are a special and unambiguous case of underperformance.  Hayn (1995) posits 
that losses should not be treated in the same way as profits for valuation purposes 
because losses are likely to be considered temporary since shareholders will exercise 
their put option to liquidate the firm rather than continue to suffer losses.  Collins, 
Pincus and Xie (1999) show that losses are not much help in predicting future 
                                                 
1 For this study, an ‘initial’ loss is one preceded by two years of reported profit. 
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earnings and so the company’s book value becomes much more important for the 
valuation of loss-making companies both as a proxy for future normal earnings and 
an indicator of liquidation value.  Losses can occur for many reasons but all involve 
some exogenous shock to the firm’s products and/or markets (examples include 
technological and/or regulatory changes).  Therefore, the theoretical link between 
corporate governance and losses is not as clear as that between corporate governance 
and fraud situations.  The result is that an initial loss is more likely to be exogenous 
(i.e. less dependent on corporate governance) than a fraud situation or enforcement 
action and so is worthy of further investigation.   
 
A loss may be a transitory event but it may also be the beginning of the end of a 
company.  Incurring a loss is indicative of a situation that requires remedial action 
and one which, potentially, may evolve to become a crisis.  Even if losses are not 
expected to perpetuate, they are clearly indicative of a rate of return that is below that 
required by investors.  When the initial loss is reported investors will attempt to 
assess whether the loss is a transitory blip or a symptom of the terminal decline of the 
company.  The firm’s management will generally attempt to signal that it is the 
former which is the case and that remedial action has been taken to return the firm to 
profitability.  In other words, the signal of unambiguous underperformance provided 
by a loss will not be tolerated by investors over a prolonged period and needs to be 
addressed.  This study predicts that firms which experience an initial loss will attempt 
to mitigate the adverse consequences of underperformance by improving their 
corporate governance in response to their underperformance.   
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One way of demonstrating to the market that the loss is not terminal is via disclosure 
and information management — for example, to signal to shareholders that the 
company is well governed.  Accordingly, any firm that incurs or is about to incur a 
loss will attempt to signal that (notwithstanding the inherent stickiness and uniformity 
of corporate governance mentioned previously) its corporate governance is of a 
sufficiently high standard for the firm to continue as a going concern.  The timing of 
any improvement in corporate governance is also of interest.  There is evidence that 
firms can anticipate losses.  A sample of loss firms was clearly unable to avoid 
incurring the loss, but it is likely that they will have anticipated the loss before it is 
announced.  Therefore, in line with the disclosure and information management 
hypothesis, it is likely that improvements in corporate governance will begin before 
and possibly precede the reporting of the loss. 
 
Firms in trouble are also more likely to have misstated earnings.  In their study of the 
relationship between corporate governance and the declaration of internal control 
material weaknesses (ICMWs), Johnstone et al. (2011) also link losses to ICMWs but 
do not investigate losses further.  However, not all initial loss companies will have 
misstated earnings or ICMWs and so it is worthwhile investigating if an initial loss 
can motivate a change in corporate governance (this is not the only motivation since 
underperformance will also impact on corporate governance changes).   
 
There is also significant evidence that firms manage earnings to avoid reporting 
losses (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Hansen, 2010).  As stated above, a sample of 
loss firms clearly could not avoid incurring losses such that an analysis of the quality 
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of earnings in the year before the loss can be used to directly test for evidence of 
earnings management.  The unwinding of managed abnormal accruals is also of 
interest.  There is evidence that firms take a ‘big bath’ to make the most of a bad 
situation by making things a little worse (Chai & Tung, 2002).  In line with the big 
bath hypothesis, there is a possibility that some loss firms will use the loss to unwind 
more managed abnormal accruals than necessary to create a reserve for future years.  
A formal investigation of companies reporting initial losses (as opposed to avoiding 
or deferring them) would make a significant additional contribution to the existing 
literature on earnings management behaviour around the loss avoidance benchmark 
(Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Ayers, Jiang & Yeung, 2006; Ronen & Yaari, 2010; 
Dechow et al., 2003; Hansen, 2010).   
 
There is also evidence that the market’s interpretation of accounting earnings (losses 
in this case) is conditioned by other information available (e.g. Freeman, 1987; El-
Gazzar, 1998; Donnelly & Lynch, 2002).  Analyses of the average behaviour of 
corporate governance and earnings management around the initial loss event do not 
control for the richness of the information environment of the firm.  For instance the 
stickiness and uniformity of a firm’s existing corporate governance mechanisms will 
likely impact on the degree to which corporate governance will change in response to 
any shock (Beasley et al., 2010).  Pre-existing corporate governance also potentially 
plays a conditioning role on the earnings management behaviour in response to the 
loss, especially the extent to which prior year abnormal accruals predict the 
subsequent loss.  The relative severity of the loss event will also likely play a 
significant role on the behaviour of corporate governance and earnings management 
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in response to the loss.  The relative severity of shock events and the market’s 
interpretation of the shock have been used as conditioning variables in other change 
studies (Hennes, Leone & Miller, 2008; Desai, Hogan & Wilkins, 2006; Srinivasan, 
2005). 
 
To answer all of these research questions, this study collects a sample of initial loss 
firms in the UK.  The UK setting is important because its “comply or explain” 
approach differs from the mandatory compliance approach to governance in the US2.  
Specifically, because the London Stock Exchange allows its listed firms not to 
comply with the Combined Code (so long as they explain why they do not) it follows 
that firms are likely to exhibit more variation in their corporate governance.  Because 
corporate governance is less prescriptive in the UK to begin with, this setting is likely 
to facilitate a comprehensive analysis of the interaction between financial information 
and corporate governance mechanisms, especially when this study is attempting to, 
inter alia, examine the change in corporate governance response around the reporting 
of losses.  An industry- and size-matched control sample of non-loss firms is also 
collected against which to compare the corporate governance and earnings 
management behaviour of loss firms.  This approach gives greater assurance that the 
study is not only capturing differences and changes due to underlying macro-factors 
but is properly attributing the impact of the loss event.  For example there is evidence 
that firms pursue target corporate governance structures (Cicero, Wintoki & Yang, 
2010) and that earnings management behaviour is influenced by, inter alia, industry 
                                                 
2 “Comply or explain” requires firms to disclose whether (and to what extent) they comply with a 
particular corporate governance code and, if they do not (fully) comply, explain why they do not 
comply. 
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and firm size.  The matched sample approach provides a series of controls to avoid 
attributing macro- and industry-induced changes in corporate governance and the 
behaviour of earnings management to the loss event. 
 
This study contributes to the literature in at least six main ways.  First of all, it fills 
the significant gap in the literature by intertwining the loss, corporate governance and 
earnings management literatures.  The reporting of an initial loss should have 
implications for corporate governance and earnings management at those firms.  
Since the work of Hayn (1995) about the impact of losses on the significance of the 
results from panel studies, losses have been represented as a dummy explanatory 
variable in analyses that are otherwise concerned only with coefficients of non-loss 
firms (i.e. Vafeas, 2000, 2005) or otherwise shocked firms (i.e. Johnstone et al., 
2011).  In other words the impact of losses is separated to avoid biasing the results 
but this impact is otherwise unexplored.  Indeed, Kerstein and Rai (2007) exclude 
loss firms from their analysis altogether since earnings management has been found 
to be less important when earnings are negative (Degeorge et al., 1999).  Second, it 
adds to the corporate governance literature on the efficacy of corporate governance 
amalgamations rather than individual variables in corporate governance studies.  
Third, to the best of the author’s knowledge no study has formally directly tested the 
role of losses as a change agent for corporate governance.  The timing of these 
changes also provides evidence of the ability of firms to anticipate the loss.  Fourth, 
as a formal investigation of the earnings management behaviour of initial loss firms, 
it makes a significant additional contribution to the existing literature on earnings 
management behaviour around the zero benchmark (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; 
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Ayers et al., 2006; Ronen & Yaari, 2008; Dechow et al., 2003; Hansen, 2010).  Fifth, 
by investigating the mitigating role of the ex-ante quality of corporate governance 
and/or the severity of the loss throughout this study, an additional contribution is to 
analyse the role of alternative information sources on the informativeness of 
accounting earnings (losses is in this case).  Finally, it also reports evidence on the 
ability of positive abnormal accruals to predict losses and also investigates how this 
predictive ability is mitigated by corporate governance. 
 
The research is organised as follows: Chapter 2 frames the research questions in the 
context of the relevant literature.  It presents the origin of the separation between 
ownership and control, discusses the interaction between the corporate governance 
and accounting information that results from agency theory and introduces the 
endogeneity problem between the two.  It explains the corporate governance response 
to crisis situations and establishes an initial loss as one such example.  In particular, it 
establishes an initial loss as an unambiguous signal of underperformance that will not 
be allowed to continue by investors.  Something will have to change and this chapter 
outlines the likely changes in corporate governance and earnings management as well 
as the mitigating role alternative sources of information will likely play on these 
relationships.  Chapter 3 presents the methodology.  It details the hypotheses to be 
examined arising from the gaps in the literature.  It describes how the sample of 
initial loss firms is collected, how the control sample is matched and how the 
corporate governance, accounting, and market variables are constructed.  It also 
details and explains the benefits of using the difference-in-difference methodology 
and the statistical tests used to answer the research questions in this study.  Chapters 
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4, 5, and 6 are the empirical chapters.  Specifically, Chapter 4 investigates the 
relationship between the initial loss event and corporate governance changes, the 
timing of these changes as well as the mitigating role a firms’ existing corporate 
governance mechanisms have on the relationship.  Chapter 5 examines the 
relationship between the initial loss event and abnormal accruals behaviour in 
response to the initial loss and tests for any evidence of big bath behaviour as well as 
the mitigating role the severity of the loss has on the change in abnormal accruals in 
response to the loss.  The ability of abnormal accruals to predict a loss is also tested.  
Chapter 6 combines the analyses in Chapter 4 and 5 by testing the conditional impact 
of the quality of ex-ante corporate governance on the change in abnormal accruals.  
The combined impact of corporate governance quality and loss severity on the change 
in abnormal accruals as well as the mitigating role played by corporate governance on 
the ability of abnormal accruals to predict an initial loss are also tested.  The 
conditional impact of the severity of the loss on corporate governance changes is also 
examined in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 summarises, concludes and also reports the 
limitations of the research and avenues for future developments. 
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2.1  Introduction 
 
The separation of ownership from management has clear advantages but also 
gives rise to many challenges.  Not least among these are the agency problems which 
arise when decision making authority is delegated to managers.  Shareholders hold 
management accountable for the use of this power and, accordingly, require 
information regarding the performance of their firm in order to evaluate managers’ 
decision making.  Corporate governance is a set of control mechanisms that is 
specially designed to monitor and ratify managerial decisions on behalf of 
shareholders.  In this context, corporate governance and accounting become 
intertwined.  Academics study corporate governance, accounting and (given that the 
two are endogenously determined) the relationship and interaction between the two.  
The endogeneity problem can be solved with careful experimental design by 
monitoring the change in one around an “event” in the other.  A general finding is 
that corporate governance improves in response to a troubled/significant accounting 
event (i.e. disclosure of financial fraud and earnings restatements).  Another is that 
firms manage earnings to, inter alia, avoid reporting losses.  The conditioning role 
played by corporate governance is also studied and the general finding 
(notwithstanding the endogeneity problem) is that there is an inverse relation between 
the quality of corporate governance and earnings management. 
 
This chapter explores the extant literature that deals with these topics to identify 
research gaps, establish the parameters of this study, frame the resulting research 
questions, determine the analytical methods required to answer those questions and to 
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fill the gaps in the literature.  The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 
explains agency theory and issues related to the separation of ownership from control.  
Salient corporate governance characteristics and their impact in a variety of situations 
are discussed.  The endogeneity problem inherent in studies relating corporate 
governance and performance is addressed. Section 2.3 examines corporate 
governance in crisis situations and explores the impact of conditioning variables on 
the results of these studies.  Section 2.4 explains why losses are different from other 
examples of crisis from a valuation and signalling perspective and therefore worthy 
of particular examination as an obvious gap in the literature.  Section 2.5 discusses 
the literature examining earnings management around benchmarks, especially the loss 
avoidance threshold, and investigates the research gap presented by the sample in this 
study.  Section 2.6 details the overlap between the earnings management and 
corporate governance literatures with a particular focus on the role of governance 
amalgamations to maximise construct validity.  Section 2.7 concludes by bringing 
together the significant research gaps in and between the loss, corporate governance 
and research literatures identified in the previous sections. 
 
2.2  Corporate Governance and Agency Theory  
 
Although it is argued that corporate governance research is characterised by 
the lack of a single unifying theory (which explains the diversity of research in the 
area to date, the questions asked, the models specified, how the variables are defined 
and measured, the estimators used and how the results are applied), the 
overwhelmingly dominant theoretical perspective applied in modern corporate 
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governance studies is agency theory.  This convincing theory, accredited to Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), was originally introduced by Adam Smith (1776) in The 
Wealth of Nations, where writing about joint stock companies he stated: 
“The directors of such companies . . . being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a 
private copartnery frequently watch over their own.  Like the stewards of a rich 
man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s 
honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it.  
Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the 
management of the affairs of such a company.” (Book 5, Chapter 1, Part 3, Art. 
1) 
 
The separation of ownership (shareholders) from control (management) provides the 
opportunity for managers (agents) to act in their own self-interest by maximising their 
own wealth and power at the expense of the owners (principals).  Agency theory 
explains how the modern organisation can survive and prosper despite the different 
agendas of shareholders and management.   
 
Shareholders have several mechanisms available to organise the structure of their 
company in a way that aligns the goals of management with their own; these 
mechanisms represent the firm’s corporate governance structure.  Although the 
distinction can be blurred, this study, like others (Gillan, 2006) distinguishes between 
external and internal governance characteristics and focuses on monitoring by 
shareholders and the corporate board as emblematic of the latter to help to frame the 
study, i.e. by internal corporate governance characteristics this study means the 
corporate governance structures and processes that are within the control of the firm’s 
shareholders and its board of directors.  Examples include the size of the board, the 
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number of non-executives on the board, the number of independent directors on the 
board, the duality of the CEO/Chair roles, gender diversity, and the extent of insider 
and outsider ownership.  The general view is that weak corporate governance confers 
private control benefits to insiders at the expense of outsiders (Leuz, Nanda & 
Wysocki, 2003).   
 
The increased interest in, and the increased importance of, corporate governance best 
practice is perhaps no surprise in light of the international corporate scandals 
(Adelphia, Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat, HealthSouth, Tyco, Lehman, Anglo Irish 
Bank etc.) that dogged the end of the stock market boom and the credit crunch since 
the turn of the century.  Regulators and governance advocates have argued that the 
absence of quality in financial reporting and the precipitous share price falls of these 
companies were due in large part to poor corporate governance.  The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (2002) and the Combined Code (2003; 2006) were introduced in the US and UK, 
respectively, in direct response to these corporate scandals to strengthen corporate 
governance regulation and in an attempt to ensure the efficient operation of a 
corporation on the behalf of its stakeholders.  These regulations primarily focus on 
the board of directors, their decision making ability, and their role in reviewing and 
evaluating the performance of management in running the firm.   
 
2.2.1  Corporate Governance Characteristics 
 
Since the seminal work of Fama and Jensen (1983) where they contended that 
boards play an important role in monitoring managerial actions, corporate governance 
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research has increasingly focused on the importance of the corporate board.3 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) believe monitoring by the board of directors is one of 
several institutions that have developed in modern organisations to resolve the agency 
problem between top management and shareholders.  A number of UK reports (The 
Cadbury Report, 1992; The Combined Code on Corporate Governance4) have 
focused attention on board structure because firms have the opportunity to influence 
and enhance them, whereas firms cannot influence the external market of corporate 
control directly.  The fact that the corporate board will play an important role in this 
process and will vary in their incentives to monitor on behalf of shareholders is a 
central tenet of agency theory.  John and Senbet’s (1998) survey of the empirical 
literature concludes that board directors are a central corporate governance 
mechanism.   
 
The corporate board is comprised of individuals drawn from top management and 
non-executive directors.  The board of directors represents the shareholders’ interest 
and it is the board’s role to review and evaluate the performance of management in 
running the firm.  The board is ultimately responsible for ensuring that shareholder 
wealth is maximized and agency problems are minimized.  As such, the corporate 
board is the first line of defence against incompetent management (Schellenger & 
Wood, 2001).   
 
                                                 
3 Sloan (2001) and Bushman and Smith (2001) provide an extensive review of corporate governance 
and financial information. 
4 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) in the UK is derived from a review of the role 
and effectiveness of non-executive directors (Higgs, 2003) a review of audit committees (Smith, 
2003).  It supersedes and replaces the Combined Code issued by the Hampel Committee on Corporate 
Governance in June 1998.   
 
 
 
 
 
 - 20 - 
 
 
One aspect of board composition that is a focus of academic research is whether 
directors are employees of the firm (affiliated, inside or executive directors) or 
outsiders (non-affiliated or non-executive directors, aka NEDs).  Non-executive 
directors are seen as “professional referees”, there to ensure that competition among 
insiders stimulates actions consistent with shareholder wealth maximisation (Fama, 
1980).  A higher number of outside members on the board increases the likelihood 
that the quality of financial information will be monitored more effectively (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Vafeas, 2000; 2005).  Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) demonstrate 
that the market reaction to the adoption of a poison pill is positive when non-
executive directors form the majority of the board, but is significantly negative when 
non-executive directors are in the minority. 
 
Director independence is another important attribute of the corporate board in the 
literature.  Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) indicate that outside directors are 
particularly valuable in situations where the firm is troubled since, at such times, their 
independence enables them to assess objectively the performance of executives and 
make changes where appropriate.  That the context in which governance operates is 
important can be seen in the extant literature where boards with greater representation 
of non-affiliated and independent directors provide beneficial monitoring and 
advisory functions to firm shareholders in circumstances that occur infrequently 
(Brickley & James, 1987; Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; 
Weisbach 1988).  Cotter, Shivdasani and Jenner (1997) report that target shareholder 
gains are about 20% higher in tender offers when the board has a majority of 
independent outside directors.  Studies examining management buyouts (e.g. Lee, 
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Rosenstein, Rangan & Davidson, 1992) and tender offers for bidders (e.g. Byrd & 
Hickman, 1992) have shown that shareholders benefit when the board is independent.   
 
Another important aspect of the composition of the corporate board is whether the 
roles of CEO and Chairman are separated.  It is posited that for the board to be 
effective, it is important to separate the roles of CEO and Chairman (Jensen, 1993).  
Agency theory argues that without the direction of an independent leader it is much 
more difficult for the board to perform its critical functions (Brickley et al., 1994; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Worrell, Nemec & Davidson, 1997).  For this reason, the 
Combined Code recommends that, in addition to the separation of the roles, that the 
Chairman should also be an independent NED in order to minimise the possible 
abuse of CEO power.  For example, Goyal and Park (2002) find that the sensitivity of 
CEO turnover to performance is lower when the same individual is both CEO and 
chairman.  Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) argue that separating the roles of CEO 
and Chairman, also involves potential costs, insofar as, for some firms, CEO/Chair 
duality may be an efficient outcome.  They argue that CEOs have specialized 
knowledge regarding the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the firm which 
is valuable to the role of Chair.  Thus, they conclude, the separation of the CEO and 
Chairman titles necessitates the costly and generally incomplete transfer of critical 
information between the CEO and Chair.  But the empirical evidence generally 
suggests that the bifurcation of the CEO and Chair roles is the better option. 
 
The board’s size also influences its ability to function effectively.  Smaller boards 
have generally been considered more effective in decision-making.  Alexander, 
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Fennell and Halpern (1993) found that CEOs in organisations with large boards tend 
to use their power to entrench themselves whereas smaller, administratively focused, 
boards maintained their power by frequently replacing the CEO.  John and Senbet 
(1998), Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) also suggest that large boards 
may be less effective than small boards at monitoring managerial activity.  This 
argument is supported by Yermack (1996) and Vafeas (2000).  This is due to the 
combination of communication difficulties (referred to as process costs by Jensen) 
and the possibility of some directors free-riding (referred to as coalition costs by 
Jensen) facilitating a CEO’s dominance of the board (Eisenberg, Sundgren & Wells, 
1998).  To promote better decision-making, governance codes often specify that the 
board should not be too large.  The Combined Code favours smaller boards stating, 
“the board should not be so large as to be unwieldy”.  However, very small boards 
can also be a problem.  The Combined Code recommends that even small companies 
should have at least two independent non-executive directors.  Clearly, one executive 
director is not sufficient so we may infer that boards of directors with less than four 
members are sub-optimal.   
 
Although Li and Wearing (2003) observe that “the absence of gender issues is one of the 
noteworthy weaknesses in the corporate governance debate”, the gender diversity of the 
corporate board has become a high profile issue in recent years.  In the UK the updated 
Combined Code (2010) states that members should be appointed to boards with due 
regard to diversity, “including gender diversity”.  The recently completed Davies 
Report (2011) highlighted the current gender gap on UK boards but stopped short of 
recommending quotas.  Norway, Spain and France have introduced gender quotas 
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while the EU recently abandoned plans to introduce a quota system and is likely to 
recommend that where candidates are equally qualified, the underrepresented sex is 
favoured.  Gender diversity at board level taps into a greater talent pool, increases 
creativity and innovation and can bring additional perspectives to board decision 
making i.e. resource dependence theory (Tricker, 1984).  Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
argue that because they do not belong to the “old boys club”, female directors more 
closely correspond to the concept of the independent director emphasized in theory.  
However, it is argued that increased gender diversity may also adversely affect 
decision making at board level if the appointment of women directors is motivated by 
societal pressure i.e. if women are appointed as “tokens” rather than for their intrinsic 
business skills (Carter, Simkins & Simpson, 2003).  Thus, it is possible (as with non-
executive and independent directors) that gender diversity improves monitoring only 
when additional board monitoring is necessary such that mandating gender quotas in 
the boardroom could harm already well-governed firms. 
 
Ownership structure is another important aspect of corporate governance that has 
been investigated in the literature.  Jensen (1993) contends that “many problems arise 
from the fact that neither managers nor non-manager board members typically own 
substantial fractions of their firm’s equity” (p. 864); Fama and Jensen (1983) further 
propose that when there is diffusion in ownership, the potential for conflicts between 
the principal and the agent is greater.  When insider ownership is high, management 
face less pressure to signal firm value to the capital markets and focus on long term 
value creation over short term earnings (Jensen, 1986; Klassen, 1997) such that it can 
be argued that opportunistic managerial behaviour decreases monotonically 
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(Mulgrew & Forker, 2006).  Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995) provide evidence 
supporting agency theory when they find that the extent of shareholding by 
management is positively associated with the amount of information given about 
earnings5.  On the other hand, it is argued that excessive management ownership can 
also be counter-productive because management could become entrenched.  Stultz 
(1988) proposes that the likelihood of successful takeovers is reduced as management 
ownership increases, due to the high premium being asked by management who hold 
substantial shares.  This contention is found in entrenchment theory (Weston, 1979; 
Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; McConnell & Servaes, 1990) where the relationship 
between inside ownership by officers and directors and firm value is not linear across 
all ownership levels and that, in certain situations, managerial ownership serves to 
entrench management allowing them to extract larger private benefits at the expense 
of outside investors.   
 
Balotti and Elson (2000) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that equity 
ownership by outside directors is also important for the effective monitoring.  Jensen 
(1993) contends that “encouraging outside board members to hold substantial equity 
interests would provide a better incentive” (p. 864) for them to monitor management.  
Empirical evidence of the impact of outsider director ownership is given by Farrell 
and Whidbee’s (2000) sample of forced CEO turnovers, in which directors are more 
effective monitors if they are independent and aligned with owners through equity.   
 
                                                 
5 Although, confusingly, Warfield et al. (1995) label shareholdings by management as the sum of the 
shareholdings of both insiders and outsiders. 
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The concentration of outside ownership is also important (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985).  
The convergence of interest hypothesis and the efficient monitoring hypotheses predict 
that outside block holders will actively monitor the firm’s management (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986; Pound, 1988; Huddart, 1993; Maug, 1998; Noe, 2002; McConnell & 
Servaes, 1990; Admati, Pfleiderer & Zechner, 1994; Pagano & Röell, 1998).  These 
studies argue that if large blocks of equity are held by a few large shareholders, then 
agency costs may be reduced.  This is because large shareholders are expected to 
have greater incentives to monitor management as their wealth is tied to the firm’s 
financial performance.   
 
2.2.2  The Endogeneity Problem  
 
The previous section highlighted the effectiveness of various characteristics of 
the internal governance structure in a variety of situations.  The conflict between 
principals and agents can include a motivation for management to sustain an 
information advantage over owners and to obfuscate the true financial performance of 
the company in its financial report.  Should any manager be tempted to manipulate 
financial information for personal reward or to disguise performance for any other 
reason, their ability to do so will be determined, to some extent, by the standard of the 
company’s corporate governance structures.  Therefore a natural extension of prior 
research is to address the quality of a firm’s performance contingent on the operation 
of specific corporate governance mechanisms.  
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While the literature linking corporate governance and accounting based performance 
measures is extensive (Pearce & Zahra, 1991; Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Carter et al., 
2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; Bøhren & Strøm, 2005), the consensus view is that much 
of the literature concerning the relationship between the two is riven with 
endogeneity, i.e. does corporate governance influence firm performance or does firm 
performance influence corporate governance?  For instance, in their study of whether 
corporate governance influences firm performance (i.e. the stock market reaction to 
the announcement of female additions to the boards of Fortune 500 companies), 
Farrell and Hersch (2005) note that if women are scarce commodities at board level, 
they may choose to serve on the boards of better performing firms such that 
performance may influence governance, i.e. the two variables are endogenously defined.  
Notwithstanding that the endogeneity problem in the corporate governance literature is a 
real and serious one (Brown, Beekes & Verhoeven, 2011), most studies merely mention 
the possibility of endogeneity6.  
 
The results from research that examines the influence of corporate governance on 
firm performance while specifically considering the endogeneity of the relationship 
are mixed.  For instance, there is no conclusive evidence that a more independent 
board leads to better firm performance (Bhagat and Black, 2002; Dahya and 
McConnell, 2007; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Fu and Yu, 2010).  Wintoki et al. (2010) 
show that board structure is dynamically endogenous, with current board structure 
                                                 
6 Brown et al. (2011) comment that any study that unreasonably ignores the possibility of endogeneity 
while making a causal argument that (say) better corporate governance leads to better firm 
performance is, at the very least, incomplete.  They also note that editors of leading journals now 
expect corporate governance researchers to identify and to formally address any suspected endogeneity 
problems inherent in their research questions. 
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strongly related to past performance but (controlling for simultaneity) find no causal 
relationship between board structure and current firm performance.  In a simultaneous 
equation framework, Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008) report that the positive 
association between firm performance and board composition runs in one direction 
only: from board independence to firm performance, arguing that a dominant 
shareholder can increase firm value by appointing an independent board.   
 
Baliga, Moyer and Rao (1996) find evidence that the market is indifferent to the firm’s 
CEO/Chair duality status, i.e. there is no significant cumulative average excess return 
around the announcement day, while Carapeto, Lasfer and Machera (2005) report that 
positive (negative) abnormal accruals greet the decision to separate (combine) the roles 
in the UK. The evidence suggests that firms endogenously choose their leadership 
structure as part of broader firm characteristics and ownership structure decisions 
(Bhagat & Black, 2002; Chen, Lin & Yi, 2008; Iyengar & Zampelli, 2009). 
 
Accounting for the possibility of endogeneity, there also appears to be no causal 
relationship between insider ownership and firm performance (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; 
Loderer & Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Bhagat & Black, 
2002; Coles, Lemon & Meschke, 2007; McConnell et al., 2008).  Indeed, Loderer and 
Martin (1997) find that when the endogeneity problem is taken into consideration, a 
previously observed positive causal relationship between governance (insider 
ownership) and performance reverses, i.e. that it is the improved firm performance that 
affects insider ownership rather than vice versa.  Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and 
Coles et al. (2007) report similar results.  Avoiding the endogeneity problem altogether, 
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McConnell et al. (2008) measure changes in firm performance around the 
announcement of purchases of shares by insiders and report a significant abnormal 
return consistent with a causal interpretation of the impact of governance (insider 
ownership) on firm performance.   
 
The research shows that outside block holders are also important with institutional 
investors being more likely to play a governance role (Khan, 2006).  Brickley, Lease 
and Smith (1988) report institutional shareholders vote more actively on anti-takeover 
amendments than other shareholders and more actively oppose proposals that seem 
harmful to shareholders.  Chen, Harford and Li (2007) find that concentrated holdings 
by long-term institutions are related to better post-merger firm performance and that 
their presence makes the withdrawal of bad bids more likely.  Klein and Zur (2009), 
Boyson and Mooradian (2007), Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas (2008) and 
Greenwood and Schor (2009) all argue for the effectiveness of the monitoring role 
played by hedge funds.  Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler (1998) find that the 
performance of a firm improves following an acquisition of a block of shares by an 
activist investor, i.e. activism appears to pay off. 
 
2.3 Corporate Governance in Crisis Situations 
 
Kosnik (1987) argues that the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms is better gauged when a firm is facing a crisis such that a firm’s non-
adherence to best or common corporate governance practice is likely to come in to 
sharper focus when the firm is in trouble.  The logic is that the crisis event 
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destabilizes the corporate governance equilibrium which provides an impetus to 
change (improve) corporate governance mechanisms as firms dynamically learn and 
move toward their optimal governance structure (Larcker, Richardson and Tuna, 
2007).   
 
This study is primarily focused on the influence of extreme firm underperformance 
(the reporting on an initial loss) on corporate governance, i.e. the change in corporate 
governance in response to the reporting of the initial loss.  A problem for governance 
change studies like this one is that the board of the average firm is not revamped very 
frequently meaning that corporate governance is inherently sticky.  It is also worth 
noting that even though corporate governance changes are discretionary, they 
typically are taken against a backdrop of best practice recommended by governance 
codes.  Cicero et al. (2010) present evidence that US firms pursue target board 
structures.  Therefore, for established firms, the board’s structure and membership 
can be sticky around uniform levels (Beasley et al., 2010).  Notwithstanding the 
potential of this stickiness to dampen the corporate governance changes under 
investigation, it is likely that the corporate governance equilibrium at shocked firms 
with a lower standard of ex-ante corporate governance i) is more likely to destabilise, 
and ii) that these firms will be further away from their optimal corporate governance 
to begin with and so will have more room to exhibit change in response to the shock.   
 
It is also not obvious that every revelation of trouble should be followed by 
governance changes — firms inclined to change their corporate governance 
mechanisms will do so having due regard for the cost of such changes (Agrawal, 
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Jaffe & Karpoff, 1999).  The authors investigate the relationship between fraud 
detection and subsequent director turnover and fail to find one.  They argue that it can 
be extremely costly for a firm to design and implement an internal control mechanism 
to replace a board member which might explain why, even when a governance 
change might be warranted, it might not happen (i.e. help explain why governance is 
sticky).  Fich and Shivdasani (2007) also find no association between the revelation 
of fraud and board of director turnover.  There is evidence that when firms are in 
financial stress corporate governance changes (improves) in response.  For instance, 
Farber (2005) examines how corporate governance changes in response to an 
investigation by the SEC (and so is focused on financial rather than general fraud), to 
test whether the shock event precipitates a change in a range of corporate governance 
metrics.  Farber (2005) finds that prior to the announcement of the SEC investigation, 
fraud firms exhibited weakness in the proportion of outside directors on the board and 
that at the end of the test period fraud firms were indistinguishable from a matched 
control sample in this variable.  This indicates that in response to a shock event, fraud 
firms wish to report their financial information more credibly and improve their 
governance mechanisms in attempt to do so.  Srinivasan (2005) finds that outside 
directors experience substantial turnover on the boards of firms that restate earnings.  
Gilson (1989) finds that director turnover in firms that are also financially distressed 
exceeds turnover in non-distressed entities almost by a factor of three.  Johnstone et 
al. (2011) examine changes in corporate governance that stem from the revelation of 
internal control material weaknesses (ICMW).  It is one of the provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that firms and their auditors must report on the presence of 
ICMWs.  Johnstone et al. (2011) document a positive association between the 
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disclosure of ICMWs and the subsequent turnover of members of the boards of 
directors.  Of particular relevance to the current study is that one of their control 
variables (the reporting of a loss) is positively associated with the incidence of 
ICMWs. 
 
A potential reason for the lack of findings by Agrawal et al. (1999) and Fich and 
Shivdasani (2007) is that not all shock events are the same, i.e. some are worse than 
others and the degree to which the shock is relatively bad or good can have a 
conditioning impact on the results.  The difference in the significance of the results 
for general fraud studies (e.g. Fich & Shivdasani, 2007) versus financial fraud studies 
(e.g. Farber, 2005) is an example.  Given the discussion about the influence of 
corporate governance in the previous section, the relative quality of governance prior 
to the shock could be used to determine, albeit indirectly, the severity of the shock 
(and so, useful in that role as a conditioning variable).   
 
Alternatively it may be possible in some circumstances to determine the severity of 
the shock directly.  For instance, accounting restatements occur due to errors; some 
may be designed to mislead users of financial statements, others not — Hennes et al. 
(2008) show that the negative market response to restatements of error is significantly 
lower than to restatements of irregularity.  In other words the severity of the shock 
has a conditioning impact on the market’s response to that shock: the more severe the 
shock, the bigger the market decline.  Another example of the conditioning impact of 
the severity of the shock is whether the company voluntarily acknowledges its error 
and prompts a restatement or whether it is the auditor which flags the problem (Desai 
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et al., 2006).  The former is viewed as less severe because, although late, the 
admission is made voluntarily; Desai et al. (2006) document that auditor-prompted 
restatements are associated with the most negative announcement-period returns.  
Another method would be to rank the shock (restatements in this case) by size to 
determine whether it is relatively good (small restatement) or bad (large restatement); 
Srinivasan (2005) finds evidence that the likelihood of director turnover is linked to 
the severity of the misstatement.   
 
Both Hennes et al. (2008) and Desai et al. (2006) reference the market’s response to 
shock events such that it can be extrapolated that the market’s interpretation of the 
shock is itself useful to assess the relative severity of the shock (and so, useful in that 
role as a conditioning variable).  If the shock is accompanied by a large decline in 
firm value, then it may benefit the firm to affect a change in corporate governance 
(Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985).  In such circumstances, it may be optimal to effect a 
visible corporate governance change to restore investors’ faith in the firm and try to 
recover the firm’s reputation. 
 
2.4 An Initial Loss as a Potential Crisis Situation 
 
What constitutes a crisis, troubled or shocked situation is an open question.  
The literature previously discussed includes earnings restatements, investigations of 
fraud, SEC investigations (financial fraud), and the reporting of ICMWs as valid 
examples.  What the literature has not considered to date is potential crisis situations 
of which reporting an initial loss (i.e. a loss following years of consecutive profits) is 
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an example.  An initial loss is obviously not as egregious an example of a crisis 
situation as those mentioned above, and so are encountered much more often than 
such extremes.  As such, the prevalence of initial losses, their role as potential (as 
opposed to immediately obvious) crisis situations and the more nuanced response that 
this potential will precipitate for initial loss firms represents an obvious gaps in the 
literature.  
 
A large body of research demonstrates that accounting numbers and, in particular, 
earnings have information content.  Yet, earnings appear to explain only a small 
fraction of the total variation in returns as measured by the earnings response 
coefficient (ERC) (Bernard, 1989; Lev, 1989).  An explanation for the observed weak 
return-earnings relation is that the earnings contain transitory components that are 
either value-irrelevant or should have only a limited valuation impact (see Givoly & 
Hayn, 1993; Ramesh & Thiagarajan, 1993; Ramakrishnan & Thomas, 1998).  Hayn 
(1995) posits that losses should not be treated in the same way as profits for valuation 
purposes because losses are likely to be considered temporary since shareholders can 
liquidate the firm rather than continue to suffer losses whereas firms perpetuating in 
profits pose no such problems.  Indeed, Hayn (1995) finds that excluding loss cases 
results in almost a tripling of both the one-year earnings-response coefficient and the 
explanatory power of annual earnings with respect to contemporaneous returns.  In 
contrast, when only loss cases are considered, the magnitude of the reported losses 
does not appear to be correlated at all with contemporaneous price movements.  
Similarly, as part of their study, Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) demonstrate the 
non-linearity in the return-earnings relation by excluding observations dominated by 
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transitory earnings components (i.e. loss cases) from their sample; having done so, 
the average ERC nearly doubled.   
 
While Hayn (1995) reports no relation between earnings and contemporaneous price 
movements for loss firms, Jan and Ou (1995) report the most puzzling results at 
extreme negative earnings — a reliably negative price-earnings relation for loss firms 
implying that the more negative a firm’s earnings, the higher is its share price.  
Collins et al. (1999) investigate this negative coefficient on earnings in the simple 
earnings capitalization model for loss firms.  They argue that the reason for this 
puzzling result is that the simple earnings capitalization model is mis-specified for 
loss firms, i.e. the observed negative price-earnings relationship at extreme negative 
earnings is caused by the omission of the book value of equity as an explanatory 
variable.  Collins et al. (1999) find that when the simple earnings capitalisation model 
is augmented with book value of equity, any observed statistically significant 
negative earnings coefficient for loss firms becomes either reliably positive or not 
significantly different from zero in each year of their sample, i.e. the misspecification 
of the simple earnings capitalisation model due to the omission of book value causes 
a negative bias on the earnings coefficient for loss firms.  Hayn (1995) argues that 
book value represents the abandonment option — if losses are allowed to perpetuate 
the shareholders of the company will exercise their put option to liquidate the firm at 
book value.    
 
In addition to their implications for valuation detailed above, an initial loss also 
introduces the prospect of financial distress such that an initial loss has the potential 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 35 - 
 
 
to lead to crisis and ultimately, failure.  That is, unlike the disclosure of financial 
fraud of earnings manipulation, not all losses are inherently and equally bad news.  A 
firm reporting a small loss is unlikely to be managing earnings (i.e. it is likely the 
firm could have avoided or deferred the loss by managing earnings upward but chose 
not to do so) — but reporting an initial loss can represent a significant crossroads 
because losses cannot be allowed to perpetuate.  The initial loss will either be 
transitory and the firm will return to profitability (i.e. and so in hindsight the initial 
loss represented a modest crisis situation), or be permanent and the firm will fail (the 
ultimate crisis situation beyond which changes are unobservable).  In other words, 
once again, the conditioning impact of the severity of the crisis needs to be 
considered, and especially so for losses given their more subtle role as a potential 
crisis situation. 
 
Even if losses are not expected to perpetuate, they are indicative of a rate of return 
that is clearly below that required by investors. The signal of unambiguous 
underperformance provided by losses will not be tolerated by investors over a 
prolonged period and requires to be addressed at the outset, i.e. at the initial loss.  The 
inference is that due to, inter alia, the valuation implication of losses and the 
potential crisis that their reporting implies, firms do not strategically target an initial 
loss as a desirable reporting event.  Indeed, the evidence in the next section regarding 
earnings management around the zero benchmark suggests that the opposite is the 
case.  Simply put, an initial loss event is a shock (perhaps modest, perhaps critical but 
unequivocally troubled relative to matched firms continuing in profits) which cannot 
perpetuate and so something has to change.  Given the focus of this study, the 
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changes at issue are those relating to corporate governance and earnings management 
behaviour. 
 
2.5  Losses and Earnings Management 
 
Regulators and investors are increasingly concerned about firms managing 
earnings to meet benchmarks (Niemeier, 2001; Turner, 2001).  These concerns make 
earnings management around earnings benchmarks (the loss avoidance benchmark 
being the primary focus of this study) both an interesting and important area of 
research.   
 
Hayn (1995) first introduced the concept of analysing the pooled, cross-sectional 
distribution of reported earnings around undesirable outcomes to test for earnings 
management behaviour where earnings management is assessed using accounting-
based methods to estimate abnormal accruals.  The approach hypothesizes that 
corporate managers have incentives to avoid, inter alia, reporting losses (see Ronen 
& Yaari, 2010 for an in depth discussion) and relies exclusively on observing 
discontinuities in the distribution of reported earnings around this (zero) threshold to 
detect earnings management (Degeorge et al., 1999).  The initial explanation is based 
on the conjecture that unmanaged earnings should have a normal distribution such 
that unusually low frequencies of small losses and unusually high frequencies of 
small positive income imply that firms are, on average, managing earnings to avoid 
reporting a loss (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Holland & Ramsay, 2003).  Similar 
results were reported in Yang and Mulcahy (2013) for Chinese firms. 
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Ayers et al. (2006) find that forward looking discretionary accruals are higher for 
firms just above the loss-avoidance benchmark than for firms just below.  Using an 
alternative test period, Dechow et al. (2003) test the same relationship but do not find 
any significant difference.  Hansen (2010) finds that the lack of evidence in Dechow 
et al. (2003) is due to the impact of alternative benchmark goals (earnings 
improvement and/or analyst forecast) and finds that after controlling for the 
alternative benchmarks, firms with small profits have significantly higher abnormal 
accruals.  A number of studies provide both direct and indirect evidence that 
managers engage in income increasing behaviour to avoid losses (Bhattacharya, 
Black, Christensen & Larson, 2003; Ayers et al., 2006; Beaver, McNichols & Nelson, 
2007; Dechow et al., 2003; Durtschi & Easton, 2005).  On the other hand, Leuz et al. 
(2003) posit that while managers have incentives to avoid reporting losses of any 
magnitude, they often have limited discretion and may not be able to report profits in 
the presence of large losses and so argue that small losses, on the other hand, are 
more likely to be driven by managers’ accounting discretion.  To date there has been 
no direct examination of earnings quality of loss firms in the year before the initial 
loss event (i.e. when the avoided loss, which the firm ultimately only succeeded in 
deferring, becomes unavoidable) — this represents another gap in the literature that 
this study attempts to fill.  Following on from the results from the discontinuity 
studies it is likely that firms reporting an initial loss will display evidence of 
managing earnings upward (via elevated accruals) in the year prior to the loss such 
that these abnormal accruals might be used to predict the likelihood of a loss.  Using 
abnormal accruals in predictive loss avoidance/reporting models in this manner to 
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directly test the results implied by discontinuity studies represents another gap in the 
literature.   
 
The literature is also silent on the change in abnormal accruals (from whatever pre-
period level) induced by the reporting of the initial loss.  It is likely that some initial 
loss firms (i.e. the loss acceptors) will exhibit no change in abnormal accruals 
because, by making the decision to report a loss in a timely fashion (i.e. they have not 
attempted to avoid or to defer it), these firms are less likely to be managing earnings 
in the first place.  Other initial loss firms may change abnormal accruals behaviour in 
response to the initial loss (i.e. to unwind those accruals arising from their ultimately 
vain attempt to avoid the loss), and some others still may change abnormal accruals 
significantly as part of a ‘big bath’, i.e. will make the most of a bad situation by 
making things a little worse (Chai & Tung, 2002).  In other words the exacerbating 
impact of the severity of the loss event needs to be considered.   A big bath is defined 
as “the attempt to increase reported earnings in subsequent periods by charging items 
that may have a negative future impact to expenses in the current period, further 
worsening current period business results in an accounting period in which results are 
bad” (Itoh 2007, p.207).  A big bath may be taken, for example, “during the periods 
of organizational stress or reorganization” or when “a firm must report a loss” (Scott, 
2009, p.405).  For this study the hypothesis predicts income-decreasing earnings 
management in the loss year in excess of that required to just unwind the higher prior 
year accruals built up in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to avoid the loss.  
Regardless of the prevalence of firms using earnings management to lower reported 
profit for various reasons (i.e. Degeorge et al., 1999; Healy, 1985; Gaver, Gaver & 
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Austin, 1995; and Holthausen, Larcker & Sloan, 1995), the literature implies that loss 
acceptors are the exception such that an analysis of changes in abnormal accruals in 
response to an initial loss event to test this hypothesis is warranted to fill the research 
gap.   
 
2.6  Corporate Governance and Earnings Management   
 
As discussed in section 2.2, a fundamental objective of governance research in 
accounting is to provide evidence on the extent to which information provided by 
financial accounting systems mitigate agency problems arising from the separation of 
ownership from control.  Notwithstanding the endogeneity problem sometimes 
embedded in such studies, it is argued that (to the extent that weaker corporate 
governance structures yield greater information asymmetry between shareholders and 
the firm and accounting information is useful in removing this asymmetry) the quality 
of the earnings at well governed firms should be higher, i.e. earnings management 
should be lower than at those that are poorly governed.   
 
Peasnell et al. (2005) find that that percentage of NEDs on the boards of UK firms 
mitigates income increasing earnings management; Klein (2002) finds a similar negative 
relation between board independence and abnormal accruals in the US and Liu and 
Lu (2007) and Lo, Wong and Firth (2010) suggest that independent boards decrease 
earnings management of Chinese companies.  Dechow et al. (1996) find that firms 
subject to SEC's enforcement actions for earnings manipulation are more likely to 
have boards of directors dominated by insiders, implying that the two are related.   
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If CEO/Chair duality impedes effective monitoring then it would be associated with 
greater use of discretionary accruals.  Indeed, Dechow et al. (1996) provide evidence 
that firms engaging in earnings management are more likely to have a CEO who is also 
the Chair as do Sarkar, Sarkar and Sen (2008) in their study of Indian firms.  Prencipe 
and Bar-Yosef (2011) indicate that a dual CEO/Chair increases the size of abnormal 
accruals and that the positive relation between CEO duality and earnings management is 
worse when the dual CEO/Chair is also a member of a controlling family (Prencipe & 
Bar-Yosef, 2011) or the founder of the company (Mulgrew & Forker, 2006).   
 
Bernig and Frick (2010) contend that small boards enhance monitoring such that they 
are also associated with lower levels of earnings management. Xie, Davidson and 
DaDalt (2003) also find a negative relation between the level of abnormal accruals 
and board size which is consistent with the results from Larcker et al. (2007) which 
show a negative association between absolute accruals and board size.  Dimitropoulos 
and Asteriou (2010) find no evidence of board size affecting earnings quality among 
Greek firms.  Krishnan and Parsons (2006) find that earnings quality is positively 
associated with gender diversity in senior management.  Bernig and Frick (2010) also 
find that female board members contribute to good governance inducing less earnings 
management.   
 
Warfield et al. (1995) find that discretionary accounting accruals, are systematically 
(inversely) related to managerial ownership.  Similarly, Klein (2002) finds that 
earnings management is negatively related to CEO ownership.  Gul, Chen and Tsui 
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(2003) find similar evidence that accruals are used to opportunistically manage 
earnings in Australia when managerial ownership is low.  Sánchez-Ballesta and 
García-Meca (2007) find that there is less earnings management (and earnings are 
more informative) at low levels of insider ownership.  Evidence from Jiraporn and 
DaDalt (2009) and Wang (2006) show an inverse relationship between insider 
ownership and earnings management at founding-family-controlled firms because 
these do not face the same pressures to meet targets as other firms.  On the other 
hand, Rajgopal, Venkatachalam and Jiambalvo (2002) show no significant relation 
between discretionary accruals and managerial ownership in their US study.  
Similarly, Cornett, McNutt and Tehranian (2009), Cheng and Warfield (2005), 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Houmes and Skantz (2010) provide evidence 
that the use of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings is more 
pronounced at firms where the CEO’s potential total compensation is more closely 
tied to the value of share and option holdings (i.e. discretionary accruals are 
positively related to managerial ownership).   
 
Dechow et al. (1996) find that the existence of substantial outside block holders leads 
to closer scrutiny of management and this implies lesser opportunity for accruals 
management and earnings manipulation.  Rajgopal et al. (2002) also shows that the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals declines with institutional ownership since 
institutional owners are better informed than individual investors and this reduces the 
perceived benefit of managing accruals.  Chung, Firth and Kim (2002) report similar 
results.  Charitou, Lambertides and Trigeorgis (2007) find that new managers of 
financially distressed US firms are less likely to use income-decreasing earnings 
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management to ‘take a bath’ where the firm has institutional investors.  Kim and Yi 
(2006) and Sarkar et al. (2008) find evidence of greater earnings management in 
firms with a controlling shareholder in their studies of Korea and India, respectively.  
Yeo, Tan, Ho and Chen (2002) find that when external unrelated blockholding is 
high, regardless of the level of managerial ownership, the results indicate fewer 
opportunities for earnings management.  
 
2.6.1  Corporate Governance Amalgamations 
 
The various individual governance variables detailed so far are manifestations 
of the underlying structure of corporate governance.  Some are substitutes and others 
are complements.  Using various corporate governance variables individually will not 
capture how they combine to form the overall corporate governance architecture of a 
company.  The use of several individual governance variables may also lead to the 
problem of multicollinearity when estimating empirical models.  Larcker et al. (2007) 
argue that there is not a well-developed theory for selecting the relevant governance 
characteristics to include in an empirical study.  For this reason several studies use 
governance indices (i.e. scores constructed from individual governance variables) 
rather than the individual governance variables themselves as a summary of a firm’s 
governance structure (Gompers, Ishii & Metriick, 2003; Sivaramakrishnan & Yu, 
2008; Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005;  Klapper & Love, 2004; Brown & Caylor, 2006; 
Shen & Chih, 2007; DeFond, Hann & Hu, 2005; Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein & 
Neal, 2006; Duh, Lee & Lin, 2009).    
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In an earnings management study, Carcello et al. (2006) use an index of governance 
quality developed by DeFond et al. (2005) to provide evidence of a significantly 
negative relationship between strong governance and absolute abnormal accruals.  Shen 
and Chih (2007) use an amalgamation corporate governance characteristics (which 
including director independence and dual CEO/Chair) and find a negative relationship 
between corporate governance and earnings management.  Sivaramakrishnan and Yu 
(2008) use the governance index developed by Gompers et al. (2003) to investigate, 
inter alia, whether accrual quality is affected by governance.  Their results suggest that 
firms with adequate governance have higher quality earnings and accruals than firms 
with weak governance.  Duh et al. (2009) use an equal weighted simple governance 
amalgamation of six governance attributes (including board size, independent 
directors, an indicator variable of inside ownership, institutional investors' 
shareholding and foreign institutional investors’ shareholding), and conclude that 
governance restrains earnings management using the reversal of impairment losses.  
Pergola and Joseph (2011) use a governance index similar to Brown and Caylor 
(2006) in their study of the relationship between board equity ownership and 
corporate governance on earnings quality.   
 
However, it can be argued that the use of a single indicator (or a simple index made 
up from single indicators) for a complex construct like corporate governance does not 
accurately reflect the underlying governance structure and, as a highly subjective 
construct, is associated with considerable measurement error (i.e., low reliability).  
Another approach is to use exploratory factor analysis to construct objective general 
governance variables to provide insights into the underlying structure of corporate 
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governance.  Factors are underlying constructs, not directly measured, that are 
influenced by responses on measured variables.  Larker et al. (2007) use a factor 
analysis to develop measures for the dimensions of corporate governance.  They find 
that both the absolute level of abnormal accruals and the likelihood of having an 
earnings restatement are positively related to ‘insider power’, an amalgamation which 
reflects the percentage of the board comprised of insiders; voting rights favouring 
insiders; and the percentage of the firm owned by executives as a group and by the top 
executive.   
 
2.7  Summary and Conclusions 
 
 This chapter outlines the extant literature that deals with loss reporting, 
corporate governance, and earnings management and explores the absence of a 
synthesizing literature between and among these areas resulting in significant 
research gaps to be tested. 
 
It starts with a focus on the principal agent problem arising from the separation of 
ownership and control.  The conflict can include a motivation for management to 
sustain an information advantage over owners and to obfuscate the true financial 
performance of the company in its financial report.  Shareholders have several 
mechanisms available to organise the structure of their company in a way that aligns 
the goals of management with their own and so constrain earnings management; these 
mechanisms represent the firm’s corporate governance structure.  Most governance 
studies use individual governance variables or simple governance constructs to 
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represent corporate governance.  The literature on the efficacy of broader corporate 
governance amalgamations is less developed.  A specific feature and contribution of 
this study is its utilisation of corporate governance amalgamations constructed from 
observable governance outcomes to capture underlying governance mechanisms.   
 
There is a plethora of evidence that well-structured governance mechanisms are 
associated with better decision making and lower earnings management.  Another 
observation from the extant literature that examines the relationship between 
corporate governance and accounting numbers is that the causality may not be in one 
direction only.  One of the best ways to formally address the endogeneity problem is 
to avoid it altogether by constructing the research model such that one of the 
variables is exogenous and so the causality can only be argued in one direction.  
Using an exogenous shock as a trigger or causal event is an example.  
 
There is evidence that financial fraud and earnings restatements induce improvements 
in corporate governance.  Despite the evidence that loss firms are ‘different’ (and so 
require supplemented valuation models) and that a reported loss represents a clear 
and unambiguous signal of underperformance, losses (and initial losses, in particular) 
have not been explored as a change agent.  It is a primary contention of this study that 
the reporting of an initial loss represents an example of a potential crisis situation that 
is likely to have significant implications for, inter alia, the corporate governance and 
earnings management behaviour around the initial loss event.  This unique potential 
status is either ignored entirely or accommodated but otherwise unexplored in studies 
where the focus in on ‘normal’ profitable firms.  Despite the prevalence of losses and 
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the breadth of both the corporate governance and earnings management literatures, 
the intersection of these literatures is almost totally unexplored.   
 
An initial loss represents a significant crossroads for any firm.  The firm will either 
return to profitability or fail but one thing is for sure, shareholders will not allow 
losses to perpetuate and so something has to change.  This study contends that the 
initial loss is likely to cause a firm’s corporate governance mechanisms to come into 
sharper focus and, notwithstanding that the inherent stickiness and uniformity could 
potentially confound the results, induce governance to unstick (improve).  There is no 
literature that specifically deals with initial losses as a potential crisis situation in this 
manner and so the analysis in this study is unique in that regard. 
 
This study also contributes to the extant literature that attempts to explain whether the 
kink in the distribution of earnings (i.e. Burgastahler & Dichev, 1997) provides 
evidence of earnings management (Ayers et al., 2006; Beaver et al., 2007; Dechow et 
al., 2003; Durtschi & Easton, 2005).  The loss avoidance benchmark is an example of 
once such kink in the distribution.  However, none of these studies examine the 
impact of initial losses that occur rather than are deferred/avoided (via earnings 
management) or exaggerated (via big baths).  That is, no study investigates an initial 
loss as a shock event around which to examine earnings management behaviour.  
Prior year abnormal accruals can be examined for evidence of earnings management 
and the response can be tested for evidence of big bath behaviour.  This research, 
with its industry- and size-matched sample deals with this research gap. 
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In addition, because losses, as potential crisis situations, are not universally 
egregious, the extent of any changes in response to the initial loss is likely to depend 
on other information contained in the loss, i.e. the firm’s ex-ante governance structure 
and/or the severity of the loss itself.  The conditioning of corporate governance and 
earnings management changes in response to the initial loss on corporate governance 
quality and/or the severity of the loss represents an additional contribution to the 
extant research.  The mitigating role played by corporate governance on the ability of 
prior year abnormal accruals to predict a loss is an additional layer of complexity that 
this study will examine to further synthesise the loss, governance and earnings 
management literatures. 
 
In short, there are significant research gaps in the corporate governance, earnings 
management and loss literatures which this study examines for the first time.  The 
literature review outlines several areas for study that will be formally detailed in 
Chapter 3 and tested in the empirical Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  The way the models in this 
study are set up, the research questions in each empirical chapter will be tackled 
taking full account of the endogeneity problem.  The analyses in the chapters to 
follow are also sure to compare the results for loss firms to those of a closely matched 
control (profit) sample in order to properly test the impact of the reporting of the 
initial loss event on corporate governance and earnings management behaviour in 
response to the event.  In this study corporate governance variables are constructed 
using exploratory factor analysis to maximise construct reliability and to minimise 
measurement error.  The quality of corporate governance and the severity of loss are 
also used throughout as conditioning variables to more closely analyse and test the 
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interaction between the synthesised corporate governance, earnings management and 
loss literatures. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
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3.1   Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is, with reference to the gaps in the loss, 
corporate governance and earnings management literatures identified in Chapter 2, to 
outline the research framework for the empirical analyses to be used in Chapters 4, 5 
and 6.  This chapter builds on the line of questioning which concluded Chapter 2 to 
develop the hypotheses used in the empirical chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this study, 
describes the data collection process, details the variable construction processes for 
both the corporate governance and earnings management measures used in this study 
before discussing the significant methodological issues pertaining to the empirical 
analysis of the data. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 details the hypotheses used to test 
the research questions analysed in this thesis. Section 3.3 summarises the estimation 
models, in general form, used to test the hypotheses.  Section 3.4 describes the data 
collection process for the loss and (matched) control samples and compares the 
samples for equivalence.  Section 3.5 explains the information collected from the 
annual reports of the loss and control samples, describes the variable construction 
process and briefly analyses the corporate governance variables used in this study.  
Section 3.6 describes and briefly analyses the other (accounting and market) variables 
used throughout the remainder of this study.  Section 3.7 details the main 
econometric method and the statistical tests used to test the significance of various 
coefficients.  Section 3.8 summarises and concludes. 
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3.2  Hypothesis Development 
 
Even though this thesis synthesises a number of research areas and includes a 
number of empirical analyses, the research objective is a cohesive one.  The 
fundamental objective is to analyse the impact of the reporting of an initial loss on the 
choices of loss firms in a variety of circumstances.  Cognisant that endogeneity can 
cause problems in applied corporate governance studies such this (Brown et al., 2011; 
Larker & Rusticus, 2010), the experimental method used throughout this study is 
carefully designed to properly and fully examine the causal relationship under 
investigation (Gerety & Lehn, 1997).  To isolate the impact of the reporting of an 
initial loss event on the choices made by loss firms, a matched (control) sample of 
non-loss firms is also collected — the criteria for the selection of the control sample 
is included later in this chapter.  This matched sample acts as a comparator against 
which the pre- and post-period corporate governance and earnings quality of initial 
loss firms and the changes therein can be compared.  More comprehensively, the 
matched sample facilitates a difference-in-difference research design which 
specifically isolates the impact of the loss event on the choices of initial loss firms 
conditional on the impact of other information (ex-ante corporate governance quality 
and the severity of loss are used in this study).  
 
Chapter 4 investigates whether the reporting of an initial loss induces corporate 
governance to change (corporate governance, largely, being the result of a managerial 
choice).  It addresses this question by examining the relationship between whether or 
not a company reports an initial loss and the change in corporate governance in 
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response to that loss.  This thesis uses several corporate governance variables and 
amalgamations throughout the study, the details and construction of which are 
included later in this chapter.  Corporate governance levels at various stages before 
and after the initial loss event are compared to assess the impact of the initial loss 
event and, in a multivariate difference-in-difference analysis, the changes in these 
corporate governance measures during the test period are analysed and compared to 
an industry- and size-matched control sample to isolate the impact of the initial loss 
event on corporate governance.  It was noted in Section 2.1 of the previous chapter 
that latent uniformity in corporate governance resulting from the promulgation of 
governance best practice codes (the Combined Code in this instance) as well as the 
inherent stickiness of corporate governance biases against finding significant results.  
In other words, if significant results are found for the average initial loss firm then 
they are doubly welcome.  Chapter 4 also examines the impact of other information 
sources on any changes in corporate governance.  Specifically, Chapter 4 tests 
whether the quality of corporate governance at initial loss firms has an impact on the 
extent of any corporate governance changes in response to the initial loss.  To avoid 
the prospect of endogeneity, it is the pre-period quality of corporate governance that 
is used to condition the model.   
 
The hypotheses tested in Chapter 4 then in null form are: 
 
H4.1:  there is no association between the reporting of an initial loss and 
changes in corporate governance. 
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H4.2:  corporate governance quality in the prior year has no effect on the 
association between the reporting of an initial loss and changes in 
corporate governance. 
 
The empirical analysis in chapter 5 investigates whether the reporting of an initial 
loss impacts on the earnings management behaviour (as represented by changes in 
abnormal accruals) in response to the initial loss event.  The extent of earnings 
management behaviour in the year before the loss (to avoid/defer the loss) and the 
tendency unwind those accruals to the extent that some firms may also exhibit big 
bath behaviour in the year of the loss are of particular interest.  Conscious that an 
initial loss represents a potential rather than an immediately obvious crisis situation 
like fraud (i.e. Farber, 2005) or an earnings restatement (i.e. Srinivasan, 2005), 
Chapter 5 also examines whether the severity of the reported initial loss (i.e. Hennes 
et al., 2004; Desai et al., 2006; Srinivasan, 2005) has a conditioning impact on the 
earnings management behaviour before and in response to the loss.  Finally, bearing 
in mind the evidence from distribution studies examined in section 2.4 of the previous 
chapter (i.e. Degeorge et al., 1999; Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Holland & Ramsay, 
2003; Yang & Mulcahy, 2013), Chapter 5 also analyses the ability of abnormal 
accruals to predict a loss.  The hypotheses tested in Chapter 5 in null form then are: 
 
H5.1:  there is no association between the reporting of an initial loss and 
changes in abnormal accruals. 
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H5.2:  the severity of the loss has no impact on the association between the 
reporting of a loss and changes in abnormal accruals. 
 
H5.3:  abnormal accruals are not useful in predicting the reporting of an initial 
loss. 
 
Chapter 6 combines elements of the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 by examining the 
mitigating role corporate governance plays on the earnings management behaviour 
(abnormal accruals) at initial loss firms.  The reasoning is that low quality corporate 
governance confers private control benefits to insiders at the expense of outsiders 
(Leuz et al., 2003).  The extraction of these private control benefits motivates insiders 
to engage in earnings management to obfuscate their actions such that there in inverse 
relation between corporate governance and earnings management.  For completeness, 
the conditioning role played by the severity of the initial loss on any changes in 
corporate governance in response to the reporting of the initial loss is also examined.  
Chapter 6 also includes an analysis of the combined moderating effect of corporate 
governance quality and the severity of loss on earnings management at initial loss 
firms.  Finally, Chapter 6 builds on the analysis in Chapter 5 on the ability of 
abnormal accruals to predict a loss examining the mediating role played by corporate 
governance in such situations.  The hypotheses tested in Chapter 6 then are: 
 
H6.1:  corporate governance has no effect on the association between the 
reporting of an initial loss and changes in abnormal accruals. 
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H6.2:  the severity of the initial loss has no effect on the association between 
the reporting of an initial loss and changes in corporate governance. 
 
H6.3:  corporate governance and the severity of the initial loss have, in 
combination, no effect on the association between the reporting of an 
initial loss and changes in abnormal accruals. 
 
H6.4:  corporate governance has no effect on the association between prior 
year signed abnormal accruals and loss avoidance. 
 
In sum the empirical chapters in this thesis synthesise the loss, corporate governance 
and earnings management accruals literature to comprehensively test the impact of 
initial losses on the corporate governance and earnings management decisions made 
by initial loss firms. The following section outlines, in general form, the estimation 
equations used to test these hypotheses.  
 
3.3    Estimation Equations 
 
Having outlined the research objective, research questions and hypotheses, 
this section presents and prepares estimation models for the analyses in chapters 4, 5 
and 6.  The equations are presented in a summarized manner such that the corporate 
governance variables used in this study are, for the time being, represented by the 
generic governance indicator, GOV.   
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The multivariate estimation equations in Chapter 4 derive from the following general 
form difference-in-difference equation used to test H4.1: 
 
∆𝐺𝑂𝑉 = 𝑓(𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡,∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) 
 
 
where  
𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 =  �1                        𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒0                 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 
 
and 𝛥𝐺𝑂𝑉 represents the change in corporate governance and ∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 represents 
the change in appropriate control variables during the test period.   
 
Given the lack of evidence regarding benchmark control variables to use for 
governance changes, return is included as a compound independent ∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 
variable in the model to provide context for the loss event across the test period.  That 
is, the initial loss event is but one (albeit salient) piece of information about the loss 
firm from a potentially much richer information environment about the company.  A 
company’s market return is therefore a variable that provides information regarding 
the market’s interpretation of all information about each firm (loss or control) such 
that particularly good/bad returns will reflect particularly good/bad information about 
that firm (the calculations of the return variable are detailed in Section 3.6.2 of this 
chapter).  Insofar as the market correctly prices this information for both loss and 
control firms from the same industry (i.e. the information is accurately reflected in 
returns) then the return variable controls for any/all confounding events from changes 
in the broader macro and regulatory environment.   
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Constructed thus, with minor adaptation, the model also facilitates the conditioning of 
the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 variable by the quality of ex-ante corporate governance (H4.2) and by the 
severity of the initial loss (H6.2).  A further analysis to test H4.2 conditions the loss 
event on prior period corporate governance quality to test whether all loss firms have 
the same corporate governance response to the initial loss event or whether ex-ante 
corporate governance itself has a mitigating role to play on any changes.   
 
The multivariate analyses in Chapter 5 examine two connected but different research 
questions. The first examines the difference in the changes in abnormal accruals 
across the test period between the loss and control firms in response to the initial loss.  
The estimation models used to test the changes in abnormal accruals during the test 
period derive from the following general form difference-in-difference equation 
(H5.1): 
 
∆𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 = 𝑓(𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡,∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) 
 
which examines the impact of the loss event on changes in abnormal accruals around 
the initial loss versus a matched control sample.  Constructed thus, with minor 
adaptation, the model also facilitates the conditioning of the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 variable by the 
severity of the initial loss (H5.2) and by the quality of ex-ante corporate governance 
(H6.1). 
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The second analysis examines the ability of prior year abnormal accruals to predict 
the reporting of an initial loss.  The estimation model for this final hypothesis (H5.3) 
is derived from the general form logit equation: 
 
𝑝(𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 = 1) = 𝑓(𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅,𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) 
 
The analysis in Chapter 6 combines the elements of the analyses in the previous two 
chapters.  Hypotheses 6.1 and 6.2 are analysed using the previously mentioned 
adaptations of the general form equations used in Chapters 5 and 4, respectively, 
where the model in Chapter 5 is conditioned by ex-ante governance quality to test H 
6.1 and the model in Chapter 4 is conditioned by the quality of the initial loss to test 
H6.2.  A combination analysis of the joint mitigating impact of corporate governance 
quality and the quality of the loss on the change in abnormal accruals (H6.3) is also 
conducted.  The estimation models used to test the changes in abnormal accruals 
during the test period derive from the following general form equation: 
 
∆𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 = 𝑓(𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡,𝐺𝑂𝑉,∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) 
 
The estimation model for the final hypothesis in Chapter 6 (H6.4) is derived from the 
general form logit equation: 
 
𝑝(𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 = 1) = 𝑓(𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅,𝐺𝑂𝑉,𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) 
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3.4    Data Collection and the Samples 
 
To test the hypotheses developed in section 3.2 using the general form 
estimation models outlined in section 3.3, two separate but matched data samples — 
an initial loss sample and a closely matched control (non-loss) sample — are 
collected for the empirical analyses in this study. 
 
3.4.1    The Initial Loss Sample 
 
All of those companies which reported a loss in the years 2004, 2005 and 
2006 are potential candidates for inclusion in the initial loss sample.  The analysis is 
restricted to firms reporting a loss up to 2006 to allow for a two year test period after 
the reporting of a loss in which to examine governance changes, i.e. up to the end of 
2008.  In the empirical analyses contained in this study, all the non-failed companies 
were taken from the DATASTREAM “live” list of quoted UK industrials firms; the 
DATASTREAM code for this list is UKQI.  To avoid survivorship bias this study 
also includes the failed companies taken from the DATASTREAM “dead” list; the 
DATASTREAM code for this list is DEADUK.  This yields a total of 730, 826 and 
841 candidates for each of 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively, and these are referred 
to as loss firms.  However, this study is only concerned with initial loss events.  To 
separate initial losses from the total loss sample collected above, it is necessary to 
define what separates an initial loss from a general loss.  For the purpose of this study 
an initial loss is one with at least two prior years of reported profit; this helps to 
isolate the impact of the initial loss as a change agent by avoiding any lagging impact 
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of previous losses a firm may have reported.  It is this two years of reported profit 
before the loss event that allows this study to define the initial loss event as a 
“shock”.   
 
The analysis in this thesis is concerned with, inter alia, corporate governance, so it is 
also important that all candidate companies be subject to the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance7.  Therefore all foreign companies whose primary stock 
exchange listing is abroad are excluded, with the exception of Irish firms because 
Ireland has adopted the Combined Code.  Banks, investment trusts, property 
companies and other financial institutions (i.e. all those companies with an industry 
classification benchmark (ICB) code of 8000) are also eliminated from the sample 
because these firms have specialised accounting measurement methods.  Corporate 
governance information was not available from 45 firms; typically this meant that 
annual reports were not available from any source.  All of these restrictions: no 
foreign firms whose primary listing is abroad, no financial firms, that a loss event be 
preceded by two profitable years, and that corporate governance information is 
available results in a total 40, 50 and 48 initial loss firms for 2004, 2005 and 2006, 
respectively (see Table 3.1), for a total loss sample of 138 companies.  In the two 
years following the reporting of a loss, 36 of these companies were acquired, 
liquidated or delisted resulting in the perusal of the 500 annual reports for corporate 
governance information for the loss panel.   
 
                                                 
7 The most recent update was published in June 2010 and is now called the UK Corporate Governance 
Code 
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Table 3.1  Selection of the Initial Loss Sample
Number of firms reporting a loss between 2004 and 2006 2,397     
Less:
Non-conforming loss firms* 2,142      
Duplicate firms 26           
Financial firms 10           
Firms with a foreign primary listing 36           
Firms with insufficient data/Other 45           
Final Sample 138        
* Non-conforming loss firms are those loss firms which did not report profits in each 
of the two years before the initial loss event.
 
Table 3.2 indicates that initial loss firms are widely distributed among industry 
classification, with some clustering in business support services, software, heavy 
construction and publishing. 
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Table 3.2  Distribution of Initial Loss Sample by Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) Codes
ICB ICB Number ICB ICB Number
Industry Subsector of Industry Subsector of
Code Code Industry Description Firms Code Code Industry Description Firms
2000 2713 Aerospace 1            1000 1773 Diamonds & Gemstones 1            
5000 5751 Airlines 1            2000 2727 Diversified Industrials 1            
5000 5371 Apparel Retailers 2            3000 3722 Durable Household Products 1            
3000 3355 Auto Parts 2            2000 2733 Electrical Equipment 3            
4000 4573 Biotechnology 2            2000 2737 Electronic Equipment 3            
5000 5553 Broadcast & Entertainment 3            9000 9574 Electronic Office Equipment 1            
2000 2353 Building Materials & Fixtures 3            1 533 Exploration & Production 4            
2000 2791 Business Support Services 16          3000 3573 Farming & Fishing 1            
2000 2793 Business Train & Employment 3            6000 6535 Fixed Line Telecom. 1            
3000 3763 Clothing & Accessory 3            3000 3577 Food Products 2            
9000 9533 Computer Services 5            5000 5337 Food Retail,Wholesale 2            
7000 7535 Consumer Electricity 1            3000 3726 Furnishings 2            
2000 2723 Containers & Package 2            5000 5752 Gambling 3            
2000 2717 Defense 1            7000 7573 Gas Distribution 1            
(Continued)  
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Table 3.2  Continued
ICB ICB Number ICB ICB Number
Industry Subsector of Industry Subsector of
Code Code Industry Description Firms Code Code Industry Description Firms
1000 1775 General Mining 1            4000 4577 Pharmaceuticals 1            
1000 1777 Gold Mining 2            5000 5557 Publishing 6            
4000 4533 Healthcare Providers 1            3000 3745 Recreational Products 2            
2000 2357 Heavy Construction 6            5000 5755 Recreational Services 2            
3000 3728 Home Construction 1            5000 5757 Restaurants & Bars 2            
5000 5375 Home Improvement Retail 1            9000 9576 Semiconductors 1            
2000 2757 Industrial Machinery 4            9000 9537 Software 8            
2000 2797 Industrial Suppliers 1            5000 5377 Specialised Consumer Services 1            
5000 5555 Media Agencies 2            1000 1357 Specialty Chemicals 1            
4000 4535 Medical Equipment 1            5000 5379 Specialty Retailers 5            
4000 4537 Medical Supplies 1            9000 9578 Telecom. Equipment 5            
1 573 Oil Equipment & Services 2            3000 3747 Toys 3            
1000 1737 Paper 2            2000 2777 Transport Services 2            
3000 3767 Personal Products 2            5000 5759 Travel & Tourism 1            
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3.4.2  The Control Sample 
 
Prior research and the current study show some clustering by industry among 
loss firms.  Dechow et al. (1996) and Farber (2005) find a similar industry clustering 
among fraud firms.  Therefore, an examination of corporate governance and earnings 
management behaviour around the reporting of an initial loss has the potential to 
reveal characteristic behaviour that is associated with changes at industry level rather 
than with the reporting of the initial loss.  To control for this possibility and to 
account for any general underlying changes across all industries during the period 
under study, a matched sample of control (i.e. profit) firms for 2004, 2005 and 2006 
is also collected to test changes in corporate governance following the reporting of a 
loss.  A control company is defined as any company reporting a profit for three 
consecutive years ending in the year in question (2004, 2005 or 2006) which also 
reports a profit (or is acquired, liquidated or delisted) in the two years following the 
event year.   
 
The matching of the control companies to each of the 138 loss firms is a two stage 
process.  The first stage is that the control firms are sorted by industry classification 
benchmark (ICB) subsector code (DATASTREAM: FTAG5) and the initial loss 
firms are first matched to the appropriate subsector group.  The second stage involves 
selecting the control firm from the subsector group with a market value closest to that 
of the initial loss firm.  Market value is calculated as at the calendar year end when 
the initial loss firm was selected.  In some situations there is no control firm with the 
same subsector code as the loss firm.  In these situations the matching criterion is 
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relaxed to the broader industry code (DATASTREAM: FTAG2) where, as before, the 
control firm with the closest market value is chosen.  If it is discovered that a control 
company was unsuitable (typically because an annual report(s) are not available from 
any source) then the matching process is repeated and the next most suitable control 
firm is selected as a replacement.  In the two years following the event year 28 of the 
control companies were acquired, liquidated or delisted resulting in 532 annual 
reports being perused.   
 
The distribution of control firms and their industry classifications is included in Table 
3.3 with, by design, clustering in the same industries (business support services, 
software, heavy construction and publishing) as for the initial loss sample. 
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Table 3.3  Distribution of Control Sample by Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) Codes
ICB ICB Number ICB ICB Number
Industry Subsector of Industry Subsector of
Code Code Industry Description Firms Code Code Industry Description Firms
2000 2713 Aerospace 1            1000 1773 Diamonds & Gemstones 0
5000 5751 Airlines 1            2000 2727 Diversified Industrials 2            
5000 5371 Apparel Retailers 2            3000 3722 Durable Household Products 1            
3000 3355 Auto Parts 2            2000 2733 Electrical Equipment 3            
4000 4573 Biotechnology 3            2000 2737 Electronic Equipment 3            
5000 5553 Broadcast & Entertainment 2            9000 9574 Electronic Office Equipment 1            
2000 2353 Building Materials & Fixtures 3            1 533 Exploration & Production 4            
2000 2791 Business Support Services 15          3000 3573 Farming & Fishing 1            
2000 2793 Business Train & Employment 3            6000 6535 Fixed Line Telecom. 2            
3000 3763 Clothing & Accessory 3            3000 3577 Food Products 3            
9000 9533 Computer Services 6            5000 5337 Food Retail,Wholesale 2            
7000 7535 Consumer Electricity 2            3000 3726 Furnishings 3            
2000 2723 Containers & Package 2            5000 5752 Gambling 3            
2000 2717 Defense 0 7000 7573 Gas Distribution 0
(Continued)
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Table 3.3  Continued
ICB ICB Number ICB ICB Number
Industry Subsector of Industry Subsector of
Code Code Industry Description Firms Code Code Industry Description Firms
1000 1775 General Mining 2            4000 4577 Pharmaceuticals 1            
1000 1777 Gold Mining 2            5000 5557 Publishing 6            
4000 4533 Healthcare Providers 1            3000 3745 Recreational Products 0
2000 2357 Heavy Construction 5            5000 5755 Recreational Services 2            
3000 3728 Home Construction 1            5000 5757 Restaurants & Bars 3            
5000 5375 Home Improvement Retail 1            9000 9576 Semiconductors 1            
2000 2757 Industrial Machinery 5            9000 9537 Software 9            
2000 2797 Industrial Suppliers 2            5000 5377 Specialised Consumer Services 1            
5000 5555 Media Agencies 3            1000 1357 Specialty Chemicals 3            
4000 4535 Medical Equipment 1            5000 5379 Specialty Retailers 5            
4000 4537 Medical Supplies 1            9000 9578 Telecom. Equipment 2            
1 573 Oil Equipment & Services 2            3000 3747 Toys 2            
1000 1737 Paper 0 2000 2777 Transport Services 2            
3000 3767 Personal Products 1            5000 5759 Travel & Tourism 1            
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3.4.3    Tests of Sample Equivalence 
 
Table 3.4 indicates that the null hypothesis that the means of the on the ICB 
subsector code and ICB industry codes for initial loss and control firms are equal to 
each other cannot be rejected.  Thus the industry matching of the loss and control 
sample has been successful.  Specifically, the t-statistics for the comparison of means 
test for the ICB subsector and industry codes are 0.21 and 0.00, respectively, 
indicating near perfect matching in the case of ICB subsector code and perfect 
matching in the case of industry level code (given that the industry level code is much 
broader than the subsector code, this is not surprising).  Because ICB code was 
prioritised over market value as a selection criterion to control for the possibility that 
changes in corporate governance are associated with industry rather than the loss 
shock, no a priori restriction on the size of the difference in market values between 
the loss and control firms is made.  The result is that even though a matched pair of 
firms will have identical ICB codes, the difference in market values between the pair 
could be significant even though the control company with the closest market value 
was selected8.  The results outlined in the final row of Table 2 indicate that the 
market values of the initial loss and control samples are not significantly different 
from each other. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 For instance, the largest market value difference between a matched pair is -£25.2 billion for 
Morrison Supermarkets plc. (the initial loss firm) and Tesco plc. (the control firm).  This difference is 
significantly greater than Morrison’s market value of £6.8 billion at the end of 2006 (the year of the 
initial loss) reflecting Tesco’s significantly greater market value of £32.0 billion on the same date.   
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Table 3.4  Matching Statistics for Initial Loss and Control Samples
Initial Loss Firm Control Firm Initial Loss Firm Control Firm
Mean Mean Median Median
Variable (in millions) (in millions) t -statistic (in millions) (in millions) p -value
Subsector Code 4,497.0       4,491.0       0.21 3,745.0       3,727.0       0.49
Industry Code 3,876.0       3,876.0       0.00 3,000.0       3,000.0       1.00
Market Value 364.7          380.8          -0.32 39.4            57.4            0.20
Market Value* 431.2          696.3          -1.33 41.4            60.1            0.10
Initial loss firms are matched with control firms on the basis of year, IBC code and market value.
The t -statistic is for the difference between the means of the matched pairs.  The p -value is for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
The asterisk (*) denotes the unwinsorised market value.  
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Table 3.4 shows the difference in market values (i.e. the asterisked values) between 
the loss and control samples indicating that the majority of the differences are 
clustered around zero (as expected) with a few (mainly negative) outliers impacting 
on the distribution.  
 
This study attempts to neutralise the impact of the extreme market values in this 
context (as well as later in the study for other market based variables) by winsorising 
the data, a strategy that takes the non-missing values of a variable and generates a 
new identical variable except that the highest and lowest values are replaced by the 
next value counting inwards from the extremes (Tukey, 1962; Barnett & Lewis, 
1994).  For instance, if correcting for outliers greater than three standard deviations 
from both sides of the mean, winsorising would see all data below the 1st percentile 
set to the 1st percentile, and data above the 1st percentile set to the 1st percentile.  As 
a result, winsorised estimators are usually more robust to outliers than their more 
standard forms.  This study specifies throughout that the fraction of observations to 
be modified in each tail is 1%, i.e. +/- three standard deviations from the mean.  The 
unasterisked values for market value in Table 3.5 show the difference in winsorised 
market values between the initial loss and control samples indicating that the majority 
of the differences are unaffected and remain clustered around zero (as expected) with 
the extreme outliers now having a smaller impact on the distribution.  A t-statistic of -
0.32 indicating no difference in the means of both samples, i.e. we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of mean equivalence between the initial loss and control samples.   
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In addition to the comparison of means test previously applied, this study also tests 
the equality of the matched pairs using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  This tests 
whether a sample median differs significantly from a hypothesised value; in this case 
the null hypothesis is that both distributions are the same.  The sign rank test can be 
used to test for differences in median between the initial loss and control populations.  
Because the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test does not require assumptions to be made 
about the form of the distribution (unlike the difference in means test), it is 
considered a robust test of equivalence.  Table 3.4 includes the p-values for the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  The ICB industry level code p-value indicates the same 
perfect matching demonstrated previously, i.e. p = 1.00.  This study also cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of median equivalence for the ICB subsector, winsorised market 
value and market value where the p-values are 0.49, 0.20 and 0.10, respectively.   
 
3.5 Corporate Governance Variables 
 
In combination, the initial loss and control samples result in 276 firms being 
selected for the empirical analysis in this study resulting in the perusal of 1,032 
annual reports from which from which approximately 14,000 items of corporate 
governance data are collected by hand. 
 
It is important to note that because of the lag between the financial year end and the 
reporting of results, the corporate governance information contained in the annual 
report often needs to be adjusted to align with the fiscal year end.   This adjustment is 
important to ensure that companies anticipating the reporting of the initial loss event 
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are not allowed to adjust their corporate governance between the financial year end 
and the date the initial loss is reported; to allow them to do so would, a priori, 
dampen the impact on the causal relationship being tested in some of the hypotheses 
in this study.  Thus, insofar as is possible, the corporate governance data collected for 
each firm reflects the corporate governance in place at the financial year end.   
 
One of the most important pieces of governance information culled from these annual 
reports is the number of non-executive directors and the number of independent non-
executive directors on the board.  The distinction between non-executive directors 
and independent directors is an important one; for various reasons, not all non-
executive directors are independent.  In most cases companies will differentiate 
between those non-executives which are independent and those which are not in their 
annual reports with reference to the recommendation of the Higgs Report contained 
in the Combined Code on Corporate Governance, (2003).   
 
According to the Combined Code (2003), a director is not independent if the director 
1.  Has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years; 
2. has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship 
with the company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or 
senior employee of a body that has such a relationship with the company; 
3. has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from 
a director’s fee, participates in the company’s share option or a performance-
related pay scheme, or is a member of the company’s pension scheme; 
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4. has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or senior 
employees; 
5. holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through 
involvement in other companies or bodies; 
6. represents a significant shareholder; or 
7. has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of first election 
 
Even so, many companies use the latitude allowed by the Combined Code (section 
A.3.1 p.6) “the board should identify in the annual report each non-executive director 
it considers to be independent”, to deem certain non-executives as independent even 
though, per the definition of the Combined Code (and as is often stated elsewhere in 
the company’s annual report), they clearly are not.  Where there is disagreement 
between the number of independent non-executive directors described in the annual 
report and those that would qualify as independent if the conditions of the Code were 
applied, this study is careful to apply the conditions of the Code where possible to 
identify “true” independence.   
 
Information about the chairman is also collected from the annual reports.  Whether 
the chair is a nonexecutive director is a variable often considered in governance 
studies and this study also collects this information.  In addition to the non-executive 
status of the chair, and with reference to the previous discussion about the difference 
between non-executive and independent directors, this study also collects information 
about the independence of the chair.  The conditions of the Combined Code state 
(section A.2.2. p.5) “The Chairman should on appointment meet the independence 
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criteria”, but thereafter the test of independence is not appropriate in relation to the 
Chairman.  Despite the rider that the Chair should not, after appointment, be 
considered independent, this study also collects information about the independence 
of the Chairman to get a better overall picture of the quality of this governance 
variable.   In addition, as a further measure of the quality of the chair this study also 
collects information about whether the chair has ever been an executive of the 
company.  This is a more strenuous test than the five year test recommended by the 
Combined Code [see 1.) above] that will provide a better overall picture of the quality 
of the chair.  Information about the number of female board members is also 
collected from the annual statements to measure gender diversity. 
 
Next, this study collects ownership data from the annual report.  Information about 
the number of shares beneficially owned by all the directors is collected as well as the 
number of shares held by the top director (where top is defined by the quantity of 
shares beneficially held, i.e. not necessarily the CEO or Chair).  Information about 
outside ownership by professional shareholders (defined as non-insider non-
individual holders of blocks greater than 3%) and other outside shareholders (i.e. non-
inside shareholders other than professional shareholders holding blocks of greater 
than 3%) is also collected.  Specifically information about the total number of shares 
held by professionals in blocks greater than 3%, the number of shares held by the top 
professional investor (where top is defined by the number of shares held, i.e. not 
necessarily the best known or largest pension fund manager), the number of 
professional shareholders and the total number of shares held by non-professional 
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outside shareholders is collected.  Table 3.5 details the complete list of corporate 
governance information culled from these annual reports. 
 
 
Table  3.5  Corporate Governance Information Collected  
Description 
The size of the board 
The number of non-executive directors on the board 
The number of  independent non-executive directors on the board 
Whether the Chair is a non-executive 
Whether the Chair is an independent non-executive 
Whether the Chair was ever an executive 
The number of female directors on the board 
The number of shares held beneficially by all directors 
The number of shares held beneficially by the largest shareholding director 
The number of shares held by professional shareholders in blocks > 3% 
The number of shares held by the largest professional shareholder 
The number of professional shareholders owning shares 
The number of shares held non-professional shareholders in blocks > 3% 
 
The corporate governance information detailed in Table 3.5 is then used to generate 
corporate governance variables.  Combining the corporate governance information 
about the number of non-executive and independent directors with the information 
collected about the size of the board, two measures of non-executive director related 
board quality are constructed; 
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1. The proportion of the board comprised of non-executive directors (% NEDs) 
2. The proportion of the board comprised of independent non-executive directors 
(% INDs) 
 
Combining the governance information about the chairman this study also constructs 
three governance measures focused on the chairman; 
1. Is the chairman a non-executive director? (NED Chair) 
2. Is the chairman an independent non-executive director? (IND Chair) 
These measures are dummy variables having a value of 1 if true and otherwise having 
a value of 0.  Whether the chair was never an executive (Chair Never Exec.) is also 
used to construct an additional chair related variable; this is a dummy variable having 
a value of 1 if true and otherwise having a value of 0. 
 
By combining the information regarding board size (BSize) and the independence of 
the Chair (IND Chair) this study also calculates the proportion of the board, 
excluding the chairman, comprised of independent non-executive directors (% IND 
Excl. Chair). 
 
Combining the corporate governance information regarding the number of female 
directors with the information collected about the size of the board, the proportion of 
the board comprised of female directors (% Fem) is constructed.   
 
Ownership variables are constructed from the ownership information collected from 
the annual reports.  The percentage of the company beneficially owned by the board 
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of directors (% Tot. Dir. Own.) is calculated by dividing the number of common 
shares collectively owned by this group by the number of common shares outstanding 
at financial year end.  Similarly, the percentage of the company owned by the top 
director (% Top Dir. Own.) is calculated by dividing the number of common shares 
collectively owned by the top director (by number of shares owned) by the number of 
common shares outstanding at financial year end.   
 
Outside ownership variables are also calculated.  The percentage of the company 
owned by professional investors (% Tot. Prof. Own.) is calculated by dividing the 
number of common shares collectively owned by professional shareholders 
(institutions) in amounts of at least 3% by the number of common shares outstanding 
at financial year end.  Similarly, the percentage of the company owned by the top 
professional shareholder (% Top Prof. Own.) is calculated by dividing the number of 
common shares collectively owned by the top professional investor (where top is 
defined by the number of shares owned) by the number of common shares 
outstanding at financial year end.  The percentage of the company owned by block 
holders (% Tot. Block Own.) is calculated by dividing the number of common shares 
collectively owned by all non-insiders (i.e. including professional shareholders) 
owning block of shares of at least 3% by the number of common shares outstanding 
at financial year end.  Sometimes the number of shares in the company owned by 
these groups (professionals and block holders) at exactly year end is not disclosed in 
the annual reports.  In these situations the number of shares held by these groups at a 
date between year end and the publication of the annual report is disclosed and this 
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study relies on this information instead.  The complete list of individual corporate 
governance variables included in this study, then, are included in Table 3.6. 
 
Table  3.6  Corporate Governance Variables  
Variable Description 
BSize The size of the board. 
% NEDs  The proportion of non-executive directors on the board. 
% INDs  The proportion of truly independent non-executive directors on the board. 
NED Chair 
 
Whether the Chairman is a non-executive; takes the value of 1 if true, 
otherwise 0. 
IND Chair 
 
Whether the Chairman is an independent non-executive; takes the value of 1 
if true, otherwise 0. 
Chair Never Exec. 
 
Whether the Chairman was ever a company executive; takes the value of 1 if 
true, otherwise 0. 
% IND Excl. Chair  
 
The proportion of the board, excluding the Chairman, comprising of 
independent non-executive directors. 
% Fem. The proportion of female directors on the board. 
% Tot. Dir. Own. The proportion of shares held beneficially by all directors. 
% Top Dir. Own. 
 
The proportion of shares held beneficially by the top director (by number of 
shares owned).  
% Tot. Prof. Own. The proportion of shares held by all professional investors in amounts > 3%. 
% Top Prof. Own. 
 
The proportion of shares held by the top professional investor (by number of 
shares owned).  
# Prof. Own. The number of professional investors owning shares. 
% Tot. Block Own. The proportion of shares held by all outside shareholders in amounts > 3%. 
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3.5.1   Analysis of Corporate Governance Variables 
 
This section analyses and discusses the distributions of the 14 individual 
corporate governance variables included in this study.  This involves estimating the 
mean, median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of 
each variable as well as a test of normality of each variable.  Table 3.7 includes a 
summary of all 14 individual governance variables at the aggregate level (i.e. 
combining the loss and control samples).  The Shapiro-Wilk test is a test of normality 
where the null hypothesis is that the variable is normally distributed.  The p-values in 
Table 3.7 under this heading are the confidence level at which you can reject the null 
hypothesis that the governance variables are normally distributed; in this case all of 
the p-values for all of the governance variables are 0.00 indicating none are normally 
distributed for all alpha levels. 
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Table 3.7  Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Governance Variables for the Combined Sample, All Years
Variable Obs Mean St. Dev Median Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis Shapiro-Wilk
BSize 1,002       6.663       2.306       6.000       1.000       15.000      0.859       4.078       0.000            
% NEDs 1,002       0.490       0.161       0.500       0.000       0.900       -0.415 3.339       0.000            
% INDs 1,002       0.350       0.193       0.333       0.000       0.833       -0.151 2.364       0.000            
% IND Excl. Chair 1,002       0.341       0.201       0.333       0.000       0.800       -0.209 2.145       0.000            
NED Chair 1,002       0.642       0.480       1.000       0.000       1.000       -0.594 1.353       
IND Chair 1,002       0.396       0.489       0.000       0.000       1.000       0.427       1.182       
Chair Never Exec. 1,002       0.562       0.496       1.000       0.000       1.000       -0.252 1.063       
% Fem. 1,002       0.055       0.090       0.000       0.000       0.500       1.662       5.632       0.000            
% Tot. Dir. Own. 1,002       0.150       0.194       0.065       0.000       0.945       1.595       4.852       0.000            
% Top. Dir. Own. 1,002       0.110       0.157       0.043       0.000       0.935       2.135       7.879       0.000            
% Tot. Prof. Own. 1,002       0.310       0.199       0.296       0.000       0.947       0.324       2.492       0.000            
% Top. Prof. Own. 1,002       0.135       0.113       0.110       0.000       0.890       2.451       12.465     0.000            
# Prof. Own. 1,002       4.063       2.630       4.000       0.000       14.000      0.518       2.939       0.000            
% Tot. Block Own. 1,002       0.371       0.196       0.374       0.000       0.947       0.080       2.582       0.000            
  Variable definitions are included in Table 3.6
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One of the immediate observations is that, on average, boards are of a reasonably 
small size with a mean of 6.66 and a reasonable spread of observations with a 
standard deviation of 2.31; the coefficient of variation is therefore 0.35.   
Another observation from the data is the centralisation of the % NEDs distribution 
around 50.0%.  Section B.1.2 of the Combined Code reads “. . . at least half the 
board, excluding the chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined 
by the board to be independent.”  This indicates that, in line with the coverage that 
this corporate governance indicator has received in the literature, firms are conscious 
of the requirements of the Combined Code that non-executives should make up the 
majority of the board.  This is consistent with the evidence from Dahya, McConnell 
and Travlos (2002) who found that post the adoption of the Cadbury Code, the 
proportion of outside directors rose to 47% from 26% prior to the adoption.  In other 
words there is evidence of movement in corporate governance characteristics 
prompted by regulatory recommendations (Beasley et al., 2010; and Brown et al., 
2011). 
 
While companies seem to be, on average, compliant with the first part of section 
B.1.2 of the Combined Code quoted above, the additional requirement that the non-
executives also be independent is not as universally observed.  Based on the evidence 
from Table 3.7, the centralisation observed in the % NEDs variable is absent for the 
% IND Excl. Chair variable.  Indeed it is noted that, due to the way this study 
rigorously applies the Combined Code’s independence criteria to directors, more than 
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150 firm years from a total sample of 1,001 firm years had no independent director 
whatsoever on the board.   
 
The interpretation of the NED Chair, IND Chair and Chair Never Exec. variables is 
also interesting.  The Combined Code is very clear in its prescriptive advice regarding 
the duality of the Chair “. . . the roles of chairman and chief executive should not be 
exercised by the same individual.”  In light of this statement, the statistics for are 
interesting.  What is observed is that 64.2% of firms in the combined sample had a 
non-executive director as chair meaning that 35.8% of firms had a dual chair and 
chief executive (there were no co-chairs in any firm year) in contravention of the 
recommendations of the Combined Code.  These values are significantly lower than 
the levels observed by Peasnell et al. (2005) who found CEO duality in 76% of their 
sample between 1993 and 1996. Once again it looks like there is evidence of 
movement in corporate governance characteristics prompted by regulatory 
recommendations. In light of the high percentage of firm years without a dual 
CEO/Chair in this study, and the non-findings for duality in previous studies (i.e. 
Brickley et al., 1997; Xie et al., 2003; Benkel, Mather & Ramsay, 2006), there is a 
need to measure the effectiveness of the Chairman in a better way.  Although the 
Combined Code doesn’t make any recommendations regarding the need for the chair 
to also be independent, whether or not this is the case will have implications for the 
quality of the board generally and the Chair in particular.  In that regard, only 39.6% 
of firm years had an independent director as chair.  Also 56.2% of firm years had a 
chair who had never been an executive of the firm meaning that in 43.8% of cases the 
chair was/is the chief executive (there were no instances where the chair was/is an 
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executive other than the CEO).  Ned Chair, IND Chair and Chair Never Exec. are all 
binary variables and so, by construction, tests of skewness, kurtosis and normality are 
not valid.   
 
The statistics for the % Fem. variable are also interesting.  This study finds that on 
average 5.5% of directors are Female; the standard deviation is 9.02% yielding a 
coefficient of variation of 1.63.  While the Combined Code for the sample period 
under investigation makes no specific recommendations regarding gender balance it 
does state that appointments to the board should be made “. . . against objective 
criteria and with due regard for the benefits of diversity on the board, including 
gender”.  In the context of this recommendation and the requirements by some 
countries that a certain percentage of directors be Female (i.e. Norway’s 40% rule 
and Spain’s 50% target by 2015) the mean seems low, especially when compared to a 
2007 UK average of 15.2% reported by Heidrick and Struggles (2007) — although 
the blue chip focus (FTSE 100) and the small number of UK firms (n = 50) of their 
sample is noted.  Also of note is that in excess of 650 companies (more than half the 
sample) had no female representation whatsoever on the board and the maximum 
value is 50% indicating that no board has a majority of female directors. 
 
Director ownership statistics also make interesting reading.  The % Tot. Dir. Own. 
variable has a mean, median and maximum of 15.00%, 6.54% and 94.51%, 
respectively indicating a highly positively skewed distribution; σ3 is 1.595.  Of 
particular interest to this study is that the mean value of 15.00% is greater than the 
12.00% figure identified by Short and Keasey (1999) as the inflection point where 
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management ownership moves from aligning the interests of shareholders and 
management to entrenching management; this is pertinent later in this chapter where 
general governance constructs are calculated from the variables detailed in Table 3.6.   
 
The % Tot. Prof. Own. variable has a median of 29.62% which, when combined with 
the mean of 31.03% results in a moderately skewed distribution (σ3  = 0.32) despite 
the large number of 0.0% observations from the fact that in excess of 100 companies 
had no professional owners whatsoever.  The mean, median and maximum values for 
% Top Prof. Own. are 13.49%, 10.96% and 88.99% resulting in a highly positively 
skewed distribution (σ3 = 2.45).  The # Prof. Own. variable has a mean approximately 
equal to its median with values of 4.06 and 4.00, respectively, resulting in a largely 
symmetrical distribution (albeit truncated at 0.00).  The % Tot. Blk. Own. variable, 
i.e. the percentage of shares owned by all outside directors including professional 
investors, has a mean of 37.13% and a median of 37.37% indicating a lack of 
skewness confirmed by σ3  = 0.08.   
 
3.5.2  Corporate Governance Constructs 
 
The variables outlined in Table 3.6 combine to form the overall corporate 
governance architecture of a company.  Some are substitutes and others are 
complements.  Using all these variables individually can be associated with 
considerable measurement error (i.e., low reliability) and will not capture how they 
combine to form the overall corporate governance architecture of a company.  The 
use of several individual governance variables may also lead to the problem of 
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multicollinearity when estimating empirical models.  As discussed in Section 2.6.1 of 
Chapter 2, corporate governance research has moved to considering amalgamations 
that condense the information contained in a large number of individual corporate 
governance items in to a single (yet seemingly informative) measure.  The widely 
used G-Index (Gompers et al., 2003) as well as the Gov-Score (i.e. Brown & Caylor, 
2006) and other normalised summations of corporate governance characteristics 
(Bertrand & Murllainathan, 2001) are examples.  Other corporate governance 
research simply relies on outside firms to produce proprietary governance indices — 
the Corporate Governance Quotient from ISS, the Accounting and Governance Risk 
index from Audit Integrity, the CG rating from Governance Metrics International and 
the Corporate Governance Score from Standard & Poors are examples. 
Notwithstanding the proliferation of all-encompassing corporate governance indices, 
Brown and Caylor (2006) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) find that 
parsimonious indices are more effective.  Indeed, Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) point 
out that firms have different ways of mitigating agency problems and that these are 
not conveniently summarised by a single number (Brown et al., 2011).   
 
There is no universally accepted theory that explains how individual governance 
mechanisms combine to form the overall governance of a company.  Therefore, like 
Larcker et al. (2007), we use an exploratory factor analysis to combine the variables 
in Table 3.6 into general corporate governance constructs.  This approach is used 
because, rather than just summing corporate governance variables to achieve 
parsimony, it provides insights into the underlying structure of corporate governance.  
Exploratory factor analysis is used in situations where the dimensionality of data and 
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its structural composition are not well known.  It is a statistical method used to 
describe variability among observed variables in terms of a potentially lower number 
of unobserved variables called factors.  Factors are conceptualised as underlying real 
world underlying constructs or commonalities, not directly measured, that are 
influenced by responses on measured variables.  In other words it is possible, for 
example, that variations in several observed governance variables mainly reflect the 
variations in a reduced number of unobserved variables (Bushman, Piotroski & 
Smith, 2004).  The reduced number of unobserved variables can be estimated as 
factor scores calculated from the observed individual variables.  This study uses 
factor analysis to distil the fourteen observed corporate governance variables from 
Table 3.6 to a reduced number of underlying latent corporate governance constructs.  
The sample used for the factor analysis is the combined initial loss and control 
sample.   
 
Before this study decides what methodology to use to combine variables into general 
constructs, it is important to verify that the matrix of corporate governance variables 
is factorable.  A matrix is factorable if it includes several sizeable correlations; a rule 
of thumb is that, except in the most exploratory sense, if there are no correlations in 
excess of 0.30 then there is probably nothing to factor analyse.  The matrix of 
pairwise correlations includes many medium to large correlations (34 correlations 
from a possible 120 correlations in excess of 0.30).  The generally low correlations 
between BSize and % Fem. and the other individual governance variables in the 
correlation matrix (see Table 3.8) indicates that these variables should be excluded 
prior to the exploratory analysis. This does not mean that these variables are not 
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relevant corporate governance variables in their own right, just that they do not 
combine meaningfully with other individual governance variables to form general 
corporate governance constructs. 
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Table 3.8  Pearson (Spearman) Correlations are Presented in the Lower (Upper) Diagonal
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
BSize (1) --- 0.277 0.281 0.265 0.195 0.110 0.148 0.225 -0.267 -0.250 0.066 0.135 0.071 -0.076
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (0.037) (.000) (0.026) (0.578)
% NEDs (2) 0.299 --- 0.580 0.527 0.468 0.290 0.370 0.121 -0.395 -0.405 0.217 0.229 0.162 0.118
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
% INDs (3) 0.257 0.594 --- 0.890 0.298 0.518 0.328 0.230 -0.533 -0.558 0.264 0.343 0.145 0.174
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
% IND Excl. Chair (4) 0.263 0.540 0.893 --- 0.033 0.113 0.022 0.196 -0.443 -0.465 0.231 0.293 0.131 0.136
(.000) (.000) (.000) (0.300) (.000) (0.488) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
NED Chair (5) 0.159 0.460 0.302 0.037 --- 0.599 0.838 0.109 -0.307 -0.312 0.108 0.147 0.092 0.092
(.000) (.000) (.000) (0.246) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) (0.004) (.004)
IND Chair (6) 0.087 0.277 0.523 0.115 0.599 --- 0.710 0.155 -0.363 -0.381 0.137 0.188 0.062 0.130
(0.006) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (0.050) (.000)
Chair Never Exec. (7) 0.116 0.360 0.330 0.024 0.838 0.710 --- 0.125 -0.332 -0.338 0.114 0.165 0.066 0.083
(.000) (.000) (.000) (0.458) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (0.036) (.009)
% FEM. (8) 0.144 0.118 0.223 0.194 0.112 0.152 0.125 --- -0.111 -0.118 0.039 0.038 0.028 0.021
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) (0.218) (0.236) (0.371) (.503)
% Top Dir. Own. (9) -0.173 -0.321 -0.389 -0.331 -0.255 -0.252 -0.236 -0.018 --- 0.981 -0.397 -0.336 -0.334 -0.326
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (0.571) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
% Tot. Dir Own. (10) -0.174 -0.356 -0.454 -0.394 -0.269 -0.281 -0.259 -0.023 0.933 --- -0.415 -0.352 -0.350 -0.348
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (0.460) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
% Tot. Prof. Own. (11) 0.033 0.216 0.245 0.220 0.093 0.124 0.101 0.084 -0.437 -0.480 --- 0.770 0.767 0.843
(0.296) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (0.002) (0.008) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
# Prof. Own. (12) 0.100 0.231 0.328 0.286 0.142 0.189 0.160 0.034 -0.396 -0.432 0.742 --- 0.337 0.598
(0.002) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (0.283) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
% Top Prof. Own. (13) 0.000 0.115 0.053 0.050 0.034 0.018 0.014 0.100 -0.299 -0.331 0.692 0.121 --- 0.6669
(0.991) (0.000) (0.091) (0.111) (0.278) (0.561) (0.663) (0.002) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
% Tot. Block Own. (14) -0.047 0.114 0.155 0.126 0.080 0.108 0.064 0.070 -0.439 -0.476 0.849 0.594 0.618 ---
(0.140) (.000) (.000) (.000) (0.011) (0.001) (0.042) (0.026) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
  Variable definitions are included in Table 3.6
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High bivaraite correlations among the remaining variables are however, not ironclad 
proof that the correlation matrix contains factors.  It is possible that correlations are 
between only two variables and do not reflect underlying processes that are 
simultaneously affecting several variables.  For this reason it is helpful to examine the 
matrix of partial correlations (see Table 3.9) where the pairwise correlations from 
Table 3.8 are adjusted for effects of other remaining variables.  If there are factors 
present, the high bivariate correlations should become low partial correlations.  The 
matrix of partial correlations confirms that several of the variables which have high 
pairwise correlations with each other have significantly lower partial correlations.  
For example, the pairwise correlation between % NEDs and % INDs is 0.594 
whereas when the impact of all the other variables in the matrix is accounted for, the 
partial correlation between these two variables drops to 0.113.   
 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test can also be used to assess the factorability of 
the data.  The KMO test is a measure of overall sampling adequacy which tests 
whether the partial correlations among variables are small.  KMO takes values 
between 0 and 1, with values less than 0.5 meaning that overall the variables have too 
little in common to warrant a factor analysis.  The overall KMO value for the 
corporate governance variables in this study is 0.625 indicating moderate 
factorability.  
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Table 3.9 Partial Correlations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
% NEDs (1) ---
% INDs (2) 0.113 ---
(.000)
% IND Excl. Chair (3) 0.015 0.971 ---
(.635) (.000)
NED Chair (4) 0.349 0.065 -0.106 ---
(.000) (.040) (.001)
IND Chair (5) -0.129 0.885 -0.848 -0.048 ---
(.000) (.000) (.000) (0.133)
Chair Never Exec. (6) -0.024 -0.033 0.013 0.688 0.247 ---
(0.458) (.307) (.679) (.000) (.000)
% Top Dir. Own. (7) -0.021 0.005 0.021 -0.036 0.002 0.042 ---
(.501) (.887) (.52) (0.252) (.953) (.184)
% Tot. Dir Own. (8) -0.001 0.004 -0.055 0.009 -0.023 -0.058 0.898 ---
(.988) (.910) (.086) (.777) 0.479 (.070) (.000)
% Tot Prof. Own. (9) 0.059 0.020 -0.010 -0.097 -0.033 0.077 -0.006 0.061 ---
(.063) (.529) (.766) (.002) (.305) (.015) (.855) (0.057)
# Prof. Own. (10) -0.011 0.006 0.003 0.049 0.011 -0.023 0.008 -0.084 0.839 ---
(..732) (.848) (.936) (.124) (.738) (.471) (.811) (0.008) (.000)
% Top Prof. Own. (11) 0.026 -0.008 -0.007 0.050 0.009 -0.048 0.024 -0.099 0.813 -0.812 ---
(.407) (.800) (.828) (.120) (.790) (.131) (.445) (0.002) (.000) (.000)
% Tot. Block Own. (12) -0.112 -0.022 0.000 0.090 0.040 -0.108 0.002 -0.099 0.466 -0.092 -0.045 ---
(.000) (.486) (.993) (.004) (.206) (.001) (0.947) (0.002) (.000) (.000) (0.155)
  Variable definitions are included in Table 3.6
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As a general rule it is recommended that all factors with an eigenvalue greater than 
1.0 should be kept because it indicates the factor explains more of the variance than 
any of the individual governance variables does on its own.  That is, drop any 
component that accounts for less variance than does a single variable.  Keeping all 
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 results in the retention of three factors that 
together retain 73.5% of the total variance in the original data.  This is represented as 
a screeplot (Figure 3.1) with eigenvalues on the y-axis and the factor number on the 
x-axis.  The plot provides a visual aid for deciding at what point including additional 
factors no longer increases the amount of variance accounted for by a nontrivial 
amount.  In this case three appears to be the optimal number of factors.   
 
Figure 3.1  Screeplot of Eigenvalues  
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Beekes, Hong and Owen (2010) note that correlations among the variables to which 
factor analysis is applied are unbiased provided all of the variables are continuous.  
Kolenikov and Angeles (2004) propose a discrete factor analysis which involves 
modifying the correlation matrix to take account of the nature of the underlying 
variables.  Beekes et al. (2010) employ a discrete factor analysis on 17 governance 
variables collected from different sources and identify 7 underlying governance 
constructs.  When these components are used in a fashion comparable to Larcker et 
al. (2007), they do not obtain the same results.  The inclusion of binary and count 
variables in the Chair and Ownership constructs in this study is therefore problematic.  
For this reason, this study also employs a discrete factor analysis.  The results (not 
included here) are the same. 
 
The reduced three factor solution for this study is then rotated using an oblique 
(promax) rotation that allows the retained factors to be correlated in order to enhance 
interpretability of the pattern matrix.  After the initial factor analysis, the variables 
that are unrelated to others in the set are identified; a variable with a low squared 
multiple correlation with all other variables and low correlations (or “loading”) with 
all important factors is an outlier among the variables.  The squared multiple 
correlations and the correlations between the variables presented in Table 3.10 
indicate that, having already excluded BSize and % Fem., none of the remaining 
variables are outliers.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 95 - 
 
 
Table 3.10  Squared Multiple Correlations (SMC)
Variable SMC
% NEDs 0.5085       
% INDs 0.9771       
% IND Ex. Chair 0.9687       
NED Chair 0.7460       
IND Chair 0.8965       
Chair Never Exec. 0.7743       
% Tot. Dir. Own. 0.8729       
% Top Dir. Own. 0.8884       
% Tot. Prof. Own. 0.9372       
# Prof. Own. 0.8569       
% Top Prof. Own. 0.8297       
% Tot. Block Own. 0.7451       
  Variable definitions are included in Table 3.6  
 
The results for the rotated pattern matrix used to represent the underlying dimensions 
of corporate governance are presented in Panel A of Table 3.11.  To interpret the 
factors, it is necessary to determine which indicators have a substantive association 
with each factor.  The literature indicates an arbitrary salience criterion of ±0.30 
(Grice and Harris, 1998) although a lower cut-off can be acceptable for an early 
exploratory analysis.  This minimum factor loading for a variable in this thesis is 
±0.50 in absolute value — a relatively high salience criterion.  The resulting variables 
that are associated with each factor are summarized in Panel B of Table 3.11.  As it 
happens, the three factors are made up from combinations of corporate governance 
indicators that one might expect ex-ante to be highly correlated.  That is, all the 
variables relating to ownership load on the first factor, all the variables relating to the 
board load on the second factor and all the variables relating to the chair load on the 
third factor.  
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With the exception of % Top Dir. Own. and % Tot. Dir. Own. which also load 
relatively highly on the second factor (but not as high as the first), the factor loadings 
have a relatively simple structure.  That is, as can be seen from Panel A of Table 
3.11, each variable loads well on only one factor and most loadings are either very 
high or very low which results in the factor analysis producing a very interpretable 
solution.   
 
3.5.3  Board Chair and Ownership 
 
Since corporate governance is a complex general construct, the results from 
the factor analysis are encouraging and make it easy to assign a general name based 
on the characteristics of the indicators loading on each factor.  For example, as is 
done is Panel B of Table 3.11, it is easy to name the first factor “Ownership”, the 
second “Board” and the third “Chair”.   
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Table 3.11                    Principal Component Factor Analysis
Panel A: Rotated Factor Loadings
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
% NEDs -0.045 0.641          0.244   
% INDs -0.078 0.923          0.108   
% IND Ex. Chair -0.079 1.056          -0.294
NED Chair -0.021 -0.089 0.949   
IND Chair -0.025 0.051          0.818   
Chair Never Exec. -0.027 -0.121 0.990   
% Tot. Dir. Own. -0.526 -0.331 -0.118
% Top Dir. Own. -0.543 -0.378 -0.119
% Tot. Prof. Own. 0.962          -0.036 -0.050
# Prof. Own. 0.630          0.179          0.008   
% Top Prof. Own. 0.799          -0.220 -0.051
% Tot. Block Own. 0.955          -0.139 -0.037
Panel B: Named Factors
Factor Loading
Ownership
% Tot. Dir. Own. -0.526
% Top Dir. Own. -0.543
% Tot. Prof. Own. 0.630          
# Prof. Own. 0.799          
% Top Prof. Own. 0.955          
% Block Own. 0.962          
Board
% NEDs 0.641          
% INDs 0.923          
% IND Excl. Chair 1.056          
Chair
NED Chair 0.949          
IND Chair 0.818          
Chair Never Exec. 0.990          
  Variable definitions are included in Table 3.6  
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Next we have to calculate the factor scores.  The literature indicates that a unit 
loading methodology where those factor loadings exceeding the arbitrary salience 
criterion are unit-weighted (standardised to z-scores if measured on different scales) 
in accordance with the sign of the structure coefficients may actually be preferable to 
exact factor scores in certain circumstances (Grice, 2001; Grice & Harris, 1998).  
Indeed Grice (2001) suggests that unit-weighted factor scores are preferable to exact 
factor scores when the structure of the factor loadings is simple and the loadings not 
highly variable as is the case here.  Because of the mixture of binary, count and 
continuous scales among the individual variables and due to the heterogeneous 
variance this causes, this study uses a variation of the unit-weighted method where 
the weight is divided by the number of indicators (i.e. averaged) instead of each 
indicator having a unitary weight (Larcker et al., 2007).  The result is that because the 
factors are constructed from standardised indicators, the mean of each of the 
corporate governance constructs is equal to zero.   
 
The construction of the Board and Chair governance constructs is straightforward 
using this methodology.  Each is made up of indicators with only positive loadings 
and so each is computed as the average equal-weighted sum of its standardized 
indicators:  Board is calculated as the sum of the standardised % NEDs, % INDs and 
% IND Excl. Chair divided by three; Chair is calculated as the sum of the 
standardised NED Chair, IND Chair and Chair Never Exec. divided by three.  
Because the indicators relating to Ownership exhibit a combination of positive and 
negative loadings, its construction is more difficult.  To compute factor scores for 
Ownership we must take the negative sign on two of the structure coefficients into 
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consideration, i.e. the substitutability across the components.  Specifically, % Tot. 
Dir. Own. and % Top Dir. Own. load negatively such that the Ownership construct is 
calculated as the sum of the standardized % Tot. Prof. Own., % Top Prof. Own., # 
Prof. Own. and % Tot Block Own. less the sum of standardized % Tot. Dir. Own. and 
% Top Dir. Own. divided by six.   
 
The negative weightings on the inside ownership variables in this study are in line 
with the entrenchment hypothesis in the governance literature where the relationship 
between inside ownership by officers and directors and good corporate governance is 
not linear across all ownership levels — Short and Keasey (1999) indicate that the 
lower limit is 12.0% for the U.K.  This study is also a U.K. study and, per Table 3.7, 
the mean director ownership percentage (% Tot. Dir. Own.) for companies in this 
study is 15.0% indicating that at this average ownership level the interests of inside 
and outside owners are at odds. 
 
This study notes that this combination of ownership information is at odds with the 
construction of the ownership variable in Warfield et al. (1995).  In their study they 
combine the ownership of officers, directors and beneficial owners to create their 
constructed ownership variable.  Their positive weighting of all the individual 
elements of this ownership construct differs from the negative weightings on the % 
Tot. Dir. Own. and % Top Dir. Own. variables detailed here.  Warfield et al. (1995) 
also construct an alternative ownership variable which takes only the ownership of 
officers and directors into consideration to distinguish between direct and indirect 
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managerial control thereby accounting for the impact of outside ownership by simply 
ignoring it.   
 
There is evidence of construct reliability (or the inverse of measurement error) based 
on the computation of Cronbach coefficient alphas for indicators associated with each 
governance construct (see Table 3.12).  For the multi-item scores, standardised 
coefficient alphas (mean = 0.870) all exceed the minimum reliability levels suggested 
by Nunnally (1967).   
 
Table 3.12      Cronbach Alphas
Variable Sign Alpha
% NEDs + 0.943       
% INDs + 0.701       
% IND Ex. Chair + 0.745       
Board 0.862       
NED Chair + 0.830       
IND Chair + 0.912       
Chair Never Exec. + 0.750       
Chair 0.883       
% Tot. Dir. Own. - 0.843       
% Top Dir. Own. - 0.851       
% Tot. Prof. Own. + 0.826       
# Prof. Own. + 0.812       
% Top Prof. Own. + 0.862       
% Tot. Block Own. + 0.873       
Ownership 0.868       
  Variable definitions are included in Table 3.6  
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Also of note is that none of the confidence intervals for correlations among the three 
corporate governance constructs include unity at conventional levels of statistical 
significance (see Table 3.13).  While many of these correlations between factors are 
statistically significant at conventional levels, the absolute value for most of these 
bivariate correlations is small in magnitude.  These results suggest that our 
governance constructs are statistically distinct and exhibit construct validity.  The 
negative relationship between Ownership and both Board and Chair can be 
interpreted as the entrenchment effect of director ownership dominating the 
Ownership factor.  That is, in the entrenchment range director ownership is 
negatively related to other board quality measures — in this case Board and Chair. 
 
Table 3.13    Correlation of Corporate Governance Constructs
1 2 3
Board (1) -- 0.365 -0.305
(0.000) (0.000)
Chair (2) 0.360 -- -0.204
(0.000) (0.000)
Ownership (3) -0.307 -0.197 --
(0.000) (0.000)
Board, Chair and Ownership are corporate governance amalgamations, 
the construction of which is according to a principal components 
analysis the workings of which are included in Table 3.11.
 
 
Because this study is concerned with comparing corporate governance from the initial 
loss and control samples it is important that the methodology used to construct the 
underlying governance amalgamations described above is appropriate for both 
samples separately (the preceding analysis was performed on the combined initial 
loss and control samples).  Although minor differences are to be expected, the 
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underlying structure of both populations needs to be the statistically the same if the 
inferences from using the corporate governance constructs are to be credible.  Catell’s 
salient similarity index (s) (Catell, 1957; Cattell & Baggaley, 1960) can be used to 
compare two solutions’ patterns of loadings (see Table 3.14) to establish whether or 
not this is the case.  To perform this analysis each of the loadings for each of the 
variables for the initial loss and control samples is classified as positively salient (this 
study uses a salience criteria > 0.30), negatively salient (< -0.30) or neither 
(hyperplane).  A third order square matrix of the frequency counts is constructed to 
compare the initial loss and control samples (see Table 3.14).  Counts in the main 
diagonal (i.e. those with matrix references [11], [22] and [33]) — especially [11] and 
[33] — indicate similarity of structure.  Counts off the main diagonal — especially 
[13] or lower left [31] — indicate dissimilarity.  
 
Table 3.14  Third Order Square Matrix of Salience
Initial Loss Sample
Positive Salient Hyperplane Negative Salient
Control Sample
Positive Salient 10 0 0
[11] [12] [13]
Hyperplane 1 20 2
[21] [22] [23]
Negative Salient 0 1 2
[31] [32] [33]
Loadings from performing the factor analysis on each of the initial loss and control 
samples are determined as positive salient (> 0.30), negative salient (< -0.30) or 
hyperplane (neither).  [] are cell references within the third order square matrix. 
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The following formulae (using cell references from the third order square matrix 
above) are the used to calculate Catell’s salient similarity index (s) and a hyperplane 
count (h) 
 
𝑠 = [11] + [33] − [13] − [31][11] + [33] + [13] + [31] + 0.5([12] + [21] + [23] + [32]) 
  
ℎ = [12] + [21] + [20] + [23] + [32][11] + [12] + [13] + [21] + [22] + [23] + [31] + [32] + [33] 
 
Using the numbers from this study these formulae become 
  
𝑠 = 10 + 2 − 0 − 010 + 2 + 0 + 0 + 0.5(0 + 1 + 2 + 1) = 0.86 
 
ℎ = 0 + 1 + 20 + 2 + 110 + 0 + 0 + 1 + 20 + 2 + 0 + 1 + 2 = 0.66 
 
Thus the salience criterion of ±0.30 results in an s value of 0.86 and a hyperplane 
count of 66%.  Using a hyperplane count of 60% for 10 variables (even though this 
study has a hyperplane count of 66% and 12 governance variables, the probability 
tables are only available for hyperplane counts and variables in multiples of 10) the s 
value in this study exceeds the critical value (0.67) at the .002 significance level, i.e. 
the factors for the initial loss and control samples are reliably similar9. 
 
                                                 
9 The probability tables are available in pages 717–718 of Tabachnick and Fidell (1989). 
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3.5.4  Diversity 
 
It is noted in Section 3.5.1 that % Fem. did not load on any of the factors in 
the analysis such that this variable can be treated as a significant corporate 
governance variable in its own right.  As a proxy for gender diversity this study uses 
the % Fem. variable to calculate a measure that takes into account both the number of 
gender categories (two) and the evenness of the distribution of board members among 
them.  These two attributes of diversity referred to, respectively, as variety and 
balance, may be combined into dual concept measures of diversity (Stirling, 1998).  
These measures are widely used across a range of scientific fields, including ecology, 
genetics, linguistics, communications and cultural studies, and economics (Harrison 
and Klein, 2007).  Similar to Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), this study utilises 
the Blau (1977) index as a primary proxy for gender diversity (Diversity) measured 
as  
 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 1 −�𝑃𝑖2𝑛
𝑖=1
= 1 − �𝑃𝑓2 + 𝑃𝑚2� 
 
where 𝑃𝑖 is the percentage of board members in each category [two, female (f) and 
male (m)] and n is the total number of board members.  A version of this index was 
originally proposed by Simpson (1949) as a measure of species diversity in an 
ecosystem and it is also known as Herfindahl’s (1950) index and Hirschman’s (1964) 
index when applied to the measurement of industrial concentration.  Values of the 
Blau index for gender diversity range from 0 to a maximum of 0.5, which occurs 
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when the board comprises an equal number of men and women.  That is, when the 
board is evenly split among women and men such that the percentage females (𝑃𝑓) 
and males (𝑃𝑚) both equal 50% then  
 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 1 − [0.52 + 0.52] = 0.5 
 
3.5.5  Descriptive Statistics  
 
The corporate governance variables for this study, then, include BSize (which, 
like % Fem., did not load on any of the factors in the factor analysis such that this 
variable is analysed as is) as well as Diversity and the general corporate governance 
constructs Board, Chair and Ownership detailed previously.   
 
A detailed breakdown of the main corporate governance variables by year for each 
year of this study is included in Table 9.1 in the Appendix.  As evidenced in Panel A 
of Table 9.1, because Board, Chair and Ownership are weighted combinations of 
standardized variables, the mean governance score for the combined loss and control 
sample for each of these variables is, by construction, equal to zero.  These aggregate 
scores for the governance constructs should have considerably less measurement 
error than any individual governance indicator and this reduction in measurement 
error should substantially improve the econometric properties of these constructs.  
The result is that, with zero means, calculating the coefficient of variation is 
meaningless.  Also, because the Chair variable is constructed from three individual 
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binary variables, its distribution is non-continuous and so defies standard analysis of 
its higher moments.   
 
Of particular note are the apparent dissimilarities between the initial loss and control 
samples at (t – 1), the year before the initial loss, and the subsequent improvement in 
most of the variables for the initial loss sample from that point.10  A detailed 
univariate analysis of whether the mean and median values of the initial loss and 
control samples are equivalent is included in Chapter 4 when the changes in the 
various corporate governance variables are calculated and considered. 
 
3.6  Other Variables 
 
This section details the construction of and analyses the non-governance 
variables used throughout this study.  These include the proxies for earnings 
management (abnormal accruals) and market-based measures of firm size and stock 
market return. 
 
3.6.1  Accounting Variables 
 
Depending on the hypothesis being tested, this study uses a number of 
accounting and market based variables as dependent and independent control 
                                                 
10 It is noted that because the corporate governance levels in any year of the test period are constructed 
versus the overall sample period mean, it is possible that for both the initial loss and control sample 
any particular variable could have below/above mean values. 
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variables in various regressions in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  The accounting information 
used in this study is downloaded from DATASTREAM.   
 
Measures of abnormal accruals are typically used as surrogates for earnings 
management (Frankel, Johnson & Nelson, 2002; Klein, 2002; Myers, Myers, & 
Omer, 2003).  Accruals refer to the recognition of revenue or expenses at the time 
they are earned or incurred, regardless of when the money is received or paid out.  
Accruals are defined as the difference between earnings and cash flow and, as such, 
they have the desirable trait of giving a summary measure of the firms accounting 
choice — ceteris paribus, firms with larger accruals are assumed to have lower-
quality earnings than firms with smaller accruals.  In earnings management research, 
accruals are usually further broken up into discretionary (unexpected) accruals and 
non-discretionary (expected) accruals: 
Total Accruals =  Earnings – Cash flow from operations = Expected accruals + 
Unexpected accruals 
Measurement of accruals typically focuses on the unexpected (also called abnormal) 
component of the accruals which assume that managers primarily rely on their 
discretion over certain accounting accruals as a means of manipulating earnings 
(Jones, 1991).  This is because the flexibility afforded through accrual accounting 
makes the accrual component of earnings less reliable than the cash flow component 
and therefore a potentially useful measure for examining the quality of financial 
reports. That is, normal accruals are economically determined, whereas abnormal 
accruals are determined by management and are therefore used as the proxy of 
earnings management.  
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Because they cannot be observed directly from financial statements, abnormal 
accruals are estimated as the difference between the actual observed accruals and an a 
priori estimation of what those accruals should have been. Therefore, the prediction 
ability of the models is vital to the accuracy of the abnormal accruals measure.  The 
literature attempts to identify abnormal accruals based on the relation between total 
accruals and hypothesized explanatory variables.  To estimate abnormal accruals, 
total accruals are regressed on variables that are proxies for normal accruals.  Most of 
the models estimate a firm’s normal accruals from the firm’s past accruals levels 
during periods when no systematic earnings management is assumed (Jones, 1991).  
Abnormal accruals are thus the unexplained components (i.e., the residuals from the 
estimated expectations models) of total accruals. 
 
The aggregate accruals literature began with Healy (1985), who devised the first and 
simplest model. The Healy model defines estimated discretionary accruals for firm i 
in period t as total accruals scaled by lagged total assets: 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 
where DACi,t is discretionary accruals for firm i in period t, TAi,t and Ai,t-1 are total 
accruals and total assets in period t and t - 1 for firm i. 
The Healy model assumes that expected normal accruals for the period are zero and 
hence that any non-zero value for total accruals is attributable to managerial 
discretion.  However, this assumption is likely to prove highly restrictive given that 
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the level of working capital accruals will fluctuate in response to economic conditions 
(Kaplan, 1985).  Subsequently, DeAngelo (1986) assumes that, for a steady-state 
firm, normal accruals in period t equal normal accruals in the previous period.  Thus, 
the change in total accruals is used as measure of management's discretion over 
earnings. The DeAngelo model is more specifically as follows: 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = � 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 −   𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1�𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1  
However, the steady-state assumption is not applied to most of the firms, and the 
normal accruals are not stationary across different business circumstances.  To 
address these problems Friedlan (1994) proposes a modified model as a means of 
controlling for non-stationarity in the non-discretionary accrual component, assuming 
that normal accruals to be constantly proportional to operating activity as measured 
by sales.  Although this model does not set high requirements on data availability, it 
lets non-discretionary accruals fluctuate between periods due to changes in 
circumstances. The Modified DeAngelo Model produces the discretionary accruals 
by the following equation: 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝑆𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1  
where Si,t and Si,t-1 are sales revenue in period t and t-1 for firm i, and all other 
variables are as previously determined. 
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The most widely used models for separating expected and discretionary accruals in 
studies of aggregate accruals are the Jones (1991) and modified Jones (Dechow, 
Sloan & Sweeney, 1995) models.  The tests of these models were implemented with 
sufficient time-series data to estimate firm specific coefficients, which were then used 
to estimate abnormal accruals for a particular year.  The Jones model is a time-series 
model that regresses total accruals on the level of property, plant and equipment 
(PPE), and changes in sales. The regression provides coefficients which are then used 
to estimate abnormal accruals as the unexplained (i.e. the residual) components of 
total accruals. The Jones model is as follows: 
 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛽0,i 1𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1,i  ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2,i  𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where ΔREVi,t is the change in revenues from year t-1 to year t for firm i; PPEi,t is 
gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i; εi,t is the error term in year t 
for firm i; and all other variables are as previously determined. 
 
The estimated coefficients from the Jones Model are then combined with data from 
the test period to generate the discretionary accruals, i.e.: 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 − �?̂?0,i 1𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + ?̂?1,𝑖  ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + ?̂?2,𝑖  𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡� 
Dechow et al. (1995) argue that because credit sales could also be a source of 
earnings management through inflated receivables, the first parameter should be 
corrected with the change in receivables.  Thus, they modify the Jones model by 
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adjusting the changes in the revenues by subtracting the corresponding change in 
receivables. This modified Jones model assumes that the change in revenues less the 
change in accounts receivable is free from managerial discretion (i.e., credit sales are 
assumed to be abnormal) and that capital intensity drives normal accruals.  Dechow et 
al. (1995) provide evidence that the modified Jones model is more powerful than the 
original model at detecting cases of revenue manipulation.  The modified Jones 
model for discretionary accruals is: 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 − �β�0,i 1𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + β�1,i � ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 −  ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡�𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + β�2,i  𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡� 
where ΔRECi,t is change in sales receivables between period t and t-1 for firm i, and 
all other variables are as previously determined.  
 
Despite the widespread use of accruals models (and especially the Jones model) as a 
proxy for earnings management (McNichols, 2000), the validity and reliability of 
these discretionary proxies for correctly distinguishing abnormal accruals from 
normal accruals have been criticized.  Dechow et al. (1995) find that all of the 
accruals models outlined above generate tests of low power for earnings management 
of economically plausible magnitudes (e.g. one to five per cent of total assets) and all 
models are poorly specified when they are applied to samples of firm-years 
experiencing extreme financial performance.  McNichols (2000, 2002) states that 
aggregate accrual models that do not consider long-term earnings growth are 
potentially mis-specified and can result in misleading inferences about earnings 
management behaviour.  For instance, investment in inventory and other assets is 
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likely to accompany growth phases of the firm’s life cycle — observing an increase 
in inventory in this circumstance is not necessarily due to opportunistic managerial 
behaviour — but, the modified Jones model classifies such increases as abnormal. 
 
With these limitations in mind, Larcker et al. (2007) advance the accruals research by 
including proxies for growth and current performance in the accruals estimation 
process.  They include the book-to-market ratio (BM) as a proxy for expected growth 
(they expect and find large positive accruals for growing firms).  They also include 
current operating cash flows to account for previous research findings that 
unexpected accruals are more likely to be mis-specified for firms with extreme levels 
of performance (Dechow et al., 1995; Young, 1999).  Larcker et al. (2007) also use a 
cross-sectional as opposed to a time series version of the modified Jones model.  Both 
approaches have their limitations — the time series approach assumes temporal 
stationarity of parameter estimates, whereas the cross-sectional approach assumes 
homogeneity across firms in the same industry (Bartov, Gul & Tsui, 2001; DeFond & 
Subramanyam, 1998).  However, the cross sectional approach has less restrictive data 
requirements.  The Larcker et al. (2007) model is then: 
𝐷𝐴𝐶 = 𝑇𝐴 − �?̂?0 + ?̂?1(∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶) + ?̂?2𝑃𝑃𝐸 + ?̂?3𝐵𝑀 + ?̂?4𝐶𝐹𝑂 +  𝜀� 
where all of the variables are, as before, scaled by total assets.  This model is similar 
to that employed in Dechow et al. (2003).  They show that this model i) has far 
greater explanatory power than the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model, ii) 
identifies unexpected accruals that are less persistent than other components of 
earnings, iii) identifies unexpected accruals that detect earnings manipulation 
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identified in SEC enforcement actions, and iv) identifies unexpected accruals that are 
associated with lower future earnings and lower future stock returns.  However, 
despite these improvements they acknowledge that attempts to decompose total 
accruals are still subject to the limitations of model misspecification.  Indeed, the 
inclusion of both BM and CFO is not without issue.  It is likely that incentives to 
manage earnings vary in response to growth opportunities and current operating 
performance.  Specifically, market expectations of future growth can place greater 
pressure on management to engage in earnings management (Dechow & Skinner, 
2000).  In addition, current performance can create incentives to engage in earnings 
management such that including these additional variables may be controlling for 
some of the variation in total accruals that Larcker et al. (2007) are seeking to 
identify.  However, a cross-sectional Jones-type model is not practical for the 
calculation of abnormal accruals for poorly performing companies (Reynolds & 
Francis, 2000). 
 
Consistent with Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998), DeFond and Park (2001) develop 
a proxy for abnormal accruals that uses the firm’s prior year accruals (rather than a 
longer time series inherent in Jones-type models) when calculating the expectation.  
Specifically, their proxy measures the difference between realised working capital 
and a proxy for the market’s expectations of the level of working capital needed to 
support current sales, i.e. expected accruals are based on a firm’s prior year ratio of 
current accruals to sales.  The intuition is that this difference is the proportion of 
working capital accruals that are expected to reverse against future earnings, i.e. are 
unlikely to be sustained.  This model is not a random walk model where this year’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 114 - 
 
 
current accruals are expected to equal last years.  Rather, accruals are assumed to be 
linearly related over time with sales that can be used to predict current period accruals 
for a given level of sales.  The DeFond and Park (2001) model is then: 
 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑡 =  𝑊𝐶𝑡 − � 𝑊𝐶𝑡−1𝑆𝑡−1 ∗  𝑆𝑡� 
where 𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑡  is the abnormal working capital accruals in year t;  𝑊𝐶𝑡  is the 
reported non-cash working capital in year t;  𝑆𝑡 is the sales in year t;  𝑊𝐶𝑡−1𝑆𝑡−1  = the 
working capital to sales  ratio in year t-1.   
 
Francis and Wang (2008) develop this model further to include the prior year’s ratio 
of depreciation expense to gross property, plant and equipment such that their model 
becomes: 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑡 = �𝑊𝐶𝑡 − � 𝑊𝐶𝑡−1𝑆𝑡−1 ∗  St�� − �𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 − � 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑛𝑡−1𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1 ∗  PPEt�� 
where 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡  = is the gross property, plant and equipment year t; 
 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑛𝑡−1
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1
 = the 
depreciation expense ratio in year t-1.  
 
It is a central contention of this study that an initial loss represents an unambiguous 
signal of underperformance.  Reynolds and Francis (2000) contend that the models 
presented heretofore may not be suitable for poorly performing companies.  In 
addition, due to the limited history of many of the firms in the sample being analysed 
in this study, there is not enough time data to reliably estimate abnormal accruals 
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using time series methods.  For these reasons the most suitable methods to estimate 
abnormal accruals is to use modified versions of those developed by DeFond and 
Park (2001) and Francis and Wang (2008).   
 
Because this chapter is primarily concerned with changes in abnormal accruals, the 
modification used in this study is in the choice of the year when the ratio for the 
‘normal’ level of accruals and the scaling variables are determined.  The ‘normal’ 
ratio and scaling variable which occurred two years before the loss year, i.e. (t – 2) is 
selected and these are then used to calculate abnormal accruals in each year thereafter 
across in the test period.  The reason the ratio and scaling variable are set in this 
manner is because this study is concerned with the unwinding of abnormal accruals.  
If the previous year’s ratio and scaling variable were used to calculate the level of 
abnormal accruals in each year of the test period (per the traditional DeFond and Park 
model) this would overestimate (i.e. introduce a negative bias into) the change in the 
abnormal accruals variable in the loss year. 
For this study abnormal accruals in the year before the loss (t – 1) are calculated as11    
𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 =  𝑊𝐶𝑡−1 − � 𝑊𝐶𝑡−2𝑆𝑡−2 ∗  𝑆𝑡−1�𝑇𝐴𝑡−2  
 
the abnormal accruals in the loss year, t, are calculated as 
𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡 =  𝑊𝐶𝑡 − � 𝑊𝐶𝑡−2𝑆𝑡−2 ∗  𝑆𝑡�𝑇𝐴𝑡−2  
                                                 
11 An alternative but similarly adjusted model specification developed by Francis and Wang (2008) is 
also used for the remainder of the thesis to test the robustness of the results related to abnormal 
accruals. 
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and the abnormal accruals in the year the loss firm returns to profitability, (t + 1)/(t + 
2)  
𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡+1/𝑡+2 =  𝑊𝐶𝑡+1/𝑡+2 − � 𝑊𝐶𝑡−2𝑆𝑡−2 ∗  𝑆𝑡+1/𝑡+2�𝑇𝐴𝑡−2  
 
where 𝑊𝐶𝑡  is the reported non-cash working capital in year t;𝑆𝑡 is the sales in year t;  𝑊𝐶𝑡−2
𝑆𝑡−2
 is the working capital to sales ratio set in year t – 2, and  𝑇𝐴𝑡−2 is the total 
assets (i.e. scaling variable) set in year t – 2. 
 
In the extant research there is little consensus as to whether the focus should be on 
raw (or signed) measure of abnormal accruals or their absolute value (Larcker et al., 
2007).  If the earnings management around the initial loss event is expected to be 
nondirectional such that loss firms can be expected to engage in income-increasing 
and income-decreasing behaviour, the research design should focus on deviations 
from a normal level of total accruals (Klein, 2002).  However, if it is assumed that 
initial loss firms, insofar as they display earnings management behaviour different 
from the control sample, are expected to attempt to avoid/defer the loss in the year 
before the loss then the relationship between the two is assumed to be directional and 
the appropriate metric is the raw (signed) value and the research design should focus 
on signed measures of abnormal accruals (Francis and Wang, 2008).  Using signed 
accruals also presents the possibility of capturing big bath behaviour on the part of 
loss firms in response to the loss, i.e. unwinding accruals by so much that abnormal 
accruals in the loss year are negative; analysing unsigned accruals would miss this 
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behaviour.  This study makes an assumption that the relationship between losses and 
earnings management is directional and so, for the remainder of this study, examines 
directional values for abnormal accruals.   
 
Other variables included as control variables in the empirical chapters of this study 
include cash flow from operations (𝐶𝐹𝑂) deflated by lagged total assets, leverage 
(LEV) calculated as total assets divided by total liabilities, and growth (GROWTH) 
calculated as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity, i.e. the 
book-to-market ratio.   
 
3.6.2  Market Variables 
 
The market based information used in this study is downloaded from 
DATASTREAM.  A market based variable included as a control variable in this 
study is the log of market value (𝐿𝑀𝑉) which is included to control for the potential 
effects of firm size.  Another market based variable included as a control variable in 
this study is return.  The appropriate construction of return measures is a matter of 
conjecture in the extent literature. For instance, Kothari and Sloan (1992) and El 
Shamy and Kayed (2005) align the end of the return window with the fiscal year in 
their study.  However the fiscal year end is, of course, not when earnings are 
announced and published and so it is argued that price (and hence the returns derived 
from them) do not have an opportunity to fully respond to the accounting numbers. 
To avoid this look-ahead bias, a contemporaneous analysis requires that the return 
interval corresponds with the earnings disclosure dates rather than the fiscal year end.  
 
 
 
 
 
 - 118 - 
 
 
For this reason Easton, Harris and Ohlson (1992), Jan and Ou (1995) and Collins et 
al. (1999) all include a three month period after the end of the fiscal year before 
collecting pricing information to ensure that companies in their sample will have 
reported (because of quarterly reporting requirements in the US all companies will 
typically have reported within three months of the fiscal year end) and that share 
prices have the opportunity to fully reflect the information content contained in the 
accounting numbers.   
 
Another issue in the extant literature is whether or not to include dividends in the 
estimation of the price and return measures; corporate finance theory is clear that 
dividends are often a significant contributor to total shareholder returns and should be 
included in price and measures of return for completeness.  For instance Jan and Ou 
(1995) use ex-dividend share price in their earnings capitalisation model to test for 
differences between the earnings response coefficient between loss and control firms 
as do El Shamy and Kayed (2005).  Collins et al. (1999), meanwhile use a cum-
dividend share price to test their earnings and book value model.   
 
This study is careful to ensure that the calculation of return is as comprehensive as 
possible, in line with corporate finance theory.  For this reason, because companies 
report every six-months in the U.K. (versus three months in the U.S.) and therefore 
have a longer period over which to report earnings, this study allows a six month 
window after fiscal year end before collecting cum-dividend price information (rather 
than just raw prices).  These cum dividend prices are then used to calculate twelve 
month measure of return around the fiscal year.  Specifically, the twelve month return 
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interval used in this study includes a six month window after the end of fiscal year 
end t (plus six months before the year-end) to ensure that companies in our sample 
will have reported the earnings Xt generated during the period (t – 1) to t.  The twelve 
month return measure also includes the forward twelve month dividend yield, 𝐷𝑡, for 
the twelve month period beginning six months prior to the financial year end are used 
to calculate the return measure, 𝑟𝑡 (see Figure 3.2, Panel A).   
 
This study also uses two twenty four month return intervals.  The first, a 
contemporaneous measure, includes an eighteen month window after the end of fiscal 
year end t (plus six months before the event).  The forward twelve month dividend 
yield, 𝐷𝑡, for the twelve month period beginning six months prior to the fiscal year 
end and the forward twelve month dividend yield, 𝐷𝑡+1, for the twelve month period 
beginning six months after the financial year end also included are used to calculate 
the return measure, 𝑟𝑡 (see Figure 3.2, Panel B).  The second, an anticipatory 
measure, is similar except with a six month window after the end of fiscal year end t 
(plus eighteen months before the event) (see Figure 3.2, Panel C).   
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Figure 3.2 The Construction of Return Variables 
Panel A: 12-month Return 
 
Panel B: Contemporaneous 24-month Return 
 
Panel C: Anticipatory 24-month Return 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 121 - 
 
 
This study follows Kothari and Sloan (1992) in assuming that any interim dividends 
are reinvested back into the firm (unlike Easton et al. (1992) who assume that these 
interim dividends are reinvested at the risk free rate).  This reinvestment assumption 
means that 𝐷𝑡 must also be adjusted to account for any capital gain/loss in the second 
twelve month period.  Also, because the information on dividend yield collected in 
this study are annual yields and the 24-month measures are comprehensive, 𝐷𝑡+1 
must also be adjusted to starting price 𝑃𝑡−1 from 𝑃𝑡.  The return measure for any 
twenty-four month period, t, is calculated as: 
 
𝑟𝑡 =  �𝑃𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑡−1𝑃𝑡−1 � + [𝐷𝑡 ∗  (1 + 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡+1)] + �𝐷𝑡+1 ∗ � 𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑡−1�� 
 
where 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡+1 =  �𝑃𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑡 � 
 
and 𝐷𝑡 and 𝐷𝑡+1 are the twelve month forward dividend yields. 
 
3.6.3  Descriptive Statistics 
 
The non-governance variables for this study, then, include abnormal accruals 
(AB_ACCR), the log of the market value of equity (LMV), cash flow from operations 
(CFO), leverage (LEV), growth (GROWTH) and Return.  All of these variables are 
winsorised at the 1% level to minimise the impact of outliers.  Table 9.2 in the 
Appendix includes detailed descriptive statistics for these winsorised variables — 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 122 - 
 
 
with the exception of Return which, as a change (in price) variable is detailed and 
analysed in Chapter 4.  It should be noted that the organisation of Table 9.2 is slightly 
different from Table 9.1 insofar as the post-periods (t + 1) and (t + 2) are combined 
into a single post-period (t + 1)/(t + 2). This is because in Chapter 5 the primary 
concern is with changes in abnormal accruals and so, to ensure that a firm has had the 
opportunity to change its accruals behaviour and that such changes are not 
contaminated with intervening losses, it is the return to profit year and not the 
passage of time which determines the post-period.  Therefore, whether the post-
period is (t + 1) or (t + 2) for each initial loss firm and its matched control firm 
depends on whether or not the loss firm returns to profitability in year (t + 1) or (t + 
2) after the initial loss event.  For initial loss firms that are subsequently liquidated or 
acquired in (t + 2) — none are liquidated or acquired in (t + 1) — the default post 
period is (t + 1).  Panel A of Table 9.2 then includes a combined panel made up from 
the pre-period (t – 1), the loss year (t), and the post-period (t + 1)/(t + 2) for the loss, 
control and combined samples.  Panels B, C and D of Table 9.2 include non-
corporate governance statistics for the loss and control samples for each of the years 
(t – 1), t, and (t + 1)/(t + 2), respectively.   
 
Of particular note are the apparent dissimilarities between the initial loss and control 
samples at (t – 1), the year before the initial loss, and the apparent subsequent 
unwinding of abnormal accruals.  Detailed univariate and multivariate analyses of 
whether the mean and median values of these variables are equivalent for the initial 
loss and control samples are included in Chapter 5 when the changes in the various 
non-corporate governance variables are calculated and considered. 
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3.7    Econometric Methods 
 
This section explains the primary econometric technique used in this study, 
i.e. the differences-in-differences method, to test for, inter alia, differences in 
changes in governance and abnormal accruals between the loss and control samples 
in response to the initial loss event. 
 
3.7.1  The Difference-in-Differences Method 
 
In the context of the analysis of experimental data, the simple comparison of 
the mean of the outcome in treatment and control groups (i.e. the differences 
estimator) is justified on the grounds that randomization guarantees that both groups 
should not have any systematic differences in any other pre-test variable.  This idea 
of trying to mimic an experiment suggests trying to find equivalents of test and 
control groups in which everything apart from the variable of interest (or other things 
that can be controlled for) are assumed to be the same. But this is often a very 
difficult claim to make because it is rarely possible to do so perfectly.  In such a case, 
any observed differences between test and control groups may be the result of some 
other omitted factors — this is one of the biggest criticisms of studies that examine 
pre- and post-period effects and draw conclusions accordingly.  
 
An alternative way to explain how the double differencing identifies the impact of an 
event is to start from the change observed over time among the beneficiaries (i.e. 
those who are impacted by the event).  This difference cannot be interpreted as the 
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impact of the event because many other factors and processes unfolding over time 
(besides the event) might have caused the observed change, i.e. it could be the result 
of omitted variables.  For instance, in an international study of the pre- and post-
period impact of IFRS, Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008) urge caution as regards 
attributing their findings to IFRS adoption because several EU countries also changed 
their enforcement and governance regimes at the same time.  In that study the 
absence of a matched sample of control firms not implementing IFRS standards 
(because such a control sample did not exist, i.e. firms could either voluntarily or 
mandatorily implement the standards; not to do so was not a choice) is the cause of 
the problem.  Marra, Mazzola and Prencipe (2011) experience similar problems in a 
study of IFRS adoption by Italian firms.  The authors are reduced to down-playing 
the impact of confounding concurrent events by pointing to the stability of the legal 
and governance environment during their study.  Other studies explain that focusing 
on one country reduces the need to control for confounding effects from country-
specific factors unrelated to the change event (i.e. Barth, Landsman & Lang, 2007).  
A study by Johnstone et al. (2011) on the impact of the disclosure of internal control 
material weaknesses has a similar problem due to the difficulty in defining precisely 
what the control sample should be and what firms it should include.  
 
Even if one cannot make the assumption that the test and control groups are the same 
in every respect (apart from the event being tested for) — for researchers in the social 
sciences, including business, this is an illegitimate assumption — one might be able 
to make the assumption that, in the absence of the event, the unobserved differences 
between test and control groups are the same over time.  One way to take these 
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natural dynamics into account is to compute the change over time among the non-
beneficiaries during the same period such that these non-beneficiaries act as a control 
group against which the impact of the event among the beneficiaries can be tested, 
i.e. subtracting the change observed over time among non-beneficiaries from that 
observed among beneficiaries produces an estimate of the impact of the event.  In this 
case data on test and control groups before the event can be used to estimate the 
normal difference between the test and control groups which can then be compared 
with the difference after the event. Obviously the existence of a control sample is 
necessary to properly implement this methodology, something that was not available 
to Daske et al. (2008) and Marra et al. (2011).  
 
For instance, define 𝜇𝑖𝑡 to be the mean of the outcome in group i at time t.  Define i = 
0 for the control group and i = 1 for the test group.  Define t = 0 to be the pre-period 
and t = 1 to be the post-period (though only the test group experiences the event).  
The difference estimator simply uses the difference in means between test and control 
groups in the post-period (𝜇11 − 𝜇10) as the estimate of the impact of the event.  
However, as discussed above, this assumes that the test and control groups have no 
other differences apart from the impact of the event, a very strong and largely 
unjustifiable assumption with non-experimental data.  A weaker assumption (and a 
more appropriate one for real world data) is that any differences in the change in 
means between the test and control groups is the result of the event i.e. that (𝜇11 −
𝜇01) − (𝜇10 − 𝜇00) is an estimate of the impact of the event — this is the differences-
in-differences (DID) estimator. 
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Figure 3.3 shows that if the estimate of (𝜇11 − 𝜇10) from the test sample is used then 
one would estimate the treatment effect as the distance AD — this estimate being 
based on the assumption that all underlying trends are irrelevant.  In contrast the DID 
estimator will take the normal difference between the test and control group as the 
distance CB and estimate the impact of the event as the distance AC.  The validity of 
this analysis is based on the assumption that the underlying trend is not irrelevant but 
is the same for both the test and control groups.  
 
Figure 3.3 Explaining Differences-in-Differences Estimation 
 
 
Since the work by Ashenfelter and Card (1985), the use of DID methods has become 
very widespread.  The simplest set up is one where outcomes are observed for two 
groups, test and control, for two time periods. One of the groups, test, is exposed to 
an event (beneficiaries) in the second period but not in the first period. The second 
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group is not exposed to the event (non-beneficiaries) during either period. In the case 
where the same units within a group are observed in each time period, the average 
gain in the second (control) group is subtracted from the average gain in the first 
(test) group. This removes biases in second period comparisons between the test and 
control group that could be the result from permanent differences between those 
groups, as well as biases from comparisons over time in the test group that could be 
the result of trends.  If sample average data is available for beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries for at least two time periods, the difference-in-differences method 
produces estimates of impacts that are in principle more plausible than those based on 
simple differences. 
 
Individual-level panel data where information on the same units is available in both 
the pre- and post- periods is a powerful tool for estimating the impact of an event.  In 
the simplest case there are two time periods, 0 and 1, where 
  
 
Control Test 
Year 0 a b 
Year 1 c d 
 
 and a binary program indicator, 𝐷𝑖𝑡, which is unity if unit i experiences the event (i.e. 
Test) at time t and zero otherwise (i.e. Control).  A simple, effective model then is 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑇t +  𝛾𝑓𝑖 +  𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,      𝑡 = 0, 1 
                    3.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 128 - 
 
 
where T is a time dummy variable such that T = 1 if t = 1 and zero otherwise, 𝑓𝑖 is an 
observed effect, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 are the idiosyncratic errors. The coefficients 𝛼,𝛽, 𝛾 and 𝛿 can 
be explained as follows:  
 
Coefficient Calculation 
𝛼 a 
𝛽 c – a 
𝛾 b – a 
𝛿 (d – b) – (c – a) 
 
where 𝛼 then is the baseline average from the control group, 𝛽 represents the time 
trend in the control group, 𝛾 represents the differences between the test and control 
sample in year 0, and the coefficient 𝛿, then, is the difference in the changes over 
time, i.e. represents the impact of the event.  Assuming that both the test and control 
groups experience the same natural dynamics equally over time, then the impact of 
macro-level variables have been controlled for such that the true impact of the event 
can be measured. 
 
Because information on the same units (firms) is available in both the pre- and post-
periods, a simple estimation procedure is to first difference equation 3.1 to remove 𝑓𝑖: 
 (𝑦𝑖1 − 𝑦𝑖0) =  𝛽 +  𝛿(𝐷𝑖1 − 𝐷𝑖0)  +  (𝑢𝑖1 − 𝑢𝑖0) 
or 
∆𝑦𝑖 =  𝛽 + 𝛿∆𝐷𝑖 + ∆𝑢𝑖 
                    3.2 
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If E(∆𝐷𝑖∆𝑢𝑖) = 0, that is, the occurrence of the event is uncorrelated with changes in 
the idiosyncratic errors, then OLS applied to equation 3.2 is consistent such that the 
ordinary least squares estimator  
𝛿 =  ∆𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 − ∆𝑦𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 
which is the difference-in-differences estimate where the means of the same units are 
differenced over time and  
?̂? =  ∆𝑦𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 
such that  
?̂? + 𝛿 =  ∆𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 
Expressing the differences-in-differences model in the form of equation 3.2 instead of 
3.1 also has the simplicity that other variables supposed to impact on the system can 
be included easily as follows: 
∆𝑦𝑖 =  𝛽 + 𝛿∆𝐷𝑖 + 𝜃𝑗∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + ∆𝑢𝑖 
                    3.3 
It is the DID model in equation 3.3 which is used in the empirical chapters (4, 5 and 
6) of this thesis to test for the impact of a initial loss event on the beneficiaries of that 
event, i.e. to test the difference in the changes in managerial choices between the 
initial loss and control firms.  For this reason, an appreciation of the econometric 
merit of the model, its robustness, as well as the assumptions underlying the model 
are essential if the significance of the results in the empirical chapters to follow are to 
be fully appreciated. 
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On the practical side, the need for pre-event outcome data often represents an 
insurmountable obstacle for DID.  This is most often due to a lack of planning in data 
collection; this is not a problem for this study as all of the information regarding 
losses is readily available.  Conceptually, the simplicity of the DID method comes at 
a price.  As discussed, the crucial identifying assumption in using DID in this study is 
that the counterfactual trend is the same for the initial loss and control samples. 
Referencing Figure 3.3, if, for example, the underlying trend was greater in the test 
group then AC overestimates the change in the test group.  Although it is a 
fundamental assumption of DID that this is the case, this identifying assumption can 
never be tested.  Notwithstanding this drawback, the equivalence of natural dynamics 
is a better assumption than ignoring their impact altogether and is one that is suitable 
for the sample collected in this study.   
 
In making explicit the trade-off between data and assumptions (neither of which 
causes problems for this study) the DID method is an excellent research tool for non-
experimental methods.  In that regard the DID method is a research method that 
closely approximates the experimental method of the natural sciences and is therefore 
an extremely robust and useful experimental model for social science researchers.  
 
3.7.2  Conditioning Terms 
 
As detailed in Section 3.2, this study includes several hypotheses to test the 
impact of the initial loss event on managerial choices, i.e. changes in corporate 
governance and abnormal accruals.  While the DID model is ideally suited to test the 
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average impact of the initial loss, an additional convincing analysis is available by 
further refining the definition of test and control groups.  This study also includes 
these types of more nuanced analyses that test the impact of the initial loss event 
conditioned other variables, i.e. the quality of corporate governance and/or the 
severity of the loss.  With some modifications, equation 3.3 can be amended to 
include the impact of conditioning interactions to test a variety of additional 
hypotheses.   
 
For instance, in the general from, assuming the conditioning variable has two states, a 
‘low’ state,  p and a ‘high’ state, q, equation 3.3. then becomes: 
 
∆𝑦𝑖 =  𝛽 +  𝛿1∆𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑝 + 𝛿2∆𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑞 + 𝜃𝑗∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + ∆𝑢𝑖 
                    3.4 
where ∆𝐷𝑖 is a binary program indicator which is unity if firm i experiences the event 
(i.e. test) and zero otherwise (i.e. control).  As constructed, coefficients  𝛿1 and 𝛿2 
then compare the ‘low’ and ‘high’ (p and q) conditioned test sub-samples, 
respectively, to the entire control sample such that  
 
𝛿1 =  ∆𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑏−𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 − ∆𝑦𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 
and   
𝛿2 =  ∆𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑏−𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 − ∆𝑦𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 
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3.7.3  Endogeneity 
 
Endogeneity arises when a variable that affects both the outcome and 
explanatory variables is not included in the regression model or when the outcome 
and explanatory variables are simultaneously determined (i.e., simultaneous 
causality).  Endogeneity is such a prevalent problem in corporate governance research 
that editors of leading journals now expect researchers to identify and address any 
suspect endogeneity problems inherent in the research question (Brown et al., 2011).  
It follows that any study that unreasonably ignores the possibility of endogeneity 
while making a causal argument regarding the impact of corporate governance, is at 
the very least incomplete.  In the absence of a valid method to deal with the problem, 
Larcker and Rusticus (2010) explain that the researcher should report how big the 
endogeneity problem has to be in order to change the OLS results. 
 
Given that it is losses and corporate governance that are at issue in Chapter 4 of this 
study, if the endogeneity between losses and corporate governance is caused by 
unobserved heterogeneity (a time invariant ‘Z’ variable related to both losses and 
governance) then a first difference model will fix the problem such that the time 
variant unobservable variable(s) is/are cancelled out such that any relation that 
remains cannot be attributable to endogeneity that arises from such an effect.  
Therefore, by happenstance, the difference-in-difference analysis solves this 
endogeneity problem in its construction, i.e. the difference-in-differences 
methodology deals with the omitted variables problem, regardless of whether or not 
those variables are correlated.   
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If the endogeneity is caused by simultaneous causality then the explanatory variables 
influence the outcome variable at the same time as the outcome variable influences 
the explanatory variable.  Again, the difference in difference approach solves this 
problem at source.  That is, given that the reporting of an initial loss is potentially a 
manifestation of agency costs, the expectation is that corporate governance will likely 
change (and most likely improve) in response to (and potentially in anticipation of) 
the announcement of the loss.  It does not make sense to argue the contrary — that an 
improvement in corporate governance causes the initial loss.  If corporate governance 
is inherently sticky such that governance variables are, in the main, not revamped that 
often (Brown et al., 2011) and the loss is shown to unstick governance (causing it to 
change) then the causation is in one direction only, i.e. endogeneity between the 
initial loss event and the change in corporate governance variables is not a problem.  
That said, however, using the quality of corporate governance as a conditioning 
explanatory variable in the equation potentially introduces another source of 
endogeneity.  To solve this potential problem the corporate governance conditioning 
variables used in this study are those at time (t – 1), not time t.  While it can be 
argued that the change in corporate governance after time (t – 1) influences the 
corporate governance level at time t, it cannot be argued that the change in corporate 
governance after time (t – 1) influences the corporate governance level at time (t – 1) 
and so a potential endogeneity problem is solved by lagging the governance 
conditioning variables.  However, it can be argued that because corporate governance 
at time (t – 1) influences both the change in corporate governance thereafter (i.e. 
worse governed firms have more room to improve) and can influence (via 
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endogenously related poor management) corporate performance (the loss in this 
case), then endogeneity is still a potential problem.  However, losses are more likely 
to be primarily caused by exogenous factors that are not related to corporate 
governance levels at time (t – 1).  The equivalence of ex-ante corporate governance 
between the initial loss and control firms (detailed in Chapter 4) will also indicate 
whether this more subtle endogeneity is an issue for this study.  
 
Similarly Chapter 5 is concerned with, inter alia, initial losses and abnormal accruals.  
There is a potential endogeneity problem if, as well as the loss causing changes in the 
abnormal accruals behaviour of loss firms (in anticipation of the loss), the change in 
abnormal accruals can be argued to cause the loss.  This would be true if the 
abnormal accruals behaviour of firms was continuous across all net income ranges 
(profit and loss).  The literature is clear that firms manage earnings upward to achieve 
earnings targets of which positive profits (i.e. loss avoidance) is one example 
(Burgstaler & Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Brown & Caylor, 2005).  Given 
that this study is concerned with the change in abnormal accruals behaviour in 
response to (and potentially in anticipation of) the loss, the expectation is that positive 
abnormal accruals will unwind (decrease) once the loss occurs.  Again, it does not 
make sense to argue the contrary — that a decrease in abnormal accruals causes the 
initial loss.  That is, if the loss is shown to change abnormal accruals behaviour then 
the causation is in one direction only.  Because neither of the conditioning variables 
used to describe the severity of the loss in chapter 5 can be argued to cause any 
observed change in abnormal accruals then it cannot be argued that these variables 
introduce endogeneity into the models used. 
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In short, as the models are constructed, endogeneity is not a major problem for this 
study. 
 
3.7.4  Wald Tests 
 
Social scientists often compare sets of coefficients in multiple models where 
comparisons among groups are desirable.  A widely used test for comparing whether 
the coefficients in two linear regressions on different data sets are equal is the Chow 
test (Chow, 1960).   In econometrics, the Chow test is most commonly used in time 
series, i.e. it is the standard F-test for testing the equality of two sets of coefficients in 
linear regression models across time.  In econometrics Chow tests are a special a 
form of F-test that check the stability of regression coefficients over two or more 
sub samples of the data.  Chow tests are often used in time series analysis to test for 
the presence of a structural break.  This is normally done by running a regression 
for the whole sample then running the same regression for subsamples and 
comparing the sums of squared residuals (SSRs).  An F-test for the constraint 
that the two sets of coefficients are equal can be computed from the SSRs 
 
Testing the simultaneous significance of all the regressions coefficients is all very 
well but social science researchers will often want to test and compare the specific 
properties of individual variables.  For this type of analysis there are various 
techniques available including Wald, Likelihood Ratio (LR) and the Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) tests.  Whereas Engle (1983) showed that all three are asymptotically 
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equivalent, the Wald test differs from the LR and the LM tests in at least two 
important aspects.  First, Wald's test explicitly expresses the hypothesis to be tested 
as a functional restriction of the parameters of the model under examination, and this 
is sometimes a desirable property.  For example, a parameter in one group may be 
expressed as three times as large as (or equal to, or any other function, of) the same 
parameter in another group — for a single parameter the Wald statistic is just the 
square of the t-statistic.  Second, the Wald test only requires the unrestricted model 
represented by an alternative hypothesis to be estimated, i.e. it only requires 
estimating one model; in comparison (and similar to the Chow test discussed above) 
the LM test requires the restricted model to be estimated, and the LR test requires 
both the restricted and the unrestricted models to be estimated, thus requiring two 
paths of computation.  In the social sciences researchers often prefer to present results 
separately for the social groups being analysed (the unrestricted model), thereby 
making the Wald test a natural choice. 
The Wald test works by testing the null hypothesis that a set of parameters is equal to 
some value, i.e. how far the estimated parameters are from zero (or any other value 
under the null hypothesis) in standard errors, similar to the hypothesis tests typically 
printed in regression output.  The difference is that the Wald test can be used to test 
multiple parameters simultaneously, while the tests typically printed in regression 
output only test one parameter at a time. 
Wald tests are used in this study to test the significance of combinations of 
coefficients as well as to the equivalence of coefficients.  Specifically, Wald test are 
used to test the following hypotheses: 
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1. (in equation 3.3) that 𝛽 + 𝛿 = 0, i.e. if the test sample coefficient is 
significant where 𝛽 is the control sample coefficient and 𝛿 is the difference 
between the test and control sample coefficients.  
2. (in question 3.4) that 𝛽 + 𝛿1 = 0 and 𝛽 + 𝛿2 = 0, i.e. if the coefficients of the 
‘low’ and ‘high’ loss sub-samples are significant  
3. (in question 3.4) that 𝛿1 = 𝛿2, i.e. if the difference between the entire control 
sample and the ‘low’ and ‘high’ test sub-samples is the same 
 
3.8   Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter provides a number of important descriptions and discussions 
which are essential to the subsequent empirical chapters of this study.  It outlines the 
research framework, introduces the research objective, specifies the research 
questions and hypotheses, reports the data collection process, details the variable 
construction process and briefly describes the variables used and adapted in later 
chapters.  It also provides a discussion of econometric issues in relation to main 
modelling technique employed in this thesis as well as the diagnostic tests used to test 
the post-estimation coefficients.  
 
In particular, this chapter discusses selection of the initial loss sample and, because 
this is a comparison study, a matched control sample.  The only difference is that the 
control firms do not report a loss during the test period.  Corporate governance 
information is manually collected from the annual reports of these initial loss and 
control samples for each year of the test period.  This information is then constructed 
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into variables, and amalgamations where appropriate, to maximise the quality of the 
information.  Factor analysis is used to identify commonalities, or factors, underlying 
the measures of corporate governance.  These factors are unobservable but manifest 
themselves through these observable outcomes such the three governance 
amalgamations used in this study (Board, Chair and Ownership) can be constructed.  
The construction of the other governance variables in this study (Diversity and Board 
Size) is also explained. 
 
The methods used for the estimation of earnings management are also explained.  
Accounting and market data are downloaded from Datastream/Worldscope.  
Following from the literature review in Chapter 2, a modified version of the DeFond 
and Park (2001) measure for calculating abnormal accruals is selected as the primary 
proxy for earnings management because this is the most appropriate for the samples 
selected and characteristics of this study.  The Francis and Wang (2008) model is also 
explained as it is used for tests of robustness in the empirical chapters of this study. 
 
The chapter also explains how the difference-in-difference (DID) model used 
throughout this study.  The implications that the use of this econometric method has 
for the general robustness of the results in this study, and the endogeneity problem in 
particular, are explained.  The chapter also includes an explanation of how the DID 
model can be interacted with conditioning variables to further analyse the impact of 
the initial loss event in order to test the more nuanced hypotheses in this study.  The 
chapter also explains the Wald test and the usefulness of this test for testing the linear 
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hypotheses after estimation (i.e. to test the significance and equivalence of post 
estimation coefficients). 
 
The next three chapters will present and discuss the empirical findings for the 
hypotheses developed in section 3.2 using from the estimation models outlined and 
variables constructed in this chapter.  
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Chapter 4 
Initial Losses and Corporate Governance 
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4.1  Introduction 
 
The literature analysed in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 detailed that, 
notwithstanding its inherent stickiness and uniformity, corporate governance changes 
in response to shocks or crisis situations.  Using the sample detailed previously in 
Chapter 3, this chapter extends this literature by using the argument developed in 
section 2.4 of Chapter 2 to analyse the impact of an initial loss on corporate 
governance.  Specifically, this chapter isolates initial loss firms trading on the London 
Stock Exchange which reported an initial loss in the period 2004–2006 to investigate 
whether the initial loss event induces any change in corporate governance over a 
sample period versus a control sample.  In line with the arguments pertaining to the 
conditioning variables outlined throughout Chapter 2, this chapter also utilises the 
quality of corporate governance in this regard to test for the exacerbating/mitigating 
impact of ex-ante bad/good corporate governance for governance changes at initial 
loss firms.   
 
The chapter is organised as follows: section 4.2 explains the construction of the 
corporate governance change variables used in this study.  Section 4.3 provides some 
univariate statistics pertaining to the levels and changes in these corporate 
governance change variables for the initial loss and control firm samples.  Section 4.4 
presents evidence from a DID analysis on the average impact of the reporting of the 
initial loss on corporate governance changes at initial loss firms.  Section 4.5 presents 
evidence from a DID analysis on the mitigating impact of the quality of ex-ante 
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corporate governance on this relationship in response to the initial loss.  Section 4.6 
summarises and concludes. 
 
4.2  Corporate Governance Changes 
 
This section analyses corporate governance changes around the initial loss 
event.  Chapter 3 explained that the data collected for this study includes corporate 
governance metrics for both the initial loss and control firms for each year from the 
year preceding the initial loss to the second year after the occurrence of the initial 
loss.   
 
A fundamental prediction of this chapter is that an initial loss is an exogenous event 
that motivates a firm to undertake change.  Change may be necessary since if initial 
losses perpetuate the firm will fail.  We predict that firms have sufficient knowledge 
about their performance to anticipate the reporting of an initial loss.  Accordingly this 
study predicts that the initial loss will motivate changes that appear to predate the 
initial loss itself.  For this reason, the collection of corporate governance metrics in 
the year prior to the initial loss event is particularly important.  Given their intimate 
knowledge of the firm, management, the board and significant shareholders are well 
placed to anticipate an initial loss.  A distinct possibility is that much of any changes 
in corporate governance could already have occurred by the time the company 
actually reports the initial loss.  Obviously some corporate governance metrics lend 
themselves to quicker changes than others so it is difficult, a priori, to predict the 
specifics of the pace of change.  Unless this look ahead bias is accounted for, this 
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study could miss real corporate governance changes because the model is 
misspecified, i.e. if corporate governance changes between (t – 1) and t then it is 
argued that it is the corporate governance in place at (t – 1) which is associated with 
the initial loss in year t rather than that in place at time t.  Tracking corporate 
governance changes only after time t risks missing a significant part of the 
relationship that this study is specifically looking to investigate.  It is for this reason 
that this study is careful to collect corporate governance data for the year preceding 
the initial loss, thereby facilitating the construction of change variables from this 
starting point.  Modelling corporate governance variables with accounting outcomes 
(i.e. initial losses in this case) can give rise to endogeneity if one believes that 
corporate governance influences the initial loss at the same time that the initial loss 
influences governance, i.e. simultaneous causality.  However, as discussed in Section 
3.7.1 of Chapter 3, the way the DID estimation models are constructed in this thesis 
mitigates this particular endogeneity problem.   
 
The expectation is that initial loss firms will have greater changes (improvements) in 
Board, Chair and Diversity than will their corresponding control firms over the same 
period.   
 
Ownership also likely plays a key monitoring role but it is difficult to predict changes 
relating to block and professional shareholders around the initial loss event because 
Ownership can possibly change for valuation and portfolio rebalancing reasons as 
well as in response to the initial loss.  In addition, it is also difficult to predict the 
changes in management and director ownership variables around the initial loss event 
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given that there could be a turnover in management and directors following (or in 
anticipation of) the initial loss event which would impact on the ownership 
information listed on annual reports.  Complications for the interpretation of the 
Ownership variable are further compounded in this study as a result of the different 
signs on the insider and outsider ownership variables used to construct Ownership in 
Section 3.5.3 of Chapter 3.  These opposite signs make any interpretation of whether 
changes in Ownership are due to insiders exploiting their information advantage 
and/or outsiders reacting to (non-earnings) published information is difficult to 
establish.  That said, however, as discussed in Chapter 3, the mean director ownership 
percentage (%Tot. Dir. Own.) for initial loss firms in this study is 15.0% — well 
within the management entrenchment range for UK data (Short and Keasey, 1999).  
In such a context increased management ownership can only be seen as detrimental to 
good corporate governance.  Therefore, this study predicts that Ownership should 
also improve (increase) since an increase in professional ownership and a decrease in 
management ownership would be considered an improvement when management is, 
on average, already relatively high.  This study, also separately analyses the total 
professional ownership variable (% Tot. Prof. Own.) and total director ownership 
variable (% Tot. Dir. Own.) for completeness.   
 
It is not really possible to determine whether an increase or decrease in board size can 
be considered an improvement since it is not possible to be categorical about the 
optimum size of a board.  Changes from board sizes that are significantly above or 
below the mean (median) toward the mean (median) could both be viewed as 
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positive, making changes in this variable more difficult to interpret. Thus all we can 
predict of BSize is that it is likely to change around the time of the initial loss. 
 
The hypothesis to perform the analysis in this Chapter, stated in the null form, is: 
 
H4.1:  there is no association between the reporting of an initial loss and 
changes in corporate governance. 
 
4.3  Univariate Analysis of Corporate Governance: Levels and 
Changes 
 
 Table 9.1 in the Appendix provis detailed descriptive statistics of corporate 
governance variables in each of the four years beginning in year (t – 1).  However, 
the primary objective of this Chapter is to test for changes in corporate governance 
resulting from the initial loss event.  To this end the detailed corporate governance 
levels information contained in Table 9.1 in the Appendix is used to estimate the 
changes in the corporate governance variables during the test periods.   
 
Table 4.1, Panels A, B, C and D outline the direction and magnitude of changes in the 
corporate governance variables for the initial loss and control firms from time (t – 1) 
to the end of each of the next three years finishing at time (t + 2) for panels A, B and 
C, respectively, and from time t to (t + 1) for Panel D.   
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The method used to calculate the corporate governance changes in Table 4.1 is 
illustrated in Figure 4.1; Δ1 is the change in corporate governance from year (t – 1) to 
year t (i.e. corresponding to the twelve month period the initial loss is ‘earned’ and in 
anticipation of the reporting of the initial loss event) in Panel A, Δ2 is the change in 
corporate governance from year (t – 1) to year (t + 1) in Panel B, Δ3 is the change in 
corporate governance from year (t – 1) to year (t + 2) in Panel C and Δ4 is the change 
in corporate governance from year t to year (t + 1) in Panel D. 
Figure 4.1 How Corporate Governance Changes are Calculated 
 
 
Table 4.1 also includes tests to compare the mean and median corporate governance 
levels between the initial loss and control firms in each period as well as the mean 
and median corporate governance changes between the initial loss and control firms 
for each of the four test periods outlined above in Panels A, B, C and D respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 148 - 
 
 
Table 4.1 Univariate tests of Preperiod and Postperiod Differences and Difference-in-Differences in Corporate Governance Levels
and Changes Between the Initial Loss and Control Samples 
Test Period ∆1
p -value of testing p -value of testing
Panel A preperiod postperiod p -value of testing
n = 138 n = 138 n = 138 n = 138 n = 138 n = 138 differences differecnes DIDs
Preperiod Postperiod Change Sig. of Change Preperiod Postperiod Change Sig. of Change col. (1) minus (5) col. (2) minus (6) col. (3) minus (7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Mean Mean Mean Two-tailed p -values: Mean Mean Mean Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values:
(Median) (Median) (Median) t -test (Median) (Median) (Median) t -test t -test t -test t -test
[st. dev] [st. dev] [st. dev] Signrank [st. dev] [st. dev] [st. dev] Signrank Signrank Signrank Signrank
Board -0.037 0.051 0.090 0.03 -0.063 -0.078 -0.015 0.70 0.78 0.19 0.07
(-0.067) (0.089) (0.000) 0.04 (0.080) (-0.067) (0.000) 0.66 0.57 0.17 0.07
[0.777] [0.837] [0.495] [0.853] [0.860] [0.468]
Chair 0.060 0.064 0.010 0.77 -0.108 -0.078 0.030 0.29 0.12 0.21 0.68
(0.273) (0.273) (0.000) 0.10 ('0.273) (0.272) (0.000) 0.20 0.12 0.15 0.75
[0.891] [0.901] [0.413] [0.903] [0.904] [0.328]
Diversity 0.091 0.108 0.019 <0.01 0.071 0.080 0.009 0.16 0.21 0.06 0.20
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) <0.01 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.19 0.24 0.09 0.19
[0.142] [0.150] [0.150] [0.118] [0.123] [0.073]
Ownership -0.033 0.114 0.154 <0.01 -0.189 -0.110 0.079 <0.01 0.09 0.02 0.04
(-0.001) (0.221) (0.091) <0.01 (-0.178) (-0.092) (0.044) <0.01 0.07 0.02 0.04
[0.758] [0.791] [0.346] [0.785] [0.768] [0.232]
BSize 6.725 6.708 -0.036 0.70 6.623 6.630 0.007 0.93 0.68 0.76 0.73
(6.000) (6.000) (0.000) 0.50 (6.000) (6.000) (0.000) 0.82 0.19 0.41 0.94
[2.177] [2.122] [1.127] [2.594] [2.494] [1.001]
%Tot.Prof.Own. 0.294 0.337 0.045 <0.01 0.266 0.284 0.018 <0.01 0.23 0.03 0.02
(0.282) (0.333) (0.022) <0.01 (0.241) (0.282) (0.002) <0.01 0.19 0.04 0.05
[0.192] [0.207] [0.120] [0.193] [0.193] [0.075]
%Tot.Dir.Own. 0.142 0.127 -0.015 <0.01 0.185 0.170 -0.015 <0.01 0.06 0.08 0.96
(0.054) (0.048) (-0.001) <0.01 (0.102) (0.084) (-0.001) <0.01 0.04 0.03 0.91
[0.189] [0.184] [0.048] [0.210] [0.206] [0.040]
(Continued)
Initial Loss Firms Control Firms
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Table 4.1  Continued Test Period ∆2
p -value of testing p -value of testing
Panel B Preperiod Postperiod p -value of testing
n = 138 n = 114 n = 114 n = 138 n = 124 n = 124 differences differecnes DIDs
Preperiod Postperiod Change Sig. of Change Preperiod Postperiod Change Sig. of Change col. (1) minus (5) col. (2) minus (6) col. (3) minus (7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Mean Mean Mean Two-tailed p -values: Mean Mean Mean Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values:
(Median) (Median) (Median) t -test (Median) (Median) (Median) t -test t -test t -test t -test
[st. dev] [st. dev] [st. dev] Signrank [st. dev] [st. dev] [st. dev] Signrank Signrank Signrank Signrank
Board -0.037 0.115 0.178 <0.01 -0.063 -0.054 0.031 0.54 0.78 0.22 0.17
(-0.067) (0.200) (0.038) <0.01 (0.080) (-0.102) (0.000) 0.12 0.57 0.10 0.13
[0.777] [0.967] [0.714] [0.853] [0.908] [0.567]
Chair 0.060 0.171 0.120 0.09 -0.108 -0.113 0.033 0.46 0.12 <0.01 0.41
(0.273) (0.614) (0.000) 0.05 ('0.273) (0.273) (0.000) 0.48 0.12 <0.01 0.38
[0.891] [0.900] [0.744] [0.903] [0.893] [0.498]
Diversity 0.091 0.104 0.019 0.07 0.071 0.076 0.005 0.49 0.21 0.02 0.31
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.03 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.78 0.24 0.03 0.31
[0.142] [0.150] [0.110] [0.118] [0.127] [0.084]
Ownership -0.033 0.161 0.209 <0.01 -0.189 -0.070 0.167 <0.01 0.09 0.03 0.58
(-0.001) (0.262) (0.185) <0.01 (-0.178) (0.019) (0.107) <0.01 0.07 0.02 0.68
[0.758] [0.762] [0.480] [0.785] [0.761] [0.409]
BSize 6.725 6.632 -0.246 0.07 6.623 6.653 -0.113 0.31 0.68 0.69 0.67
(6.000) (7.000) (0.000) 0.10 (6.000) (6.000) (0.000) 0.47 0.19 0.29 0.93
[2.177] [1.979] [1.449] [2.594] [2.541] [1.238]
%Tot.Prof.Own. 0.294 0.348 0.061 <0.01 0.266 0.298 0.042 <0.01 0.23 0.06 0.36
(0.282) (0.341) (0.037) <0.01 (0.241) (0.294) (0.026) <0.01 0.19 0.08 0.54
[0.192] [0.209] [0.160] [0.193] [0.187] [0.138]
%Tot.Dir.Own. 0.142 0.118 -0.019 0.01 0.185 0.173 -0.024 <0.01 0.06 0.03 0.41
(0.054) (0.030) (-0.002) <0.01 (0.102) (0.089) (-0.007) <0.01 0.04 0.01 0.22
[0.189] [0.169] [0.076] [0.210] [0.205] [0.050]
(Continued)
Initial Loss Firms Control Firms
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Table 4.1  Continued Test Period ∆3
p -value of testing p -value of testing
Panel C Preperiod Postperiod p -value of testing
n = 138 n = 102 n = 102 n = 138 n = 110 n = 110 differences differecnes DIDs
Preperiod Postperiod Change Sig. of Change Preperiod Postperiod Change Sig. of Change col. (1) minus (5) col. (2) minus (6) col. (3) minus (7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Mean Mean Mean Two-tailed p -values: Mean Mean Mean Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values:
(Median) (Median) (Median) t -test (Median) (Median) (Median) t -test t -test t -test t -test
[st. dev] [st. dev] [st. dev] Signrank [st. dev] [st. dev] [st. dev] Signrank Signrank Signrank Signrank
Board -0.037 0.109 0.157 0.05 -0.063 -0.000 0.107 0.05 0.78 0.61 0.96
(-0.067) (0.164) (0.095) <0.01 (0.080) (-0.003) (0.000) 0.05 0.57 0.46 0.71
[0.777] [0.978] [0.787] [0.853] [0.940] [0.555]
Chair 0.060 0.085 0.013 0.87 -0.108 0.050 0.099 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.17
(0.273) (0.273) (0.000) 0.71 ('0.273) (0.273) (0.000) 0.18 0.12 0.07 0.21
[0.891] [0.912] [0.831] [0.903] [0.880] [0.590]
Diversity 0.091 0.102 0.014 0.26 0.071 0.075 0.007 0.42 0.21 0.04 0.99
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.07 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.65 0.24 0.06 0.87
[0.142] [0.150] [0.129] [0.118] [0.125] [0.097]
Ownership -0.033 0.260 0.299 <0.01 -0.189 -0.055 0.197 <0.01 0.09 <0.01 0.21
(-0.001) (0.398) (0.226) <0.01 (-0.178) (0.055) (0.155) <0.01 0.07 <0.01 0.37
[0.758] [0.722] [0.579] [0.785] [0.768] [0.437]
BSize 6.725 6.431 -0.353 0.03 6.623 6.882 -0.009 0.94 0.68 0.12 0.13
(6.000) (6.000) (0.000) 0.07 (6.000) (7.000) (0.000) 0.68 0.19 0.29 0.13
[2.177] [1.932] [1.639] [2.594] [2.452] [1.303]
%Tot.Prof.Own. 0.294 0.376 0.091 <0.01 0.266 0.302 0.055 <0.01 0.23 0.01 0.15
(0.282) (0.385) (0.071) <0.01 (0.241) (0.293) (0.037) <0.01 0.19 0.02 0.26
[0.192] [0.208] [0.178] [0.193] [0.189] [0.142]
%Tot.Dir.Own. 0.142 0.106 -0.024 0.02 0.185 0.170 -0.028 <0.01 0.06 <0.01 0.93
(0.054) (0.018) (-0.003) <0.01 (0.102) (0.068) (-0.009) <0.01 0.04 <0.02 0.40
[0.189] [0.160] [0.106] [0.210] [0.209] [0.064]
(Continued)
Initial Loss Firms Control Firms
 
 
 
 
 - 151 - 
 
 
Table 4.1  Continued Test Period ∆4
p -value of testing p -value of testing
Panel D Preperiod Postperiod p -value of testing
n = 138 n = 114 n = 114 n = 138 n = 124 n = 124 differences differecnes DIDs
Preperiod Postperiod Change Sig. of Change Preperiod Postperiod Change Sig. of Change col. (1) minus (5) col. (2) minus (6) col. (3) minus (7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Mean Mean Mean Two-tailed p -values: Mean Mean Mean Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values:
(Median) (Median) (Median) t -test (Median) (Median) (Median) t -test t -test t -test t -test
[st. dev] [st. dev] [st. dev] Signrank [st. dev] [st. dev] [st. dev] Signrank Signrank Signrank Signrank
Board 0.051 0.115 0.045 0.38 -0.078 -0.054 0.025 0.53 0.19 0.22 0.95
(0.089) (0.200) (0.000) 0.33 (-0.067) (-0.102) (0.000) 0.66 0.17 0.10 0.68
[0.837] [0.967] [0.550] [0.860] [0.908] [0.444]
Chair 0.064 0.171 0.119 0.05 -0.078 -0.113 -0.000 0.99 0.21 <0.01 0.10
(0.273) (0.614) (0.000) 0.06 (0.272) (0.273) (0.000) 0.99 0.15 <0.01 0.26
[0.901] [0.900] [0.655] [0.904] [0.893] [0.398]
Diversity 0.108 0.104 0.001 0.90 0.080 0.076 -0.010 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.44
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.29 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.78 0.09 0.03 0.51
[0.150] [0.150] [0.080] [0.123] [0.127] [0.069]
Ownership 0.114 0.161 0.059 0.15 -0.110 -0.070 0.097 <0.01 0.02 0.03 0.55
(0.221) (0.262) (0.042) 0.04 (-0.092) (0.019) (0.027) <0.01 0.02 0.02 0.66
[0.791] [0.762] [0.438] [0.768] [0.761] [0.338]
BSize 6.708 6.632 -0.289 0.01 6.630 6.653 -0.113 0.18 0.76 0.69 0.46
(6.000) (7.000) (0.000) 0.01 (6.000) (6.000) (0.000) 0.15 0.41 0.29 0.48
[2.122] [1.979] [1.232] [2.494] [2.541] [0.930]
%Tot.Prof.Own. 0.337 0.348 -0.006 0.32 0.284 0.298 0.029 <0.01 0.03 0.06 0.61
(0.333) (0.341) (-0.000) <0.01 (0.282) (0.294) (0.006) <0.01 0.04 0.08 0.75
[0.207] [0.209] [0.063] [0.193] [0.187] [0.122]
%Tot.Dir.Own. 0.127 0.118 0.016 0.24 0.170 0.173 -0.008 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.72
(0.048) (0.030) (0.009) 0.05 (0.084) (0.089) (-0.000) <0.01 0.03 0.01 0.15
[0.184] [0.169] [0.148] [0.206] [0.205] [0.033]
Initial Loss Firms Control Firms
This table provides some summary statistics and includes univariate tests of significance for the corporate governance variables for the initial loss and control samples for time periods
from time t -1 to t + 2, as well as tests of the difference in the Pre- and Post-period values between the initial loss and control samples and tests of the difference-in-difference (DID) between the initial loss 
and control samples for the test periods ∆1, ∆2, ∆3 and ∆4 in panels A, B, C and D, respectively. Time t includes panel data from years 2004, 2005 and 2006. The collection and matching of the initial loss 
and control samples  is detailed in Chapter 3.  The decrease in the number of firms (initial loss and control) across time is due to firms liquidating or being acquired.  The corporate governance variables  
Board, Chair, Diversity, Ownership and BSize as well as %Tot.Prof.Own.  and %Tot. Dir.Own.  are as constructed, discussed and winsorized in Chapter 3. 
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Table 4.1, Panel A includes the corporate governance levels in each of (t – 1) and t as 
well as the corporate governance changes during this one year test period (∆1) and 
the difference in these changes between the initial loss and control samples.  These 
results indicate (Column 4) that initial loss firms improve the underlying quality of 
corporate governance of their Board, Diversity and Ownership in the year preceding 
the initial loss event, i.e. in the fiscal year before the initial loss is reported.  Looking 
at % Tot. Prof. Own. and % Tot. Dir. Own., the improvement in Ownership is driven 
by outside, professional owners buying the shares in the year before the initial loss at 
the same time that inside director owners are selling.  However, these results need to 
be interpreted carefully because there is a similar improvement in Ownership (with p 
<0.01/<0.01 for the mean/median) in the control sample (Column 8) which is also 
due to the same significant increase and decrease in % Tot. Prof. Own. and % Tot. 
Dir. Own., respectively, exhibited in the initial loss sample.  The p-values in Columns 
9 and 10 measure the differences between the initial loss and control samples at the 
start and end of the one year time period, respectively.  These results (Column 9) 
show that, with the exception of Ownership (p = 0.09/0.07 for the mean/median), 
there is no statistical difference between the starting values between the initial loss 
and control samples.  The difference in the starting period between the initial loss and 
control samples is a result of directors (% Tot. Dir. Own.) of initial loss firms owning 
a lower proportion of the shares in their companies versus the control sample.  At the 
end of the period, the results (Column 10) show that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the initial loss and control samples in the two corporate 
governance variables Diversity (p = 0.06/0.09 for the mean/median) and Ownership 
(p = 0.02/0.02 for the mean/median).  The Ownership values are driven by higher 
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ownership by professional shareholders (% Tot. Prof. Own.) (p = 0.03/0.04 for the 
mean/median) and lower ownership by director shareholders (% Tot. Dir. Own.) (p = 
0.08/0.03 for the mean/median) for the initial loss versus control sample.  Column 11 
displays the difference in the changes between the initial loss and control samples 
exhibited in the period.  These results are significant for Board and Ownership (p = 
0.07/0.07 and 0.04/0.04 for the means/medians for Board and Ownership, 
respectively).  The Ownership values are driven by a significantly larger increase in 
the percentage of professional shareholders on the registers of initial loss firms versus 
control firms during the test period. 
 
Table 4.1, Panel B includes the corporate governance levels in each of (t – 1) and (t + 
1) as well as the corporate governance changes during this two year test period (∆2) 
and the difference in these changes between the initial loss and control samples.  The 
results indicate (Column 4) that initial loss firms improve the underlying quality of 
corporate governance for all of the corporate governance variables in this period, i.e. 
the mean/median p-values for Board (<0.01/<0.01), Chair (0.09/0.05), Diversity 
(0.07/0.03), Ownership (<0.01/<0.01), and Size (0.07/0.10) are all significant.  
Looking at % Tot. Prof. Own. and % Tot. Dir. Own., the improvement in Ownership 
is again driven by outside, professional owners buying the shares in the year before 
the initial loss at the same time that inside director owners are selling.  However, 
similar to the results in Panel A, these results need to be interpreted carefully because 
there is a similar improvement in Ownership (with p = <0.01/<0.01 for the 
mean/median) in the control sample (Column 8) which is also due to a similar 
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significant increase and decrease in % Tot. Prof. Own. and % Tot. Dir. Own., 
respectively, exhibited in the initial loss sample.  At the end of the two year period, 
the results (Column 10) shows that there is a statistically significant difference 
between the initial loss and control samples for the Chair (p = <0.01/<0.01 for the 
mean/median), Diversity (p = 0.02/0.03 for the mean/median) and Ownership (p = 
0.03/0.02 for the mean/median) and Board but only for the median value (p = 0.10).  
The Ownership values are driven by higher % Tot. Prof. Own. (p = 0.06/0.08 for the 
mean/median) and lower % Tot. Dir. Own. (p = 0.03/0.01 for the mean/median) for 
the initial loss versus control sample.   Column 11 displays the difference in the 
changes between the initial loss and control samples exhibited over the two year test 
period (∆2); these results are not significant for any variable. 
 
Table 4.1, Panel C includes the corporate governance levels in each of (t  – 1) and (t + 
2) as well as the corporate governance changes during this three year test period (∆3) 
and the difference in these changes between the initial loss and control samples.  The 
results indicate (Column 4) that, for the initial loss sample, the underlying quality of 
corporate governance improves for all of the corporate governance variables with the 
exception of Chair over this period.  The mean/median p-values for Board 
(0.05/<0.01), Diversity (0.26/0.07), Ownership (<0.01/<0.01), and Size (0.03/0.07) 
are all significant for the median.  Similar to Panels A and B, the improvement in 
Ownership is driven by a significant increase in % Tot. Prof. Own. and a significant 
decrease in % Tot. Dir. Own.  Only Ownership with p = <0.01/<0.01 for the 
mean/median exhibits the same significant change for the control sample (Column 8) 
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as the same increase in % Tot. Prof. Own. and decrease in % Tot. Dir. Own. observed 
for the initial loss samples are present in the control sample.  At the end of the two 
year period, the results (Column 10) shows that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the initial loss and control samples for the Chair (p = 0.08/0.07 
for the mean/median), Diversity (p = 0.04/0.06 for the mean/median) and Ownership 
(p = <0.01/<0.01 for the mean/median).  The difference for the Ownership variable is 
driven by the fact that % Tot. Prof. Own. and % Tot. Dir. Own. are significantly 
higher and lower, respectively, in the initial loss sample versus the control sample at 
the end of the period.  However, the results from Column 11 indicate that the 
difference in the changes between the initial loss and control samples over the three 
year test period ∆3 are not significant for any variable. 
  
Table 4.1, Panel D includes the corporate governance levels in each of t and (t + 1) as 
well as the corporate governance changes during this one year test period (∆4) and 
the difference in these changes between the initial loss and control samples.  The 
results indicate (Column 4) that, for the initial loss sample, the underlying quality of 
corporate governance improves for Chair and BSize over this period; the 
mean/median p-values for Chair (0.05/0.06) and BSize (0.01/0.01).  There is also a 
significant increase in Ownership, but this is significant for the median only (p = 
0.04) driven by an increase in % Tot. Prof. Own. (median p < 0.01) and a decrease in 
% Tot. Dir. Own. (median p = 0.05).  Ownership also increases significantly for the 
control sample where with p-values both < 0.01, both the mean and median are 
significant.  The significance of the ownership variable is driven by an increase in % 
Tot. Prof. Own. (<0.01/<0.01) during the period.  At the start of the period, the results 
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(Column 9) indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between the 
initial loss and control samples for the Diversity and Ownership variables with 
mean/median p-values of 0.06/0.09 and 0.02/0.02 for these variables, respectively.  
The significance in the Ownership variable is driven by the fact that % Tot. Prof. 
Own. is higher and % Tot. Dir. Own. is lower for the initial loss sample versus the 
control sample at the start of the period.  At the end of the period the results show that 
there is a statistically significant difference between the initial loss and control 
samples for the Chair (p <0.01 for both the mean and median), Diversity (p = 
0.02/0.03 for the mean/median) and Ownership (p = 0.03/0.02 for the mean/median) 
— there is also a significant difference for Board at the end of the period but only for 
the median (p = 0.10).  The difference for the Ownership variable is again driven by 
the fact that % Tot. Prof. Own. and % Tot. Dir. Own. are significantly higher and 
lower, respectively, in the initial loss sample versus the control sample at the end of 
the period with p-values of 0.06/0.08 and 0.03/0.01 for the mean/median for each of 
these variables, respectively.  However, the results from Column 11 indicate that with 
the exception of Chair with a p-value = 0.10 for the mean, the difference in the 
changes between the initial loss and control samples for the ∆4 test period are not 
significant for any variable. 
 
In sum, this study finds that at the beginning of the year prior to the initial loss event 
(Column 9 of Panels A, B and C), with the exception of Ownership related variables, 
there is no obvious discernible difference in the corporate governance variables 
between initial loss and control firms. It is noted that at time (t – 1) the Ownership 
variables are, per the entrenchment hypothesis, “worse” for the control sample.  In 
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other words, the related endogeneity problem raised in section 3.7.3 of Chapter 3 is 
also not a problem for this study, i.e. if corporate governance for the initial loss 
sample at time (t – 1) is at least equivalent to that for the control sample, then it 
cannot be argued that the state of corporate governance at time (t – 1) caused the 
initial loss.  Thus initial losses are exogenous to the standard of corporate governance 
at time (t – 1). 
    
This study surmises from the univariate analysis that the initial loss event does appear 
to be a catalyst for an improvement in corporate governance for initial loss firms 
(Column 4 of Panels A, B and C).  It is also evident that much of this improvement 
occurs in anticipation of the initial loss event for Board and Ownership (i.e. Δ1 in 
Figure 4.1 and Column 4 of Panel A) confirming the decision to collect corporate 
governance information in the year before the initial loss event to capture these 
anticipatory changes.  For all variables, any corporate governance change in the 
initial loss versus the control sample precipitated by the initial loss event seems to be 
complete by the end of period (t + 1).  The results of the univariate tests regarding 
any difference in corporate governance changes between the initial loss and control 
samples are less compelling — only the Board and Ownership difference-in-
differences (Column 11) in Panel A are significant — such that a more thorough 
multivariate analysis is required to formally test any causal relationship between the 
initial loss event and corporate governance changes. Based on the significance of the 
results for the initial loss sample in Panels A and B of Table 4.1, this study will use 
the test periods from (t – 1) to t and (t – 1) to (t + 1) for the multivariate analyses to 
follow. 
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4.4 The Average Effect of an Initial Loss Event on Corporate 
Governance 
 
Having identified the likely timing of changes around the initial loss event for 
the various corporate governance variables in the previous section to select the test 
periods as (t – 1) to t and (t – 1) to (t + 1), this section purports to formally test the 
preliminary observations from the univariate analysis in the context of the return 
environment in which the initial loss event occurred.   
 
The inclusion of return as an independent variable in the model is to provide a 
context for the initial loss event.  That is, the initial loss event is but one (albeit 
salient) piece of information about the initial loss firm from a potentially much richer 
information environment about the company.  The return variable acts as a compound 
control variable providing information regarding the market’s interpretation of 
information about firms such that particularly good/bad returns will reflect 
particularly good/bad information.  Descriptive statistics of the 12- and 
contemporaneous 24-month returns are included in Table 4.2.   
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Table 4.2     Descriptive Statistics of Return
Panel A: 12-Month Return from Period (t  - 1) to t
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
Initial Loss 138 0.038 0.449      0.026 -0.840 1.887 0.956 5.685 0.000
Control 138 0.225 0.375      0.189 -0.686 1.692 0.922 4.997 0.000
Combined 276 0.132 0.423      0.114 -0.840 1.887 0.775 5.160 0.000
Panel B: 24-Month Contemporaneous Return from Period (t  - 1) to (t +  1)
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
Initial Loss 114 0.169 0.719 0.038 -0.931 3.537 1.318 6.494 0.000
Control 124 0.476 0.754 0.339 -0.866 3.537 1.768 7.782 0.000
Combined 238 0.329 0.752 0.220 -0.931 3.537 1.499 7.145 0.000
The 12-month return in this study is calculated from 6-months before the financial year end to 6-months after as follows:
𝑟𝑡 =  𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1𝑃𝑡−1 +𝐷𝑡−1
where 𝑃 is the price and 𝐷 is the twelve month forward dividend yield.  The 24-month is calculated from 6-months 
before the event to 18-months after the event.  The 24-month return assumes that any interim dividends are reinvested 
back into the firm which means that 𝐷𝑡 must also be adjusted to account for any capital gain/loss in the second twelve 
month period.  Also, because the information on dividend yield collected in this study are annual yields and our 
comprehensive return calculation is a twenty four month measure, then 𝐷𝑡+1 must also be adjusted to starting price 𝑃𝑡−1
from 𝑃𝑡.  Our comprehensive measure of return is then:
𝑟𝑡 =  𝑃𝑡+1− 𝑃𝑡−1𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑡 ∗  1 + 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡+1 + 𝐷𝑡+1 ∗ 𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑡−1
where
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡+1 =  𝑃𝑡+1− 𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑡  
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A perusal of the results in Table 4.2 where the 12-month Return for the initial loss 
sample has a mean and median of 3.8% and 2.6%, respectively, and a range from       
-84.0% to 188.7% and the 12-month Return for the control sample has a mean and 
median of 22.5% and 18.9%, respectively, with a range from -68.6% to 169.2%, 
shows the difference in Return between the two samples and indicates that the initial 
loss event is meaningful in economic terms.  Formal tests of the differences in means 
and medians confirms these indications — the results (not tabulated) of a comparison 
of means test and sign rank test are all significant with p < 0.01.  The descriptive 
statistics for the 24-month contemporaneous return initial loss and control samples, 
though larger, are broadly similar to those of the 12-month return and the significance 
of the tests of difference are both similarly significant with p < 0.01.   
 
The multivariate analysis in this section attempts to isolate the influence the initial 
loss from other variables insofar as the compound information content from those 
other variables is priced correctly by the market (i.e. is reflected in returns) for both 
initial loss and control firms and so allows a more comprehensive analysis of 
corporate governance changes than that performed in the univariate analysis.  If the 
results from the analysis in this section corroborate the tentative results from the 
preliminary univariate analysis in section 4.3, then we can specifically attribute any 
difference in observed corporate governance changes between the initial loss and 
control samples to the initial loss event rather than to any other variables from the 
broader information environment (controlled for by the matched sample).    
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To test H4.1, the impact of the initial loss event, this study therefore focuses on the 
difference in corporate governance changes between the initial loss and control firms 
for the test-periods ∆1 and ∆2 from Figure 4.1 in a model of linear regression, 
 
∆𝐺𝑂𝑉 = 𝛽 + 𝛿𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 + 𝜃𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝜀 
           4.1 
where  
𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 =  �1                        𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒0                 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 
 
and 𝐺𝑂𝑉 represents separately each of the individual corporate governance variables 
Board, Chair, Diversity, Ownership and BSize such that 𝛥𝐺𝑂𝑉 represents the change 
in corporate governance during the test period and 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 is the return over the test 
period representing the pricing of all other variables that might influence corporate 
governance changes over the period in addition to the initial loss event.  Constructed 
thus, the intercept, 𝛽, reflects the underlying change in corporate governance for the 
control sample and 𝛿 represents the difference in the change in corporate governance 
between the initial loss and control samples such that (𝛽 + 𝛿) represents the change 
in corporate governance for initial loss firms during the test period. 
 
4.4.1  Empirical Results 
 
The results of this analysis for the test periods ∆1 and ∆2 are included in 
Panels A and B, respectively, of Table 4.3.  Consistent with prior corporate 
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governance research on the impact of shocks on corporate governance changes 
(Young, 2000; Farber, 2005), the initial loss event is shown to precipitate an 
improvement in corporate governance.  That is, the results of the two tailed test of 
significance included at the end of Panel A of Table 4.3 (i.e. a Wald test) that 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 = 0 is rejected in for Board, Diversity and Ownership with p-
values of 0.03, < 0.01 and < 0.01, respectively.  These results show that for these 
variables, corporate governance increases quickly in anticipation of the reporting of 
the initial loss.  The results over the longer time period included in Panel B of Table 
4.3 are even more compelling.  That hypothesis that 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 = 0 is 
rejected in each of the five corporate governance specifications with p-values < 0.01 
for the Board and Ownership specifications and p = 0.03, 0.05 and 0.04 for the Chair, 
Diversity and BSize specifications, respectively.   
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Table 4.3 Testing the Average Effect of an Inital Loss Event 
on Corporate Governance
∆ Gov  = β + δD LOSS t  + θReturn  + ε
Panel A Test Period ∆1
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept -0.025 0.052 0.009 0.104 -0.007
(-0.56) (1.54) (1.33) (3.93)*** (-0.07)
D LOSS t 0.113 -0.037 0.010 0.054 -0.032
(1.90)* (-0.82) (1.19) (1.51) (-0.24)
Return 0.041 -0.010 0.002 -0.114 0.064
(0.58) (-1.83)* (0.15) (-2.67)*** (0.41)
n 276 238 238 238 238
R 2 1.3% 1.0% 1.0% 4.0% 1.0%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance of Loss Firms
Intercept + D LOSS t = 0 0.03 0.64 <0.01 <0.01 0.66
Panel B Test Period ∆2
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.016 0.054 0.003 0.205 -0.152
(0.25) (0.86) (0.29) (4.68)*** (-1.14)
D LOSS t 0.157 0.074 0.015 0.017 -0.107
(1.84)* (0.88) (1.17) (0.30) (-0.60)
Return 0.031 -0.043 0.0025 -0.079 0.082
(0.55) (-0.78) (0.60) (-2.03)** (0.69)
n 238 238 238 238 238
R 2 1.4% 1.0% 1.0% 1.9% 1.0%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance of Loss Firms
Intercept + D LOSS t = 0 <0.01 0.03 0.05 <0.01 0.04
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Table 4.3  Continued
This table reports the results of testing the effect of an initial loss on corporate 
governance.  The test (loss sample) consists of 119 firms which reported a loss in year t following two 
years of reporting a profit and the control sample consists of  119 firms  matched for industry and 
market value which reported a profit in each of year t - 2 to t + 2.  Financial information is obtained 
from Datastream/Worldscope.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to 
mitigate the influence of outliers.  Estimated coefficients are followed by t-statistics ().  Significance 
levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by  *, **, ***, respectively.
Variable Definitions:
∆ Gov = the change in governance during the test period (i.e. ∆1 or ∆2). The method by which 
the governance variables are calculated is detailed in Chapter 3.
DLOSS t = a dummy variable equal to one for firms that report a loss, and zero otherwise.
Return = the stock market return over the test period calculated for test period ∆1 as:
where is the twelve month forward dividend yield and for test period ∆2 as:
where
and and are the twelve month forward dividend yields.
 
However, notwithstanding the significance of these results for the initial loss sample, 
it is the significance of the difference of these results from the control sample that is 
the focus of this study.  In that regard (and the reason the difference in differences 
analysis was constructed as it is in equation 4.1) the coefficient of interest in this 
study is 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡, the difference in the corporate governance changes between the 
initial loss and control samples.  The results in Panels A and B of Table 4.3 indicate 
that, on average, for only the Board specification do initial loss firms exhibit any 
incremental change (improvement) in corporate governance over and above the 
control sample and then at only the 10% level.  The significant intercept values in the 
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Ownership specification in Panels A and B with mean (t-stat) equal to 0.113 (t = 
1.90) and 0.205 (t = 4.68), respectively, indicate the control sample is, on average, 
also improving Ownership during the test-periods.  The improving Ownership for the 
control sample was previously determined in Panels A and B of Table 4.3 to be a 
function of professional holders (% Tot. Prof. Own.) buying and director shareholders 
(% Tot. Dir. Own.) selling during the test periods.  A separate analysis of % Tot. 
Prof. Own. and % Tot. Dir. Own. is included in section 4.5.4.   
 
Overall, the absence of compellingly strong results from the univariate analysis in 
Table 4.1 are reaffirmed in Table 4.3.  This study is unable to conclusively reject 
H4.1. 
 
4.5 A Further Examination of the Effect of an Initial Loss Event on 
Corporate Governance  
 
The preceding analyses (both the univariate and multivariate analyses) test the 
average effect of an initial loss event on corporate governance.  That is, there is an 
assumption that whatever the association between the initial loss event and corporate 
governance changes that this association is the same for all initial loss firms.  This 
might not be a valid assumption if initial loss firms with different characteristics 
could be reasonably expected to induce a different corporate governance response to 
the initial loss event.  There is evidence that the market’s interpretation of accounting 
earnings or losses is always conditioned on other non-accounting information 
available (e.g. Freeman, 1987; El-Gazzar, 1998).  It is also likely that a firm which 
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can claim to have good standard of corporate governance when the loss is imminent 
will not perceive a need to alter it because of its poor performance.  The literature 
analysed in Chapter 2 affirms that the severity of the shock can have a conditioning 
role to play on the relationship being tested.  Accordingly we extend the previous 
analysis to take account of other information available to investors — the standard of 
the firm’s corporate governance in the year before the loss.   
 
This study utilizes the pre-period corporate governance as a conditioning variable to 
examine whether the corporate governance response to an initial loss event is the 
same for initial loss firms with high pre-period corporate governance as for initial 
loss firms with low pre-period governance.  This is similar to the conditioning of 
board changes in Young (2000) where the pre- and post-impact of Cadbury was at 
issue.  The expectation for this study is that initial loss firms with high quality pre-
period corporate governance have less to fear from any analysis of their corporate 
governance that an initial loss event might induce, and so have less cause to make 
improvements.  That is, their corporate governance is already appropriate; no changes 
are necessary and none are made in anticipation of or in response to the initial loss.  
The opposite could be postulated for those initial loss firms with low quality pre-
period corporate governance where the initial loss event might induce an analysis of 
their corporate governance which might not be favourable causing the equilibrium to 
unstick and governance to improve.  That is, their corporate governance is not 
appropriate; changes are necessary and are made in anticipation of or in response to 
the initial loss.  
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The hypothesis to perform this analysis, stated in the null form, is: 
 
H4.2:  ex-ante corporate governance quality has no effect on the association 
between the reporting of an initial loss and corporate governance 
changes. 
 
4.5.1  Corporate Governance Conditioning Variables 
 
To perform these analysis in this section, the five corporate governance variables 
already constructed and described in Chapter 3 of this study (i.e. Board, Chair, 
Diversity, Ownership and BSize) are grouped into high and low categories at time (t 
– 1) based on their mean values.  The selection of (t – 1) is important to avoid the 
endogeneity problem; it cannot be argued that the change in corporate governance 
after (t – 1) influences the corporate governance level at (t – 1).  The lagging of 
variables in this manner avoids the simultaneous causation problem discussed 
previously in this chapter and in Chapter 4.   
 
Given that when calculating the Board, Chair and Ownership in Chapter 3 these 
variables are constructed such that their means = 0, the separation of these variables 
is straight forward.  The variables are separated as follows: 
  
(1) A high quality Board group with a value of 1 if Board  > 0 in time (t – 1), 
otherwise 0, and a low quality Board group with a value of 1 if Board  < 0 in 
time (t – 1), otherwise 0 
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(2) A high quality Chair group with a value of 1  if Chair > 0 in time (t – 1), 
otherwise 0 and a low quality Chair group with a value of 1  if Chair < 0 in 
time (t – 1), otherwise 0 
(3) A high quality Ownership group with a value of 1 if Ownership > 0 in time (t 
– 1), otherwise 0 and a low quality Ownership group with a value of 1 if 
Ownership < 0 in time (t – 1), otherwise 0. 
 
As a result of the same construction process that resulted in the zero means for these 
variables, their standard deviations are also close to 1.  As a result, the separation of 
Board, Chair and Ownership by their means results in high and low quality  board 
groups in time (t – 1) that are almost identical to those if the variables had been 
separated based on medians (results not reported here).  Similarly, because of the 
number of firms with Diversity equal to zero and the fact that BSize can only be a 
whole number, splitting these variables based on their means results in the same 
groups as if they were split based on their respective medians, 0 and 6. The 
interpretation of the partitioned BSize variable is, however, slightly different to the 
other variables, i.e. the partitioning decision for this variable is whether a board is 
smaller/larger than the mean rather than worse quality/better quality than the mean.  
Therefore these two corporate governance variables are separated as follows: 
 
(4) A high quality Diversity group with a value of 1 if Diversity ≥ 0 in time (t – 
1), otherwise 0, and a low quality Diversity group with a value of 1 if 
Diversity = 0 in time (t – 1), otherwise 0, and 
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(5) A high BSize group with a value of 1 if BSize > 6 in time (t – 1), otherwise 0, 
and a low BSize group with a value of 1 if BSize ≤ 6 in time (t – 1), otherwise 
0. 
 
The distribution of these corporate governance subgroups, divided based on pre-
period governance, is detailed in Table 4.4 where it is evident that there is a good 
spread across the high and low categories for all of the variables such that each of the 
high and low groups have sufficient sample size.  These observed values for the 
various conditioning corporate governance variables can be tested for independence 
between the two categories (initial loss and control) and the two groups (low 
corporate governance and high corporate governance) by two-way Chi-Square test.  
The calculated values (𝜒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐2 ) are 0.014, 1.769, 0.274, 2.109 and 0.059 for Board, 
Chair, Diversity, Ownership and BSize, respectively.  When compared with the 
critical values (𝜒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡2 ) at the 1% level with 1 degree of freedom (i.e. 6.635) it is 
evident that there is no significant difference in corporate governance between the 
initial loss and control categories, i.e. (𝜒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐2 < 𝜒𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡2 ) and so the null hypothesis that 
the two distributions are the same is verified. 
 
The results of this test are not trivial.  They, once again, reaffirm the findings from 
Table 4.1 regarding the equivalence of pre-period corporate governance for the initial 
loss and control firms, i.e. that initial losses are exogenous to the standard of 
corporate governance at time (t – 1) and reinforces the suitability of pre-period 
corporate governance as a valid conditioning variable in this study.   
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Table 4.4
Corporate Governance
Characteristic
Low Governance High Governance Total
Board No. Loss Firms 71 67 138
(71) (68)
No. Control Firms 70 68 138
(71) (68)
Total 141 135 276
χ2  =  0.0145
Chair No. Loss Firms 57 81 138
(63) (76)
No. Control Firms 68 70 138
(63) (76)
Total 125 151 276
χ2  =  1.769
Diversity No. Loss Firms 94 44 138
(96) (42)
No. Control Firms 98 40 138
(96) (42)
Total 192 84 276
χ2  =  0.274
Ownership No. Loss Firms 70 68 138
(76) (62)
No. Control Firms 82 56 138
(76) (62)
Total 152 124 276
χ2  =  2.109
Size No. Loss Firms 76 62 138
(77) (61)
No. Control Firms 78 60 138
(77) (61)
Total 154 122 276
χ2  =  0.059
(Continued)
Pre-Period Mean Values
Distributions of the Initial Loss and Control Firms by Corporate 
Governance  Characteristics:  Partitioned Based on the 
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Table 4.4 Continued
This table shows the results from partitioning the loss and control firms 
into groups based on the pre-period corporate governance quality.   The sample is 
partitioned based upon pre-period mean  values which for the already normalised Board,
Chair and Ownership variables is 0, and for Diversity and Size corresponds to the median 
values which are  0 and 6, respectively.  
The formula for calculating the Chi-Square test is:
𝜒2 =  𝛴 𝐹𝑜−𝐹𝑒 2
𝐹𝑒
where Fo is the observed value and Fe is the expected value in each case.  The expected 
value for each case is calculated as (row total * column total)/total.  The number of  
degrees of freedom for the two-way Chi-Square is 1.
 
4.5.2  Empirical Results 
 
This section employs the same difference-in-difference research design over 
the sample test period as in section 4.4 to examine hypothesis 4.2.   
 
To test the mitigating impact of pre-period corporate governance quality on the 
association between the reporting of an initial loss event and corporate governance 
changes versus the control sample, this study estimates the following equation which 
is equation 3.4 modified for the variables used in this study as follows: 
 
∆𝐺𝑂𝑉 = 𝛽 + 𝛿1𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 +  𝜀 
           4.2 
where the variables are as previously explained.  Constructed thus, the intercept 
reflects the underlying change in corporate governance during the test period for the 
entire control sample — a valid comparator given the equivalence of the samples 
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demonstrated in Tables 4.1 and 4.4.  𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 reflects the difference in 
the differences in corporate governance across the test period between initial loss 
firms with low quality ex-ante corporate governance quality and the entire control 
sample and 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 reflects the difference in the differences in 
corporate governance across the test period between initial loss firms with high 
quality ex-ante corporate governance quality and the entire control sample. 
 
The results of estimating equation 4.2 for the test periods ∆1 and ∆2 are included in 
Panels A and B, respectively, of Table 4.5.  Tests conducted for the high and low 
quality corporate governance initial loss sub-samples included at the end of Panels A 
and B of Table 4.4, i.e. testing whether that 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 +  𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 = 0 
and 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 +  𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 = 0, indicate that the coefficients for the 
𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 subsample are all significant with most coefficients significant at the < 
0.01 level.  In other words initial loss firms with low quality ex-ante corporate 
governance increase their corporate governance quality during the test period in 
anticipation of and in response to the initial loss event.  The absence of similar 
universally significant results for the 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 initial loss subsample is 
noteworthy.  That is, initial loss firms with high quality ex-ante corporate governance 
mostly do not change their corporate governance during the test period in anticipation 
of and in response to the initial loss event, i.e. governance does not unstick. 
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Table 4.5
∆ Gov  = β + δ1 D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t-1 + δ2 D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 + θReturn  + ε
Panel A Test Period ∆1
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept -0.026 0.053 0.009 0.105 -0.005
(-0.59) (1.57) (1.34) (3.97)*** (-0.06)
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 0.183 0.050 0.014 0.092 0.202
(2.56)** (0.85) (1.44) (2.14)** (1.32)
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 0.040 -0.101 0.003 0.013 -0.319
(0.55) (-1.91)* (0.27) (0.30) (-1.94)*
Return 0.046 -0.103 0.001 -0.117 0.056
(0.66) (1.91)* (0.14) (-2.75)*** (0.36)
n 276 276 276 276 276
R 2 2.4% 3.3% 1.0% 5.0% 3.0%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 + Intercept = 0
<0.01 0.04 <0.01 <0.01 0.02
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 + Intercept = 0
0.81 0.25 0.27 <0.01 0.11
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1
0.08 0.02 0.42 0.10 <0.01
(Continued)
Testing the Effect of an Initial  Loss Event on Corporate 
Governance Conditioned by Corporate Governance Characteristics
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Table 4.5 Continued
Panel B Test Period ∆2
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.016 0.059 0.003 0.206 -0.146
(0.25) (1.01) (0.37) (4.81)*** (-1.16)
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 0.217 0.446 0.033 0.150 0.512
(2.13)** (4.38)*** (2.39)** (2.16)** (2.50)**
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 0.087 -0.194 -0.0287 -0.122 -0.757
(0.82) (-2.13)** (-1.44) (-1.73)* (-3.64)***
Return 0.032 -0.055 0.004 -0.082 0.069
(0.57) (-1.06) (0.43) (-2.14)** (0.61)
n 238 238 238 238 238
R 2 1.9% 12.8% 4.5% 6.5% 11.2%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 + Intercept = 0
<0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 + Intercept = 0
0.25 0.06 0.15 0.15 <0.01
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1
0.28 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.03
This table reports the results of testing the effect of a loss on corporate governance.  
The test (loss sample) consists of 119 firms which reported a loss in year t following two years of 
reporting a profit and the control sample consists of  119 firms  matched for industry and market value 
which reported a profit in each of year t - 2 to t + 2.  Financial information is obtained from 
Datastream/Worldscope.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to 
mitigate the influence of outliers.  Estimated coefficients are followed by t-statistics ().  Significance 
levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by  *, **, ***, respectively.
(Continued)
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Table 4.5  Continued
Variable Definitions:
∆ Gov = the change in governance during the test period (i.e. ∆1 or ∆2). The method by which 
the governance variables are calculated is detailed in Chapter 3.
DLOSS t = a dummy variable equal to one for firms that report a loss, and zero otherwise.
DLOWGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value below the 
mean in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise
DHIGHGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value above the 
mean in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise.  
Return = the stock market return over the test period calculated for test period ∆1 as:
where is the twelve month forward dividend yield and for test period ∆2 as:
where
 
 
That said, however, the primary coefficient of interest in both Panels A and B of 
Tables 4.5 is 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 on its own.  The results in Panel A indicate that, 
with a mean (t-stat) of 0.183 (t = 2.56) and 0.092 (t = 2.14) for the Board and 
Ownership, respectively, the corporate governance change (an improvement — 
positive change — in both cases) for initial loss firms with ex-ante quality low 
corporate governance is significantly different at the 5.0% level from the control 
sample.  The results in Panel B for the longer test period are even more compelling.  
These indicate that, with a mean (t-stat) of 0.217 (t = 2.13), 0.446 (t = 4.38), 0.033 (t 
= 2.39), 0.150 (t = 2.16) and 0.512 (t = 2.50) for each of the Board, Chair, Diversity, 
Ownership and BSize specifications, respectively, the corporate governance change 
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(a positive change — in all cases) for initial loss firms with ex-ante low quality 
corporate governance is not only significant in its own right (as discussed in the 
previous paragraph) but is significantly different from the control sample.   
 
For the Chair specification an interesting finding are the significant coefficients on 
the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 variables in both Panels A and B of Table 4.5 with means 
(t-stats) of -0.101 (t = -1.91) and -0.194 (t = -2.13), respectively, indicating that the 
amount by which initial loss firms with an ex-ante high quality Chair change the 
quality of the Chair in anticipation of (or in response to) the initial loss is 
significantly lower than the control sample.  That is, summing the coefficients, firms 
with independent chairs actually revert to appointing a current/previous insider as 
Chair, perhaps because of their being better equipped to lead the firm back to 
profitability (Brickley et al. (1997).  However, when Ownership is the dependent 
variable the significantly negative coefficient on 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 indicates that 
the underlying increase in Ownership in response to the initial loss event by the sub-
sample of loss firms with high quality ex-ante Ownership is lower than that for the 
control sample.  The overall response for the sub-sample itself is still insignificant, 
i.e. β + δ2 = 0.206 – 0.122 = 0.084 (p = 0.15).  This contrasts with the equivalent test 
for β + δ1 which is invariably positive and significant (see the pre-penultimate rows 
of Panels A and B of Table 4.5).   
 
The interpretation of the coefficients on the initial loss sub-samples in the BSize 
specification is slightly different to the interpretation for the other corporate 
governance specifications.  This is because, as discussed in Section 4.5.1, low/high 
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corporate governance in the BSize specification does not necessarily indicate 
low/high quality governance.  Because of the way this variable was constructed in 
section 4.5.1, the starting point is smaller/larger than the mean rather than worse 
quality/better quality than the mean.  Therefore the coefficient on 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗
𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 for the BSize specification with mean (t-stat) equal to -0.319 (t = -1.94) 
and -0.757 (t = -3.64) in Panels A and B of Table 4.5, respectively indicates that the 
amount those initial loss firms with a large board (relative to the mean) decrease the 
size of their board in anticipation of/in response to the initial loss is significantly 
different from the statistically significant change (decrease) occurring 
contemporaneously for the control sample captured by the negative intercept values 
for both test periods.  That is, initial loss firms with relatively small boards ex-ante 
tend to increase the size of their boards and initial loss firms with relatively large 
boards ex-ante tend to decrease the size of their boards in response to the initial loss 
(this is especially evident in the results for BSize in Panel B of Table 4.5).  
 
Another way to analyse the results in Table 4.5 is to compare the two sub-samples of 
initial loss firms to one another, i.e. compare the corporate governance changes in the 
𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 sample with that of the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 sample.  The 
two-tailed test of comparison (i.e. a Wald test) necessary to perform this analysis is 
included at the end of Panels A and B in Table 4.5.  These results compare the impact 
of the initial loss event for these sub samples not to the control sample, but to each 
other, i.e. to test the hypothesis that 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1= 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1.  
The results in Panel A indicate that for only the Diversity specification is the response 
of the two sub-samples not different from each other; in all other specification the 
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sub-samples are different from each other at at least the 10% level.  The results in 
Panel B for the longer test period are even more compelling.  In only the Board 
specification (p = 0.28) is the difference not significant at p < 0.05 but this is not a 
concern given the (more important) significance of the difference between 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗
𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 and the control sample for the Board specification and the fact that, as 
indicated in Table 4.3, the unconditioned initial loss event induces a statistically 
significant improvement in the Board, i.e. absent any conditioning by ex-ante Board 
quality.  
 
This study also notes that some of the changes in governance such as changing board 
size and replacing the chairman with and executive chairman can be interpreted as 
rebalancing governance rather than strictly improving it.  This is not surprising since 
one cannot be definitive about what the optimum governance structure is for a firm.  
Thus it can be inferred that the loss generally has a far more significant effect on the 
corporate governance of companies where, ex-ante, it might be perceived as 
relatively poor and this effect is positive and robust to the information environment of 
the firm.  Therefore, this study rejects hypothesis H4.2 and can state that ex-ante 
corporate governance quality has an impact on the association between the impact of 
an initial loss and corporate governance changes.  
 
It could be argued that the inclusion of contemporaneous Return is not ideal insofar 
as Return will also reflect the impact of the initial loss event during the period that 
this study is attempting to isolate, i.e. including both Return and 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 might 
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introduce multicollinearity into the equation.  Indeed, it could also be argued that the 
inclusion of any control variables is not necessary in a DID analysis.  Therefore, in 
order to test the robustness of the results, equation 4.2 is retested with the exclusion 
of the Return control variable.  That is Table 4.1 is essentially recreated for the test 
periods ∆1 and ∆2 but instead of a univariate analysis of the average impact of the 
initial loss event, the results reflect a univariate analysis of the initial loss event 
conditioned by ex-ante corporate governance quality.  The results (not tabulated) 
show that the results in Panels A and B of Table 4.5 are the same for all of the low 
quality ex-ante governance variables and so robust to the exclusion of Return.  In 
addition when Return is excluded as a control, the anomalous 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 in the 
Ownership specification is no longer significant, i.e. the clarity of the results improve.  
 
4.5.3  Alternative Model Specification 
 
Equation 4.2 compares the initial loss firms conditioned by ex-ante 
governance subgroups with the entire control sample.  Another approach which could 
provide additional insights while maintaining the integrity of the DID analysis is to 
compare initial loss and control firms within each sub-sample, i.e. include ex-ante 
corporate governance quality as a main effect.  Table 4.4 showed that there is a good 
enough spread of firms in each sub-category to per4form this analysis.  The equation 
to perform the analysis in this way is as follows: 
               𝛥𝐺𝑂𝑉 = 𝜗1𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 +  𝜔1𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1+ 𝜗2𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1+ 𝜔2𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 +  𝜀𝑖 
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           4.3 
where all of the variables are as previously detailed.  The intercept is omitted to avoid 
perfect collinearity as the sum of 𝐷 𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 and 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1, the main 
governance effects, equals one. 
 
The results from this analysis for the test periods ∆1 and ∆2 are included in Panels A 
and B, respectively of Table 4.6.  The results for the shorter time period in Panel A 
indicate that there is an underlying improvement in governance in the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 
control sub-sample in the Chair, Diversity and Ownership specifications with mean 
(t-stat) equal to 0.106 (t = 2.28), 0.018 (t = 2.42) and 0.144 (t = 4.36), respectively; 
there is, however, no significant difference between the initial loss and control 
𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 sub-samples (none of the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 coefficients are 
significant). The results also indicate that there is an underlying decrease in corporate 
governance in the 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 control sub-sample in the Board and BSize 
specifications with mean (t-stat) equal to -0.133 (t = -2.26) and -0.273 (t = -1.98), 
respectively.  There is also a significant difference between the loss and control 
𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 sub-samples in the Board and Diversity specifications, i.e. the 
coefficients on 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 are significant for each of these with mean (t-
stat) equal to 0.148 (t = 1.80) and 0.026 (t = 1.71), respectively. 
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Table 4.6
∆ Gov  = ϑ1 D LOWGOV t -1 +  ω1 D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 + ϑ2D HIGHGOV t -1
 + ω2 D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 + θReturn + ε
Panel A Test Period ∆1
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
D LOWGOV t -1 0.086 0.106 0.018 0.144 0.210
(1.43) (2.28)** (2.42)** (4.36)*** (1.68)
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 0.072 -0.003 0.005 0.053 -0.012
(0.88) (-0.05) (0.45) (1.12) (-0.07)
D HIGHGOV t -1 -0.133 0.002 -0.015 0.046 -0.273
(-2.26)** (0.05) (-1.30) (1.16) (-1.98)**
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 0.148 -0.05 0.026 0.072 -0.051
(1.80)* (-0.83) (1.71)* (1.36) (-0.27)
Return 0.030 -0.106 0.002 -0.115 0.032
(0.42) (-1.96)* (0.17) (-2.70)*** (0.21)
n 276 276 276 276 276
R 2 5.5% 4.5% 6.7% 18.9% 5.6%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1
0.51 0.60 0.24 0.78 0.88
(Continued)
Testing the Effect of an Initial  Loss Event on Corporate 
Governance Conditioned by Corporate Governance Characteristics:
An Alternative Model Specification
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Table 4.6 Continued
Panel B Test Period ∆2
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
D LOWGOV t -1 0.126 0.201 0.015 0.328 0.200
(1.48) (2.59)*** (1.38) (6.45)*** (1.22)
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 0.109 0.306 0.022 0.028 0.167
(0.94) (2.71)*** (1.48) (0.39) (0.73)
D HIGHGOV t -1 -0.099 -0.087 -0.025 0.008 -0.519
(-1.14) (-1.11) (-1.54) (0.12) (-3.06)***
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 0.204 -0.047 0.002 0.077 -0.382
(1.67)* (-0.45) (0.09) (0.92) (-1.63)
Return 0.021 -0.060 0.004 -0.083 0.061
(0.38) (-1.16) (0.48) (-2.24) (0.56)
n 238 238 238 238 238
R 2 5.8% 16.4% 7.7% 26.1% 16.4%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1
0.57 0.02 0.46 0.66 0.09
This table reports the results of testing the effect of a loss on corporate governance.  
The test (loss sample) consists of 119 firms which reported a loss in year t following two years of 
reporting a profit and the control sample consists of  119 firms  matched for industry and market value 
which reported a profit in each of year t - 2 to t + 2.  Financial information is obtained from 
Datastream/Worldscope.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to 
mitigate the influence of outliers.  Estimated coefficients are followed by t-statistics ().  Significance 
levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by  *, **, ***, respectively.
(Continued)
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Table 4.6  Continued
Variable Definitions:
∆ Gov = the change in governance during the test period (i.e. ∆1 or ∆2). The method by which 
the governance variables are calculated is detailed in Chapter 3.
DLOSS t = a dummy variable equal to one for firms that report a loss, and zero otherwise.
DLOWGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value below the 
mean in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise
DHIGHGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value above the 
mean in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise.  
Return = the stock market return over the test period calculated for test period ∆1 as:
where is the twelve month forward dividend yield and for test period ∆2 as:
where
 
The results in Panel B of Table 4.6 for the longer ∆2 test period indicate that there is 
a significant difference (at the 1% level) between the loss and control 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 
subgroups for the Chair specification indicating that, even though the coefficient for 
the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 for the control sample is itself significant at the 10% level (mean = 
0.201, t-stat = 2.59), the loss sample experiences and even greater improvement 
(mean = 0.306, t-stat = 2.71) in Chair quality.  There is no such difference between 
loss and control samples for the 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 in the Chair specification.  There is 
also no difference between the loss and control samples for either the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 or 
𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 in the Ownership specification.  The coefficient on 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 is 
significant at the 1% level (mean = 0.328, t-stat = 6.45) indicating that, given the 
𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 coefficient is also negative, all firms in the sample (initial loss 
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and control) with ex ante low Ownership improve their Ownership during the test 
period.  There is also no difference between the initial loss and control samples for 
either the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 or 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 in the BSize specification.  The coefficient on 
𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 is significant at the 1% level (mean = -0.519, t-stat = -3.06) indicating 
that, given the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 coefficient is also negative, all firms in the 
sample (initial loss and control) with an ex-ante high number of board members 
decrease board size during the test period. 
 
The results indicate a difference between the initial loss and control groups for Board, 
Chair and Diversity.  For Diversity and Board the significant difference is that initial 
loss firms with high quality ex-ante governance do not lower the quality of that 
governance over the period (high quality ex-ante governance control firms do) in the 
Δ1 and Δ2 periods, respectively.  For Chair the impact of the loss is that initial loss 
firms with a low-quality Chair make significant improvements supplemental to those 
improvements evident in the control sample over the same period.  That said, the 
initial loss and control samples were no matched for ex-ante governance quality and 
given that the control sample was shown to exhibit no change in corporate 
governance, on average, across both of the Δ1 and Δ2 periods in Table 4.1, it is the 
analysis in Table 4.5 which are more meaningful.  
 
4.5.4  A Further Analysis of Ownership 
 
This section includes a more thorough analysis of the Ownership construct.  
In line with Table 4.1, the % Tot. Prof. Own. and % Tot. Dir. Own. variables are 
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analysed separately to test for the differing impact of the ex-ante levels of these 
variables on any subsequent changes in the variables which is masked by the opposite 
signs of inside and outside ownership variables during the construction of the 
Ownership variable in Chapter 3.  Specifically, equations 4.1 and 4.2 are retested 
using % Tot. Prof. Own. and % Tot. Dir. Own. as representative outside and inside 
ownership variables. 
 
The results from estimating equation 4.1 for these variables are included in Table 9.3 
in the Appendix, Panels A and B for the test periods ∆1 and ∆2, respectively; the first 
column, Ownership, is simply a repeat of the results for this variable in Table 4.5 and 
are included for comparison purposes.  The results largely confirm those for the 
univariate analysis results in Panels A and B of Table 4.1.  To test equation 4.2 the % 
Tot. Dir. Own. and % Tot. Prof. Own. variables are partitioned based on pre-period 
mean values.  The means of the entire sample for these two variables were calculated 
in chapter 3 as 15.0% and 31.0%, respectively.  The interpretation of the partitioned 
% Tot. Dir. Own. groups is slightly different to that of the Ownership variable 
described previously.  Specifically, per the entrenchment hypothesis, levels of 
director ownership lower than the mean of 15.0% are “better” than levels higher than 
this value.  Therefore the pre-period variables are grouped as follows: 
 
(1) A high quality % Tot. Dir. Own. group with a value of 1 if % Tot. Dir. Own. < 
15.0% in time (t – 1), otherwise 0, and a low quality % Tot. Dir. Own. group 
with a value of 1 if % Tot. Dir. Own. ≥ 15.0% in time (t – 1), otherwise 0, and 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 186 - 
 
 
(2) A high quality % Tot. Prof. Own. group with a value of 1 if % Tot. Prof. Own. 
≥ 31.0% in time (t – 1), otherwise 0, and a low quality % Tot. Prof. Own. group 
with a value of 1 if % Tot. Prof. Own.  < 31.0% in time (t – 1), otherwise 0. 
 
The results of the test of these variables using equation 4.2 are included in Panels A 
and B of Table 9.4 in the Appendix.  As discussed previously, the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗
𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 variable is significantly positive for Ownership in both time periods.  
When % Tot. Dir. Own. and % Tot. Prof. Own. are analysed separately it is evident 
that there is a difference in the change in inside ownership between initial loss firms 
with high quality ex-ante inside ownership and the entire control sample.  However, 
as previously detailed in Table 4.1, and reaffirmed by the negative significance of the 
intercept, the underlying trend in inside ownership is significantly downward across 
the ∆2 test period such that these results are interpreted as initial loss firms with high 
quality ex-ante inside ownership increasing their inside ownership in response to the 
initial loss but by an amount significantly less than the control sample. 
 
4.5.5 Alternative Conditioning Variable Specification 
 
Equation 4.2 compares the initial loss firms conditioned by ex-ante corporate 
governance subgroups, partitioned at the mean, to the entire control sample.  Another 
approach is to partition the sample into quintiles (or as close as is feasible to do so) 
such that the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 group now represents the bottom two quintiles, a 
𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 group represents the middle quintile, and the 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 now 
represents the top two quintiles.  The variables are separated as follows:  
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(1) A high quality Board group with a value of 1 if Board ≥ 0.2585415 in time (t 
– 1), otherwise 0, a medium quality Board group with a value of 1 if 
0.2585415 < Board > -0.2418628 at time (t – 1), otherwise 0, and a low 
quality Board group with a value of 1 if Board ≤ -0.2418628 in time (t – 1), 
otherwise 0, 
(2) A high quality Chair group with a value of 1  if Chair ≥ 0.954266 in time (t – 
1), otherwise 0, a medium quality Chair group with a value of 1 if 0.954266 < 
Chair > -1.093777 in time (t – 1), otherwise 0, and a low quality Chair group 
with a value of 1  if Chair ≤ -1.093777 in time (t – 1), otherwise 0,12 
(3) A high quality Ownership group with a value of 1 if Ownership ≥ 0.2610014 
in time (t – 1), otherwise 0, a medium quality Ownership group with a value 
of 1 if 0.2610014 < Ownership > -0.11971170 at time (t – 1), otherwise 0, and 
a low quality Ownership group with a value of 1 if Ownership ≤ -0.11971170 
in time (t – 1), otherwise 0, 
(4) A high quality Diversity group with a value of 1 if Diversity ≥ 0.231111 in 
time (t – 1), otherwise 0,  a medium quality Diversity group with a value of 1 
if 0.231111 < Diversity > 0 at time (t – 1), otherwise 0, and a low quality 
Diversity group with a value of 1 if Diversity = 0 in time (t – 1), otherwise 
0,13 and 
(5) A high BSize group with a value of 1 if BSize ≥ 8 in time (t – 1), otherwise 0, 
a medium BSize group with a value of 1 if 8 < BSize > 5 at time (t – 1), 
                                                 
12 For logistical reasons the high quality Chair group is partitioned at the thirty fifth percentile instead 
of the second quintile. 
13 The low quality Diversity group is identical to that when the partitioning is at the mean and, for 
logistical reasons, the high quality Diversity group is partitioned at the third decile instead of the 
second quintile. 
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otherwise 0, and a low BSize group with a value of 1 if BSize ≤ 5 in time (t – 
1), otherwise 0.14 
 
The equation to perform the analysis is the similar to equation 4.2 except for the 
inclusion of the 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1  subgroup such that the new equation is now  
       ∆𝐺𝑂𝑉 = 𝛽 + 𝛿1𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1                + 𝛿3𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 +  𝜀 
           4.3 
where the variables are as previously specified.  The results from this analysis for the 
test periods ∆1 and ∆2 for the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1, 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 and 
𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1  variables are included in Table 9.5 in the Appendix and are the 
same as those in Table 4.5 but with higher significance.  It is noted that in all cases, 
the improvement in the corporate governance conditioning variable (from low 
through mid to high) is monotonic. 
 
4.6  Summary and Conclusions 
 
The empirical analysis in this Chapter examines the corporate governance 
response to the reporting of (or anticipation of the reporting of) an initial loss.  Extant 
research has provided evidence of management changes as a result of poor 
performance and corporate governance changes following accounting misstatements 
                                                 
14 For logistical reasons the low BSize group is partitioned at the sixty eighth percentile instead of the 
fourth quintile and the high BSize group is partitioned at the first quartile instead of the second 
quintile. 
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or fraud.  There is also evidence that corporate governance influences the relation 
between management turnover and performance.  This chapter is different in that it 
examines corporate governance changes associated with unambiguous evidence of 
underperformance.  Our analysis is based on a sample of UK companies which incur 
their first loss in three years during the years 2004 to 2006.  An industry- and size-
matched control sample of profit firms is used as a benchmark against which to 
compare the results of the initial loss sample so as not to inadvertently attribute any 
underlying corporate governance changes to the initial loss event. Using these 
samples a difference-in-difference model is used to test if incurring a loss is 
associated with corporate governance changes.   
 
The initial analysis reveals that corporate governance changes are associated with the 
initial loss and mainly occur before the loss is announced.  There are clear differences 
in the initial loss sample relative to the control sample for the board of directors and 
ownership.  A conditioned multivariate analysis, which controls for other information 
and the level of corporate governance (‘high’ or ‘low’ quality) before the initial loss, 
produces stronger results, especially when the longer 24-month period (Δ2) 
surrounding the loss is considered.  There are clear changes in the initial loss sample 
relative to the control sample with respect to all aspects of corporate governance 
under consideration.  When the conditioning analysis is extended to include a ‘mid’ 
quality subgroup the results are even more significant and the change in response to 
the initial loss event for these ex-ante corporate governance subgroups is monotonic.  
In addition Board size regresses toward its mean following an initial loss.  
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The results in this chapter contribute to the literature which asserts that although a 
firm’s corporate governance can be sticky and slow to change it is not entirely fixed 
and responds to negative shocks. The evidence suggests that an initial loss motivates 
an improvement in corporate governance particularly where relative weakness existed 
prior to the loss.  This study can now add incurring an initial loss to accounting 
misstatements, fraud and the revelation of ICMWs as a type of event that may 
precipitate changes in corporate governance.  
  
The next chapter further explores the role of an initial loss event as a change agent, 
examining the impact of initial losses on the earnings management behaviour (i.e. 
abnormal accruals) of initial loss firms.  
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Chapter 5 
Initial Losses and Abnormal Accruals 
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5.1    Introduction 
 
This chapter extends the empirical findings of the loss and abnormal accruals 
literature by analysing the relationship between initial losses and earnings 
management, specifically abnormal accruals.  The literature analysed in Section 2.5 
of Chapter 2 documented that companies manage earnings to, inter alia, avoid 
reporting losses.  This chapter builds on this literature by examining earnings 
management behaviour in situations where the loss is incurred rather than avoided.  
Using the same sample detailed previously in Chapter 3, this chapter also utilises 
severity of loss conditioning variables to test for the exacerbating/mitigating impact 
of more/less severe losses on earnings management behaviour at initial loss firms.   
 
The first test period (∆1) for these analyses is, as in Chapter 4, time (t – 1) to t.  The 
second test period (∆2) is slightly different from that outlined in Chapter 4.  For this 
Chapter ∆2 is from time (t – 1) to either (t + 1) or (t + 2) depending on whether or not 
the initial loss firm returns to profitability in year (t + 1) or (t + 2) after the initial loss 
event; for initial loss firms that are liquidated or acquired in (t + 2), the default post 
period is (t + 1).  The final analysis in this chapter is a loss reporting analysis which 
tests the ability of prior year abnormal accruals to predict an initial loss. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 introduces the topic and the primary 
hypothesis.  Section 5.3 provides some univariate statistics pertaining to the levels 
and changes in abnormal accruals as well as for the control variables used in this 
chapter for the initial loss and control firm samples.  Section 5.4 presents evidence 
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from a DID analysis on the average impact of the reporting of the loss on earnings 
management at initial loss firms.  Section 5.5 presents evidence from a DID analysis 
on the mitigating impact of the severity of the loss (relative size and market 
interpretation) on the relationship between initial losses and earnings management 
behaviour in response to the initial loss.  Section 5.6 presents evidence from a logit 
analysis on whether firms with high prior year signed abnormal accruals are more 
likely to report an initial loss.  Section 5.7 summarises and concludes. 
 
5.2  Earnings Management Behaviour at Initial Loss Firms 
 
The prediction in this chapter is that an initial loss is an exogenous event that 
motivates a firm to undertake change such that initial loss firms will exhibit different 
earnings management behaviour to the control sample.  Abnormal accruals in the 
year before the initial loss are analysed in a univariate analysis to test for evidence 
that initial loss firms manage earnings in an attempt to avoid the loss — larger 
abnormal accruals imply greater managerial opportunism and lower quality earnings.  
The change in abnormal accruals in response to the initial loss are also analysed in a 
multivariate DID analysis to test for evidence of big bath behaviour once the initial 
loss becomes unavoidable.   
The primary multivariate hypothesis in this Chapter, stated in the null form, is: 
 
H5.1:  there is no association between the reporting of an initial loss and 
changes in abnormal accruals. 
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5.3  Univariate Analysis of Changes in Abnormal Accruals 
 
 Chapter 3 provided detailed descriptive statistics of the levels of abnormal 
accruals and the four control variables used in this study in each of the four years 
beginning in year (t – 1).  However, the primary objective of this Chapter is test for 
changes in abnormal accruals resulting from the initial loss event.  To this end the 
information in Chapter 3 is used to estimate the changes in the abnormal accruals 
during the test period.   
 
Table 5.1 illustrates the direction and magnitude of changes in abnormal accruals as 
well as four control variables for the test periods.   
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Table 5.1 Univariate tests of Preperiod and Postperiod Differences and Difference-in-Differences in Abnormal Accrual and Control Variable 
Levels and Changes for the Initial Loss and Control Samples
Test Period ∆1 
p -value of testing p -value of testing
Panel A preperiod postperiod p -value of testing
n = 138 n = 114 n = 114 n = 138 n = 124 n = 124 differences differecnes DIDs
Preperiod Postperiod Change Sig. of Change Preperiod Postperiod Change Sig. of Change col. (1) minus (5) col. (2) minus (6) col. (3) minus (7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Mean Mean Mean Two-tailed p -values: Mean Mean Mean Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values:
(Median) (Median) (Median) t -test (Median) (Median) (Median) t -test t -test t -test t -test
[st. dev] [st. dev] [st. dev] Signrank [st. dev] [st. dev] [st. dev] Signrank Signrank Signrank Signrank
AB_ACCR 0.016 -0.006 -0.021 0.27 -0.016 0.003 0.019 0.17 0.08 0.76 0.08
(0.008) (0.011) (-0.002) 0.88 (-0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 0.34 0.09 0.84 0.24
[0.095] [0.235] [0.226] [0.187] [0.237] [0.159]
LMV 3.919 3.832 -0.087 0.08 4.029 4.230 0.196 <0.01 0.42 <0.01 <0.01
(3.954) (3.831) (-0.077) 0.01 (3.807) (4.071) (0.209) <0.01 0.85 0.01 <0.01
[1.830] [1.978] [0.572] [1.845] [1.872] [0.365]
CFO 0.060 0.018 -0.042 <0.01 0.131 0.109 -0.022 0.04 <0.01 <0.01 0.20
(0.063) 0.031 (-0.028) <0.01 (0.117) (0.095) (-0.016) <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.31
[0.107] [0.108] [0.126] [0.119] [0.108] [0.123]
LEV 0.512 0.569 0.057 <0.01 0.502 0.504 0.001 0.84 0.75 0.05 <0.01
(0.508) (0.577) (0.041) <0.01 (0.482) (0.478) (-0.011) 0.72 0.41 <0.01 <0.01
[0.239] [0.254] [0.125] [0.238] [0.248] [0.088]
GROWTH 0.767 0.748 -0.019 0.58 0.591 0.528 -0.061 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.33
(0.661) (0.603) (-0.039) 0.28 (0.497) (0.480) (-0.026) <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.55
[0.602] [0.710] [0.415] [0.477] [0.420] [0.253]
(Continued)
Initial Loss Firms Control Firms
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Table 5.1  Continued Test Period ∆2
p -value of testing p -value of testing
Panel B preperiod postperiod p -value of testing
n = 138 n = 114 n = 114 n = 138 n = 124 n = 124 differences differecnes DIDs
Preperiod Postperiod Change Sig. of Change Preperiod Postperiod Change Sig. of Change col. (1) minus (5) col. (2) minus (6) col. (3) minus (7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Mean Mean Mean Two-tailed p -values: Mean Mean Mean Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values: Two-tailed p -values:
(Median) (Median) (Median) t -test (Median) (Median) (Median) t -test t -test t -test t -test
[st. dev] [st. dev] [st. dev] Signrank [st. dev] [st. dev] [st. dev] Signrank Signrank Signrank Signrank
AB_ACCR 0.016 0.008 -0.013 0.66 -0.016 0.006 0.026 0.18 0.08 0.67 0.07
(0.008) (0.028) (0.007) 0.44 (-0.008) (0.027) (0.025) 0.09 0.09 0.65 0.10
[0.095] [0.305] [0.315] [0.187] [0.276] [0.212]
LMV 3.919 3.837 -0.087 0.60 4.029 4.368 0.355 <0.01 0.41 <0.01 0.02
(3.955) (3.598) (-0.003) 0.71 (3.807) (4.179) (0.393) <0.01 0.85 <0.01 <0.01
[1.830] [2.026] [1.965] [1.845] [1.926] [0.561]
CFO 0.060 0.041 -0.020 0.11 0.131 0.106 -0.018 0.11 <0.01 <0.01 0.48
(0.063) (0.052) (-0.014) 0.04 (0.117) (0.103) (-0.008) 0.27 <0.01 <0.01 0.39
[0.107] [0.114] [0.132] [0.119] [0.097] [0.122]
LEV 0.512 0.632 0.122 <0.01 0.502 0.521 0.023 0.10 0.75 0.04 <0.01
(0.508) (0.563) (0.062) <0.01 (0.482) (0.522) (0.004) 0.40 0.41 0.04 <0.01
[0.239] [0.453] [0.395] [0.239] [0.286] [0.157]
GROWTH 0.767 0.340 -0.411 <0.01 0.591 0.612 0.018 0.46 <0.01 0.07 <0.01
(0.661) (0.471) (-0.128) <0.01 (0.497) (0.502) (-0.000) 0.37 <0.01 0.45 <0.01
[0.603] [1.424] [1.271] [0.477] [0.548] [0.278]
Initial Loss Firms Control Firms
This table provides some summary statistics and includes univariate tests of significance for the abnromal accruals and control variables for the loss and control samples 
for the time periods from time t -1 (Preperiod) to t + 1/t + 2 (Postperiod), as well as tests of the difference in the Preperiod and Postperiod values between the loss and 
control samples and univariate tests of the difference-in-difference (DID) between the loss and control samples for the Preperiod and the Postperiod.  Time t includes 
panel data from years 2004, 2005 and 2006. The collection and matching of the loss and control samples  is detailed in Chapter 3.  The decrease in the number of firms 
(loss and control) across time is due to firms liquidating or being acquired.  The variable  AB_ACCR is the signed abnormal accruals calculated according to a modified
DeFond and Park (2001) model with the 'normal' ratio and scaling variable set as of the year before the preperiod (i.e. t - 2), LMV is the natural log of market value, CFO
is the cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total assets, LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, and GROWTH is the book-to-market ratio, defined 
as the book value divided by the market value.  
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The results from Table 5.1, Panel A indicate that initial loss firms report mean 
(median) abnormal accruals of 1.6 per cent (0.7 per cent) of total assets in the year 
before the initial loss event.  With a standard deviation equal to 9.5 per cent, this 
mean value is separately confirmed (untabulated) as being significantly different from 
zero at the 10% level (t = 1.94); the corresponding mean and standard deviation 
values for the control sample are -1.6 per cent and 18.7%, respectively, resulting in a 
mean not significantly different from zero (t = -1.00).  This is, perhaps, one of the 
most compelling results from the univariate analysis of abnormal accruals from Table 
5.1, i.e. that abnormal accruals for initial loss firms in the year before the initial loss 
are significantly positive (i.e. different from zero) and, more importantly for this 
study, per the results in Column 9, are also significantly different from the control 
sample.  This indicates, potentially, that problems related to the decision by initial 
loss firms to delay or defer the initial loss in the years prior to the initial loss are 
being stored on their balance sheets and is in line with theory (i.e. Burgstahler & 
Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Holland & Ramsay, 2003; and Brown & 
Caylor, 2005; Mulcahy & Yang, 2013) and our expectation that initial loss firms 
manage earnings upward in the year before the initial loss in an effort to avoid/defer 
the initial loss in that year15.  Theory tells us that accruals must eventually unwind 
and it is this unwinding (change) that is the next focus of this study. 
 
Although the change in abnormal accruals for initial loss firms (Column 4) is 
negative for both ∆1 and ∆2, neither is significantly different from zero with p = 
                                                 
15 It also reinforces the contention in chapter 3 that the causation between initial losses and changes in 
abnormal accruals in anticipation of the announcement of the initial loss event (and simultaneous with 
the ‘earning’ of the initial loss) is in one direction only, i.e. endogeneity is not a problem for this 
analysis. 
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0.27/0.88 and p = 0.66/0.44 for the mean/median for each test period, respectively.  
The change for the control sample (Column 8) in both test periods is positive but is 
also not significantly different from zero with p = 0.17/0.34 and p = 0.18/0.09 for the 
mean/median for ∆1 and ∆2, respectively.  What is evident though, and the primary 
focus of this chapter, is the significance of the difference in the changes between the 
initial loss and control samples (Column 11) across both test periods with p = 
0.08/0.24 and p = 0.07/0.10 for the mean/median for ∆1 and ∆2, respectively.  
Interestingly, despite these differences in changes between the two samples, the 
results in Column 10 of Panel A show that, on average, there is no evidence of big 
bath behaviour among initial loss firms, i.e. with p = 0.76/0.84 for the mean/median, 
there is no difference in abnormal accruals between the initial loss and control firms 
in the initial loss year.  These results confirm that the accruals of initial loss firms are 
abnormally high in the year before the initial loss but that these reverse to 
approximately the same level as the control sample post initial loss.  The results also 
reaffirm the decision to use directional rather than absolute abnormal accruals in this 
study to draw these conclusions.  The remainder of this chapter explores, inter alia, 
the ex-ante difference in abnormal accruals between the initial loss and control 
samples and analyses the difference in the difference in abnormal accruals (i.e. any 
difference in the unwinding of accruals) between initial loss and control firms over 
the test periods ∆1 and ∆2. 
 
The four control variables included in this study and detailed in Table 5.1 are 
intended to control for firm-specific factors that can affect a firm’s accruals based on 
prior research (Becker et al., 1998; Frankel et al.,  2002).  It has been argued that 
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larger firms have more potential for earnings management (Bartov, 1993).  Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990) state that larger firms face higher political costs and hence have a 
stronger incentive to manage earnings in order to reduce the associated political risk.  
Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) suggest that large firms have more pressure placed on 
their management to report more predictable earnings.  Even though, by construction, 
the accruals in this study are scaled by firm size (lagged total assets as at two years 
before the initial loss) and the comparison of means test from Chapter 3 indicates that 
(because the secondary selection criterion for matching the control sample was size) 
there is no difference in firm size between the initial loss and control samples, the log 
of market value (𝐿𝑀𝑉) is included to control for the potential effects of size on the 
choice of discretionary accruals because size may surrogate for numerous omitted 
variables.  Table 5.1 indicates that, as expected, there is no difference in 𝐿𝑀𝑉 
between the initial loss and control samples in the year before the initial loss event, 
i.e. p = <0.01/<0.01 for the mean/median in Column 9 in Panels A and B of Table 
5.1.  The results also indicate that there is a change in 𝐿𝑀𝑉 for the both the initial 
loss and control samples across the test period ∆1.  For the initial loss sample the 
change is significantly negative with p = 0.08/0.01 for the mean/median (Column 4), 
and for the control sample the change is significantly positive with p = <0.01/<0.01 
for the mean/median (Column 8).  These results are such that the difference in the 
post-period values and the difference in the changes between the initial loss and 
control samples for 𝐿𝑀𝑉 are significant with p = <0.01/<0.01 (Column 10) and p = 
0.02/<0.01 (Column 11) for the mean/median, respectively.  The results for the 
longer test period, ∆2, are similar although there is now no difference in the pre- and 
post-period values for the initial loss sample, i.e. p = 0.60/0.71 for the mean/median 
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(Column 4).  The results for ∆2 for the post-period differences (Column 10) and the 
difference in the differences (Column 11) are the same as for ∆1, i.e. initial losses 
have implications for initial loss firms — the initial loss causes the market value of 
the firm to fall. 
 
We also control cash flows from operating activities (CFO) to capture performance 
differences across firms in different industries and to control for the association 
between abnormal accruals and operating cash flow (Dechow et al., 1995).  
Consistent with prior research (i.e. Peasnell, Pope & Young, 2000), this study define 
operating cash flows from operating activities divided by lagged total assets because 
there is a well-documented inverse relation between the cash flows and accruals.  
Table 5.1, Panels A and B, indicate that there is no change in 𝐶𝐹𝑂 for the initial loss 
or the control samples across either test period, such that there is no difference in the 
changes between the two samples for ∆1 and ∆2.  There is, however, a difference in 
the pre- and post-period values for 𝐶𝐹𝑂 between the initial loss and control firms in 
both test periods and these differences are all significant (Columns 9 and 10 in Panels 
A and B of Table 5.1) with  p = <0.01 for the means and medians in all cases. The 
fact that 𝐶𝐹𝑂 is lower and abnormal accruals are higher for initial loss firms than 
control firms in the year before the initial loss suggests that initial loss firms use 
increased abnormal accruals to, inter alia,  avoid losses.  
 
Leverage may also be associated with discretionary accruals.  High leverage has been 
found to be associated with closeness to the violation of debt covenants (Press & 
Weintrop, 1990), and debt covenant violation has been found to be associated with 
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discretionary accrual choice (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994).  To avoid debt covenant 
violations, managers of highly leveraged firms have incentives to make income-
increasing discretionary accruals.  However, high leverage is also associated with 
financial distress (Beneish & Press, 1995; Ohlson, 1980).  According to DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Skinner (1994), troubled companies have large negative accruals 
related to contractual renegotiations that provide incentives to reduce earnings. 
Therefore, to control for the possible effects (either positive or negative) of high 
leverage on our results, leverage is also included as a control variable (LEV).  Table 
5.1 indicates that there is a significant positive change in 𝐿𝐸𝑉 for the initial loss 
sample during both the ∆1 and ∆2 test periods with p = <0.01/<0.01 for the 
mean/median in both cases; the control sample does not exhibit the same change with 
p = 0.84/0.72 and p = 0.10/0.40 for the mean/median for ∆1 and ∆2, respectively.  
There is no difference in 𝐿𝐸𝑉 between the initial loss and control samples in the pre-
period (Column 9 in Panels A and B) but there is evidence (as a result of the 
significant increase in 𝐿𝐸𝑉 for the initial loss sample across the test period) that there 
is a difference between the two samples at the end of the test period (Column 10) 
where p = 0.05/<0.01 in Panel A and p = 0.04/0.04 in Panel B for the mean/median 
for ∆1 and ∆2, respectively.  These results are such that the difference in the changes 
in 𝐿𝐸𝑉 (Column 11) is significant with p = <0.01/<0.01 for the mean/median for both 
∆1 and ∆2 i.e. initial losses have implications for initial loss firms — the initial loss 
causes the leverage ratio to increase. 
 
The final variable, GROWTH, controls for firm growth because the model for expected 
accruals could be mis-specified for firms experiencing unusual growth.  Skinner and 
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Sloan (2002) found evidence that suggests growth stocks have significantly greater 
negative market responses to earnings disappointments than value stocks.  This result 
implies that growth firms have greater incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises.  
Indeed, Matsumoto (2002) documents that firms with higher growth are more likely 
to manage earnings; other studies which find that growth is related to earnings 
management include Abdularahman and Ali (2006) and Huang, Louwers, Moffitt and 
Zhang (2008).  GROWTH is defined as the book-to-market ratio.  Table 5.1, Panel B, 
indicates that there is a significant change in 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 for the initial loss sample 
across the ∆2 test period with p = <0.01/<0.01 for the mean/median that is not present 
for the control sample suggesting that the initial loss has serious impact on growth for 
initial loss firms; there is no evidence of a similar change for the control sample.  
However, for the shorter ∆1 test period this relationship is reversed, i.e. it is the 
control sample that exhibits a significant (negative) change that is absent from the 
initial loss sample.  The result is that GROWTH is different between the initial loss 
and control samples in both the pre- and post-periods for both the ∆1 and ∆2 test 
periods and the difference in the differences between the two samples is significant 
for the longer ∆2 test period with p = <0.01/<0.01 for the mean/median in Column 11 
of Panel B of table 5.1, i.e. initial losses have implications for initial loss firms — the 
initial loss causes growth to fall. 
 
Overall, the results in Table 5.1 suggest that this study is correct to control for the 
variables LMV, LEV, CFO and GROWTH.   
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5.4 The Average Effect of an Initial Loss Event on Abnormal 
Accruals 
 
The univariate analysis in Section 5.3 indicates that the change in abnormal 
accruals from the pre- to the post-period differs significantly between the initial loss 
and control samples — it is these results (corresponding to Column 11 in Table 5.1) 
that are a primary focus of this chapter.  As stated previously, the changes in 
abnormal accruals in the control sample during the test period matter only insofar as 
they represent a benchmark against which to assess the contemporaneous change for 
the initial loss sample.    
 
This section uses a multivariate analysis including the control variables previously 
discussed and detailed in Table 5.1 to examine the change in abnormal accruals for 
the initial loss sample over and above those observed in the control sample to test 
whether there is a relationship between the initial loss event itself and the unwinding 
of abnormal accruals for initial loss firms.  Ex-ante, on average, the expectation is 
that the initial loss event will cause a negative change in abnormal accruals during the 
test period as initial loss firms unwind any positive abnormal accruals built up on the 
balance sheet in the years prior to the initial loss event.  Evidence from the univariate 
analysis in Table 5.1, Column 4 indicates that initial loss firms reduce positive 
abnormal accruals during the test period and the results in Column 11 indicate that 
these reductions are significantly in excess of any changes in the control sample. 
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Based on the results of the univariate analysis in section 5.3 and the results in Chapter 
4 regarding the significant role of initial losses as a change agent for corporate 
governance, this study conjectures that, controlling for changes in the other variables 
documented to impact on abnormal accruals, an increase in negative abnormal 
accruals around an initial loss event is likely to be more pronounced for initial loss 
firms than the control sample.  The multivariate analysis in this section employs the 
same difference in difference research design described in Chapter 3 to examine 
H5.1. 
 
To test H5.1, the effect of an initial loss on abnormal accruals for the event window, 
this study estimates the following equation: 
 
∆𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 +  𝛽𝑗∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝜀 
5.1 
where 
𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 =  �1                        𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒0                 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 
 
and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 indicates the control variables  (i.e. LMV, CFO, LEV and GROWTH) 
are as previously detailed.  The intercept 𝛽0 captures the change around the initial 
loss event for the control sample.  The key coefficient of interest, 𝛽1, captures the 
difference in the change in abnormal accruals between the initial loss and control 
firms and, thus, on average, the impact of the initial loss event. 
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5.4.1  Empirical Results 
 
Table 5.2 reports the results of estimating equation 5.1, which regresses the 
change in abnormal accruals on a dummy variable indicating initial loss firms 
(𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡) and the control variables.  The estimated coefficient on 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡  is -0.044 (t-
stat = -1.86) and -0.012 (t-stat = -0.33) for the ∆1 and ∆2 test periods, respectively.  
These results corroborate the results from the univariate analysis in Column 11 for 
the shorter test period in Panel A of Table 5.1 but not those for the longer test period 
in Panel B.    
 
The intercept, which captures the change from control firms only, is not significantly 
different from zero indicating that control firms experience no significant change in 
abnormal accruals over the test period (i.e. corroborating the results in Column 8 in 
Panels A and B of Table 5.1).  A Wald test of the significance of the coefficient on 
the initial loss sample on its own (i.e. 𝛽0 + 𝛽1) has a p = 0.02 for both the ∆1 and ∆2 
test periods indicating that initial loss firms experience a statistically significant 
increase in negative abnormal accruals resulting from the initial loss event (i.e. 
confirming the univariate results in Column 4 in Panels A and B of Table 5.1).   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  - 207 - 
 
 
Table 5.2
∆ AB_ACCR = β 0  +  β 1 D LOSS t + β j ∆ Controls  + ε
Independent Variables ∆ 1 ∆ 2
(t -value) (t -value)
Intercept 0.005 0.031
(0.33) (1.28)
D LOSS t -0.044 -0.012
(-1.86)* (-0.33)
Δ LMV 0.017 -0.008
(0.62) (-0.65)
Δ CFO -0.538 -0.341
(-5.96)*** (-2.44)**
Δ LEV -0.053 -0.296
(-0.48) (-3.95)***
Δ GROWTH 0.022 -0.007
(0.56) (-0.28)
n 274 228
R 2 13.18% 10.32%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
Intercept  + D LOSS t = 0 0.03 0.54
Test Periods
Testing the Average Effect of an Initial Loss Event
on Abnormal Accruals
This table reports the average effect of a loss on the change in abnormal 
working capital accruals across the test period. The pre-period is the year before the loss 
event, the post-period is either the year after or two years after the loss event depending on 
whether the loss firm returns to profitability (if at all).  The test (loss ) sample in the pre-
period consists of 137 firms which reported a loss in year t following two years of reporting a 
profit and the control sample consists of  137 firms  matched for industry and market value 
which reported a profit in each of the years t-2 to t+2.  The test (loss ) and control samples in 
the post-period consists of 116 firms chosen in the same way as the pre-period sanples.  The 
difference in the sample size between the pre- and post-periods is a results of liquidations, 
acquisitions and data avaialability.   Financial information is obtained from 
Datastream/Worldscope.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to 
mitigate the influence of outliers.  Estimated coefficients are followed by t-statistics ().  
Significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by  *, **, ***, respectively.
(Continued)
is ta le re rts t e a era e effect f an initial loss on the change in 
abnormal accruals.  For each (test or control) firm,  the  window is the year before the initial 
loss event, t-1,  to either the year of the loss (∆1) f the year  the loss firm returns to 
profitability (i.e. either  year t+1 or t+2) (∆2); for those firms that liquidate or are acquired the 
window is from year t-1 to t+1.  The test (loss sample) consists of 137 (∆1) and 114 (∆2) firms 
which reported a loss in year t following two years of reporting a profit and the control sample 
consists of  the same number of  firms  matched for industry and market value which reported 
a profit in each of year t-2 to t+2.  The difference in the sample sizes in test periods ∆1 and ∆2 
is firms (initial loss or control being acquired in the period t to t+1.  Financial information is 
obtained from Datastream/Worldscope.  All co tinuous variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers.  Estimated coefficients are followed by t-
statistics ().  Significance for two-tailed tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated with 
*,**, and ***, respectively.
(Continued)
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Table 5.2 Continued
This table reports the average effect of a loss on the change in abnormal working 
capital accruals across the test period. The pre-period is the year before the loss event, the post-
period is either the year after or two years after the loss event depending on whether the loss firm 
returns to profitability (if at all).  The test (loss ) sample in the pre-period consists of 137 firms 
which reported a loss in year t following two years of reporting a profit and the control sample 
consists of  137 firms  matched for industry and market value which reported a profit in each of the 
years t-2 to t+2.  The test (loss ) and control samples in the post-period consists of 116 firms 
chosen in the same way as the pre-period sanples.  The difference in the sample size between the 
pre- and post-periods is a results of liquidations, acquisitions and data avaialability.   Financial 
information is obtained from Datastream/Worldscope.  All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers.  Estimated coefficients are followed by 
t-statistics ().  Significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by  *, **, ***, respectively.
V r ble Definition :
∆ AB_ACCR = the change in signed abnormal accrua s during th  t st peri d (i.e. ∆1 or ∆2). The 
abnormal accrua  model used is a modified DeFond and Park (2001) model 
detailed previously in the ch pter.  
DLOSS t = a dummy variable equal t  one for firms that report a loss during the event
window, and ze o otherwise.  
∆ LMV = the change in the natural log of market value.  
∆ CFO = the change in the cash flow from operating activities scaled y lagged total assets.  
∆ LEV = the change in the ratio o  total liabilities to total assets.  
∆ GROWTH = the change in the book-to-market ratio, d fined as the book value divided by the
market value. 
 
These multivariate regression results for the ∆1 test period confirm the results of the 
univariate analysis in Panel A of Table 5.1 and provide some evidence to reject H 5.1. 
There is no difference for the longer test period, ∆2, which suggests that any/all of the 
unwinding of accruals that initial loss firms engage in occurs in the initial loss year.  
That is, on average (i.e. unconditioned), initial loss firms exhibit a statistically 
significant increase in negative abnormal accruals relative to the control firms during 
the shorter event window — in other words initial losses matter for abnormal 
accruals.   
 
5.5 A Further Examination of the Effect of an Initial Loss Event on 
Abnormal Accruals 
 
The previous section analysed the average impact of initial losses on 
abnormal accruals, hypothesising that, on average, the initial loss event will cause 
negative abnormal accruals during the test period as initial loss firms unwind any 
positive abnormal accruals built up on the balance sheet in the years prior to the 
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initial loss event.  This study finds evidence to support this hypothesis for the shorter 
test period.  However, not all initial losses are the same, i.e. they are not all 
represented by the average.  The literature analysed in Chapter 2 affirms that the 
severity of the shock can have a conditioning role to play on the relationship being 
tested.  That is, some initial losses are more egregious than others such that the 
impact of the initial loss on abnormal accruals could be expected to be different 
depending on the severity of the initial loss.  
 
The hypothesis to be tested, stated in the null form, is: 
 
H5.2:  the severity of the loss has no impact on the association between the 
reporting of an initial loss and changes in abnormal accruals. 
 
5.5.1  Loss Severity Conditioning Variables 
 
The severity of an initial loss can be determined using a number of decision 
criteria — this section uses two criteria to partition the initial loss sample in this study 
in to three subgroups: low severity (𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿), medium severity (𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿) and 
high severity (𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿), and examines each separately.  These decision criteria are; 
 
1. whether the initial loss is small (𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿), medium (𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿) or large (𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿).  To determine whether a loss is small, medium or large the net 
income initial loss is scaled by market value.  Those loss companies with 
scaled losses in the lowest two quintiles are deemed to have small losses such 
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that 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿  is 1 for these firms, otherwise 0, those loss firms with scaled 
losses in the middle quintile are deemed to have medium losses such that 
𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿  is 1 for these firms, otherwise 0, and those loss firms with scaled 
losses in the top two quintiles are deemed to have large losses such that 
𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 is 1 for these firms, otherwise 0, and  
2. whether the loss is good (DHIGHQUAL), average (𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿), or bad (𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿).  A good  loss is one where the 12-month return around the  loss 
event (calculated as 6-months before and 6-months after the year end of the  
loss year) is in the top two quintiles of these returns for both the  loss and 
control samples such that 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 is 1 for these  loss firms, otherwise 0, 
those  loss firms with a 12-month return around the  loss event in the middle 
quintile of these returns for both the  loss and control samples are deemed to 
have average  losses such that 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 is 1 for these firms, otherwise , and 
those  loss firms with a 12-month return around the  loss event in the bottom 
two quintiles of these returns for both the  loss and control samples are 
deemed to have bad  losses such that 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿  is 1 for these firms, 
otherwise 0. 
 
5.5.2  Empirical Results 
 
This section employs the same difference in difference research design to 
examine hypothesis 5.2.  To test the mitigating impact of the severity of the initial 
loss on the association between the reporting of an initial loss event and changes in 
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abnormal accruals versus the control sample, this study estimates the following 
equation which is modified for the severity of loss conditioning variables as follows: 
 
∆𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿1𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝛿2𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿            + 𝛿3𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 +  𝛽𝑗∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝜀 
5.2 
where  
𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 =  �1                        𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒0                 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 
 
and 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿,  𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 and 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 represent the severity of the initial loss 
interaction variables partitioned using the three decision criteria outlined in the 
previous section.  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 indicates the control variables  (i.e. LMV, CFO, LEV and 
GROWTH) previously detailed.  As before, the intercept, 𝛽0, reflects the underlying 
change in abnormal accruals for the entire control sample. 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 
reflects the difference in the differences across the test period in these accruals 
between initial loss firms with a high severity initial loss and the entire control 
sample, 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 reflects the difference in the differences between initial 
loss firms with a medium severity initial loss and the entire control sample, and 
𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 reflects the difference in the differences between initial loss 
firms with a high severity initial loss and the entire control sample. 
  
The results of estimating equation 5.2 for the test periods ∆1 and ∆2 are included in 
Table 5.3, Panels A and B, respectively.  The coefficient of interest is 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗
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𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 which, for the shorter test period, ∆1, is significant at the 5% level for all 
loss severity specifications with coefficients (t-stats) of -0.068 (t = -2.10) and -0.057 
(t = -1.77) for the large/medium/small and bad/average/good specifications, 
respectively, indicating that firms with a relatively large or bad initial loss are more 
likely to reverse positive abnormal accruals/increase negative abnormal accruals in 
the year of the initial loss.  The result for the initial loss sample are also significant at 
the 5% level for all specifications, i.e. the Wald test included at the end of Panel A of 
Table 5.3 that 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 = 0 is rejected with p = 0.03 and 
0.02 for the large/medium/small and the bad/average/good specifications, 
respectively.   
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Table 5.3
Panel A Test Period ∆1
Independent Variables Large/Medium/Small Bad/Average/Good
(t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.007 0.007
(0.40) (0.42)
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL -0.068 -0.072
(-2.10)** (-2.20)**
D LOSS t *  D MIDQUAL -0.076 -0.012
(-1.91)* (-0.34)
D LOSS t  * D HIGHQUAL -0.012 -0.043
(-0.41) (-1.28)
Δ LMV 0.010 0.009
(0.37) (0.32)
Δ CFO -0.540 -0.532
(-6.00)*** (-5.88)***
Δ LEV -0.037 -0.036
(-0.33) (-0.33)
Δ GROWTH 0.019 0.021
(0.48) (0.55)
n 274 274
R 2 14.22% 13.93%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL = D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL 0.13 0.49
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL + Intercept = 0 0.03 0.02
D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL + Intercept = 0 0.82 0.25
(Continued)
Testing the Effect of an Initial Loss Event on Abnormal Accruals 
Conditioned by the Severity of the Loss
∆ AB_ACCR = β 0  + δ 1 D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL + δ 2 D LOSS t  * D MIDQUAL
+ δ 3 D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL  + β j ∆ Controls  + ε
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Table 5.3 Continued
Panel B Test Period ∆2
Independent Variables Large/Medium/Small Bad/Average/Good
(t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.031 0.031
(1.27) (1.32)
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL -0.069 -0.091
(-1.41) (-1.93)*
D LOSS t  * D MIDQUAL 0.038 0.028
(0.62) (0.54)
D LOSS t  * D HIGHQUAL 0.009 0.041
(0.19) (0.83)
Δ LMV -0.008 -0.011
(-0.68) (-0.87)
Δ CFO -0.349 -0.352
(-2.49)** (-2.54)**
Δ LEV -0.296 -0.296
(-3.96)*** (-3.99)***
Δ GROWTH -0.016 -0.012
(-0.63) (-0.48)
n 228 228
R 2 11.54% 12.88%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL = D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL 0.17 0.02
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL + Intercept = 0 0.29 0.14
D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL + Intercept = 0 0.37 0.09
This table reports the effect of an initial loss on the change in abnormal accruals 
conditioned by the severity of the loss.  For each firm,  the  window is the year before the initial 
loss event, t-1,  to either the year of the loss (∆1) or the year  the loss firm returns to profitability 
(∆2); for those firms that liquidate or are acquired the window is from year t-1 to t+1.  The test 
(loss sample) consists of 137 (∆1) and 114 (∆2) firms which reported a loss in year t following two 
years of reporting a profit and the control sample consists of  the same number of  firms  matched 
for industry and market value which reported a profit in each of year t-2 to t+2.  The difference in 
the sample sizes in test periods ∆1 and ∆2 is firms (loss or control) being acquired in the period t to 
t+1.  Loss firms are partitioned based whether the loss is small/medium/large or good/average/bad.  
A small loss is one where the scaled (by market value) loss is in the bottom two quintiles of ranked 
scaled losses, a medium loss is in the middle quintile and a big loss is one in the top two quintiles.  
A good loss is one with a 12-month return around the financial year end of the loss year (6-months 
before and after) in the bottom two quintiles of  ranked 12-month returns, an average loss is in the 
middle quintile and a bad loss is in the top two quintiles.  
(Continued)
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Table 5.3 Continued
Financial information is obtained from Datastream/ Worldscope.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers.  Estimated coefficients 
are followed by t-statistics ().  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated with 
*,**, and ***, respectively. 
Variable Definitions:
∆ AB_ACCR= the change in signed abnormal accruals during the test period (i.e. ∆1 or ∆2).  
The abnormal accrual model used is a modified DeFond and Park (2001) model
detailed previously in the Chapter 3. 
DLOSS t = a dummy variable equal to one for firms that report a loss during the event
window, and zero otherwise.
DLOWQUAL = a dummy variable equal to one for  loss firms that report a high severity loss,
and zero otherwise.
DMIDQUAL = a dummy variable equal to one for  loss firms that report a medium severity loss, 
and zero otherwise.
DHIGHQUAL = a dummy variable equal to one for  loss firms that report a low severity loss, and
zero otherwise.
∆ LMV = the change in the natural log of market value.  
∆ CFO = the change in the cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total 
assets.  
∆ LEV = the change in the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
∆ GROWTH = the change in the book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value divided by the 
market value. 
 
The results for the longer, ∆2, test period included in panel B of Table 5.3 show that 
with coefficient (t-stat) of -0.091  (t = -1.93), the results for the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 
subsample for the bad/average/good specifications are significant at the 10% level, 
respectively.  The results of the Wald test included at the end of Panel B of Table 5.3 
indicate that not only are the results for this variable significantly different from zero 
but they are also significantly different from the results for the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 (p 
= 0.02) subsample. 
 
As a test of robustness, this study also scaled the large/medium/small loss severity 
specification by sales instead of market value.  The results from this alternatively 
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scaled variable (included in Table 9.6 in the Appendix), are even more significant.  
That is, the coefficient on 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿, for the shorter test period, ∆1, is 
significant at the 1% level with a coefficient (t-stat) of -0.104 (t = -3.32) and for the 
the longer test period, ∆2, at the 5% level with a coefficient (t-stat) of -0.118 (t = -
2.04).  
 
The results from Table 5.3, corroborated by Table 9.6, indicate that the severity of 
initial loss has a material impact on the reversal of abnormal accruals in the initial 
loss year such that there is evidence to reject hypothesis H5.2 and this study can 
argue that the severity of the initial loss has a conditioning role to play on the impact 
of an initial loss for abnormal accruals.  When the control variables are excluded as it 
can be argued they can be in a DID analysis, the results (not tabulated here) are the 
same.  
 
5.5.3  Alternative Model Specification 
 
Equation 5.2 compares initial loss firms from the low, medium and high 
severity initial loss subgroups with the entire control sample.  Because Table 5.1 
showed evidence that abnormal accruals are different between the initial loss and 
control samples in the year before the initial loss, another approach which could 
provide additional insights with which to interpret the relationship under investigation 
while maintaining the integrity of the DID analysis is to compare initial loss and 
control firms within each sub-sample, i.e. include the severity of the loss as a main 
effect.  For this only the bad/average/good quality distinction is analysed — 
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obviously you cannot partition the control sample by the size of an initial loss which 
never occurred.   
 
The equation to perform the analysis in this way is as follows: 
 
∆ 𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 = 𝜗1𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 +  𝜔1𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿                + 𝜗2𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿+ 𝜔2𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿                          + 𝜗3𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿+ 𝜔3𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝜗𝑗∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝜀 
           5.3 
where all of the variables are as previously detailed.  The intercept is omitted to avoid 
perfect collinearity as the sum of 𝐷 𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿, 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 and 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 equals one.   
The results from estimating equation 5.3 are included in Table 5.4.   
 
The results indicate that in both test periods only the accrual behaviour of those initial 
loss firms with a low 12-month return around the year end of the initial loss (with 
mean (t-stat) of -0.070 (t = -1.65) and -0.107 (t = -1.71) for Δ1 and Δ2, respectively) 
is different from the corresponding control subsample thereby lending further 
significance to the results in Table 5.3.   
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Table 5.4
Test Periods
Independent Variables ∆1 ∆2
(t -stat) (t -stat)
D LOWQUAL 0.004 0.048
(0.11) (1.00)
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL -0.070 -0.107
(-1.65)* (-1.71)*
D MIDQUAL -0.010 0.037
(-0.33) (0.81)
D LOSS t  * D MIDQUAL 0.005 0.024
(0.12) (0.36)
D HIGHQUAL 0.019 0.020
(0.79) (0.58)
D LOSS t  * D HIGHQUAL -0.055 0.052
(-1.46) (0.95)
Δ LMV 0.008 -0.010
(0.25) (-0.78)
Δ CFO -0.527 -0.350
(-5.75)*** (-2.52)**
Δ LEV -0.030 -0.300
(-0.27) (-4.00)***
Δ GROWTH 0.023 -0.013
(0.59) (-0.53)
n 274 228
R 2 14.13% 13.13%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL =  D LOSS t  * D HIGHQUAL 0.79 0.05
D LOWQUAL  + D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL =  0 0.02 0.15
D HIGHQUAL  + D LOSS t *  D HIGHQUAL =  0 0.26 0.10
∆ AB_ACCR  = ϑ1 D LOWQUAL  +  ω1 D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL + ϑ2 D MIDQUAL
 + ω2 D LOSS t * D MIDQUAL  +  ϑ3D HIGHQUAL  +  ω3 D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL
+ ϑj  ∆ Controls + ε
Testing the Effect of an Initial Loss on Abnormal Accruals Conditioned
by the Severity of the Loss: An Alternative Conditioning Specification
This table reports the average effect of a loss on the change in abnormal 
working capital accruals across the test period. The pre-period is the year before the loss 
                 
e information about the data collected and variables constructed in this 
appendix is the s me as that in Table 5.3.
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5.5.4  Robustness Tests 
 
In order to test the robustness of the results in Table 5.3, equation 5.2 is 
reestimated using a modified version of the Francis and Wang (2008) model detailed 
in Chapter 2.  The modification is the same as that for the DeFond and Park (2001) 
model detailed previously in Section 3.6.3 of Chapter 3, i.e. the ‘normal’ ratios and 
scaling variable are those which occurred two years before the initial loss year, i.e. (t 
– 2) and these ratios and scaling variable are then used to calculate abnormal accruals 
in each of the subsequent years. 
 
The evidence, reported in Table 9.7 in the Appendix, indicates that the results and 
sign of the main coefficient of interest is significant for the ∆2 test period but not the 
∆1 test period.  This suggests that the additional depreciation related terms in the 
calculation of abnormal accruals via the Francis and Wang methodology have a 
dampening effect on accruals during the initial loss year that is consistent with fixed 
asset related devaluations/revaluations around the initial loss event.  Despite this 
dampening effect in the shorter test period, initial losses for those firms with a large 
or bad initial loss are shown to precipitate an increase in negative abnormal accruals 
during the longer test period. 
 
5.6  Abnormal Accruals and Initial Loss Reporting 
 
The next analysis in this chapter determines the likelihood of a firm reporting 
an initial loss.  There is evidence that firms systematically manage earnings to avoid 
 
 
 
 
 
  - 220 - 
 
 
reporting initial losses (Brown & Caylor, 2005; Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; 
Degeorge et al.,  1999).   
 
Given the findings in the univariate analysis that abnormal accruals are higher for 
initial loss firms in the year prior to the initial loss event, this study examines whether 
the likelihood of reporting an initial loss differs as a function of these prior year 
abnormal accruals.  
 
The hypothesis to perform this analysis, stated in the null form, is: 
 
H5.3:  there is no association between prior year abnormal accruals and the 
reporting of an initial loss. 
 
The logit model used to test whether initial loss reporting is affected by a firm’s use 
of abnormal accruals is as follows: 
 
𝑃(𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 = 1) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀 
5.4 
where 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 = dummy variable = 1 if the firm subsequently reports negative income 
before extraordinary items in year t, 0 otherwise and which, due to the matched 
sample in this study is = 1 for 50.0% of observations.  All other variables are as 
previously defined.  The coefficient of interest, 𝛽1, tests the ability of prior year 
abnormal accruals to predict the likelihood of an initial loss. The results for the initial 
loss avoidance analysis are reported in Table 5.5.  The coefficient on  𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 
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with mean (z-value) of 2.522 (z = 2.16) indicates that the higher are signed abnormal 
accruals, the more likely is a firm to report an initial loss, i.e. H5.3 can be rejected. 
 
Table 5.5
Independent Variables Coefficient
(z -value)
Intercept -0.870
(-1.79)*
AB_ACCR  t -1 2.522
(2.16)**
LMV t -1 0.028
(0.40)
LEV t -1 0.532
(1.00)
GROWTH t -1 0.714
(2.88)***
n 274
Pseudo R 2 3.46%
Testing the Effect of Abnormal Accruals for Initial Loss Reporting
P(D LOSS t  = 1) =  β 0  + β 1 AB_ACCR t -1+ β j Controls t -1 + ε
This table reports the coefficient estimates for probability of reporting an 
initial loss.  The test (initial loss) sample consists of 137 firms which reported a loss in year t
following two years of reporting a profit and the control sample consists of  137 firms  
matched for industry and market value which reported a profit in each of year t-2 to t+2.  
Financial information is obtained from Datastream/Worldscope.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers.  Estimated 
coefficients are followed by z-values ().  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are 
indicated with *,**, and ***, respectively. 
Variable Definitions:
AB_ACCR = the signed abnormal accruals . The abnormal accrual model used is a modified 
DeFond and Park (2001) model detailed previously in Chapter 3.
DLOSS t = a dummy variable equal to one for firms that report a loss in the following 
year and zero otherwise.
LMV = the natural log of market value.  
LEV = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
GROWTH = the book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value divided by the market 
value.
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5.6.1 Robustness Tests 
 
In order to test the robustness of the results presented in Table 5.4 regression 
model 5.4 is reestimated using an alternative modified (Francis & Wang, 2008) 
model to calculate abnormal accruals.  The evidence, reported in Table 9.8 in the 
Appendix, shows that the results for the initial loss avoidance analysis are robust to 
the alternative specification of abnormal accruals.  Further analysis of the relationship 
between abnormal accruals and initial loss reporting is included in Chapter 6. 
 
5.7  Summary and Conclusions 
 
The empirical analysis in this Chapter examines earnings management 
behaviour around the initial loss event.  Extant research contends that firms manage 
earnings to avoid, inter alia, reporting an initial loss.  This chapter is different in that 
it examines earnings management in situations where the loss is incurred rather than 
avoided.  Firms that subsequently report an initial loss should have higher abnormal 
accruals in the year before the initial loss when they were attempting to avoid it (but 
only succeeded in deferring it).  The close matching of the control sample in this 
study by industry and size avoids the criticism that abnormal accruals behaviour 
varies by industry and size; this study tightly controls for both.  The results from the 
univariate analysis are confirmed by the results from a multivariate logit loss 
reporting analysis which indicate that firms with high prior year signed abnormal 
accruals are more likely to report an initial loss.  To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, this is the first time that the role of abnormal accruals in initial loss 
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reporting/avoidance has been directly tested (as opposed to indirectly inferred) in this 
manner. 
 
This research is further extended to explore the change from these pre-period 
abnormal accrual levels around (in response to) the initial loss event.  In that regard, 
the main empirical analysis examines the impact of an initial loss event on changes in 
abnormal accruals.  A matched control sample is used as a benchmark and a 
difference-in-differences approach is used to isolate the impact of the initial loss 
event.  There is evidence that the initial loss event precipitates an unwinding of 
abnormal accruals among loss firms over and above the control sample such that this 
study can conclude that initial losses matter for the accounting choices of initial loss 
firms; earnings quality (as represented by abnormal accruals) changes (improves or 
decreases) in a direct response to the initial loss event.  The results of a supplemental 
multivariate difference-in-difference analysis also indicate that the reversal of 
abnormal accruals is further accentuated when the severity of the initial loss (as 
represented by the large/medium/small and bad/average/good criteria outlined 
previously in the Chapter) is used to condition the model.  This study also utilises an 
alternative specification of the difference-in-difference model and provides 
additional, albeit indirect, corroborating evidence of the conditioning role played by 
the severity of the initial loss.  The findings are also largely robust to the use of an 
alternatively modified model to calculate abnormal accruals.  Therefore this study can 
argue that the severity of the loss has, in certain circumstances, a conditioning role to 
play on the impact of an initial loss on the reversal of abnormal accruals.  
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At the end of the chapter there is enough evidence to conclude that initial losses 
matter for the quality of earnings for initial loss firms.  That is, from the initial loss 
reporting/avoidance analysis it is evident that initial loss firms use abnormal prior 
year accruals in an attempt to avoid (but ultimately succeed in only deferring) the 
initial loss.  It is also evident from the difference-in-difference analysis that initial 
loss firms unwind these positive abnormal accruals when the loss is unavoidable (i.e. 
it occurs) and that the extent of unwinding depends on the severity of the loss event.  
It is also observed that CFO does not change any more for initial loss firms than it 
does for control firms suggesting that the change in earnings over the test period for 
initial loss firms (not tabulated here) is entirely attributable to the reversal of 
abnormal accruals.  Once again, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first 
time that abnormal accrual behaviour previous to and around a shock event have been 
analysed in this manner and so the results represent a significant, comprehensive and 
novel contribution to both the earnings management and loss literatures. 
 
This chapter, in combination with the previous one, raises additional questions.  For 
example, it would be interesting to combine the findings of Chapter 4 regarding 
corporate governance with those of this Chapter to analyse whether the severity of the 
initial loss has a conditioning role to play on the observed changes in governance 
across the test periods and, perhaps more interestingly, whether pre-period corporate 
governance quality has a mitigating impact on the ability of pre-period abnormal 
accruals to predict the initial loss and also on the observed earnings management 
decreases from these pre-period abnormal accruals levels for initial loss firms across 
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the test periods.  The next chapter provides significant contributions in addressing 
these issues. 
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Chapter 6 
Initial Losses, Corporate Governance 
And Abnormal Accruals  
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6.1    Introduction 
 
This chapter extends the empirical findings of the current literature that 
documents the importance of corporate governance mechanisms for earnings quality 
in a variety of circumstances.  The literature analysed in Section 2.6 of Chapter 2 
affirms that the way firms are run and organised is important to preserve the integrity 
of management and to prevent aggressive accounting manipulation.  In fact, when the 
corporate governance mechanisms are well appointed, they can effectively monitor 
the actions of management, they cannot easily be overridden and they can better 
protect shareholders.  Using the same sample detailed previously in Chapter 3, this 
Chapter combines the high, medium and low quality ex-ante conditioning corporate 
governance variables used in Chapters 4 with the abnormal accruals analysis in 
Chapter 5 to test, inter alia, for the mitigating impact of corporate governance on 
earnings management behaviour at initial loss firms.  A combined analysis which 
examines the change in abnormal accruals for initial loss firms conditioned by both 
the severity of the loss and the quality of corporate governance is also performed.   
 
The test periods for these analyses correspond with those in Chapter 5, i.e.  test period 
∆1 is from time (t – 1) to t and test period ∆2 is from time (t – 1) to either (t + 1) or (t 
+ 2) depending on whether or not the loss firm returns to profitability in year (t + 1) 
or (t + 2) after the loss event.  The loss reporting analysis from Chapter 5 is also 
extended to examine the conditioning impact of corporate governance on the ability 
of prior year abnormal accruals to predict a loss.   
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In addition, for completeness, this chapter also undertakes a test for any conditioning 
role played by the severity of the initial loss for the change in corporate governance at 
initial loss firms.  It is the anticipatory 24-month return variable (18-months before 
the year end of the loss year, 6-months after) rather than the 12-month variable in 
Chapter 5 that is used to determine the markets’ interpretation of the severity of the 
initial loss in this chapter.  This is because, as discussed in Chapter 4, changes in 
governance anticipate the initial loss and are calculated from the end of year (t – 1).  
The 12-month return variable does not overlap the first six months of year (t – 1) and 
so the wider return measure is used instead.  The test periods for this analysis 
correspond with those in Chapter 4, i.e. test period ∆1 is from time (t – 1) to t and test 
period ∆2 is from time (t – 1) to (t + 1). 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: section 6.2 presents evidence from a DID 
analysis on the mitigating impact of the quality of ex-ante corporate governance 
conditioning variables (Board, Chair, Diversity, Ownership and BSize) on the 
relationship between initial losses and abnormal accruals behaviour in response to the 
initial loss.  Section 6.3 goes one step further by conditioning the analysis on both the 
quality of ex-ante corporate governance as well as the severity of the initial loss to 
test whether these two conditioning variables, in combination, have a mitigating role 
to play on the abnormal accruals behaviour of initial loss firms.  Section 6.4 presents 
evidence from a logit analysis on the mitigating impact of corporate governance 
quality on whether firms with high prior year signed abnormal accruals are more 
likely to report an initial loss.  Section 6.5 presents evidence from a DID analysis on 
the mitigating impact of the severity of the loss (relative size and market 
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interpretation) on the relationship between initial losses and changes in corporate 
governance in response to the initial loss.  Section 6.6 investigates the Ownership 
variable further by repeating the analysis in section 6.2 for each of the individual 
variables that make up the Ownership construct.  Section 6.7 summarises and 
concludes. 
 
6.2 The Effect of an Initial Loss Event Conditioned by Corporate 
Governance Characteristics on Abnormal Accruals 
 
This section formally examines the mitigating role corporate governance 
plays on the impact of the initial loss event on the abnormal accruals decisions 
(changes) made by initial loss firms.  Based on the results in Chapter 4 and 5, and in 
line with the extant literature that earnings quality (management) is increasing 
(decreasing) in corporate governance, the ex-ante expectation is that initial loss firms 
with lower quality corporate governance will unwind positive abnormal accruals 
(increase negative abnormal accruals) across the test periods by more than loss firms 
with higher quality corporate governance.   
 
The hypotheses to perform this analysis, stated in the null form, is: 
 
H6.1:  ex-ante corporate governance quality has no effect on the association 
between the reporting of an initial loss and changes in abnormal 
accruals. 
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6.2.1  Empirical Results 
 
This section employs the same difference in difference research design 
detailed previously.  It is the role of initial losses as a change agent that is conditioned 
by corporate governance in the analysis to follow to establish whether corporate 
governance has any mitigating role to play in the already documented changes in 
abnormal accruals (from Chapter 5) across the test periods. 
 
To test H6.1, the mitigating impact of corporate governance on the association 
between the reporting of a loss event and changes in abnormal accruals versus the 
control sample, this study estimates the following equation: 
 
∆𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿1𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1     + 𝛿3𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑗∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝜀 
6.1 
where the dummy variables 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡, 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1, 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1and 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 are 
the loss and corporate governance quality dummies previously outlined.  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 
indicates the control variables  (i.e. LMV, CFO, LEV and GROWTH) and the intercept 
𝛽0 captures the change during the test period for the control firms.  The key 
coefficient of interest then is 𝛿1 which captures the difference in the change in 
abnormal accruals between the initial loss sample conditioned by low corporate 
governance; that is, the mitigating impact of low corporate  governance on the initial 
loss event.  
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Given the responsiveness of the analysis of abnormal accrual changes over the shorter 
∆1 test period to the conditioned severity of loss variable in Chapter 5, the results of 
estimating equation 6.1 for this test period are included in Table 6.1 — the results for 
the longer test period (untabulated) are not significant.  The results show that 
𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 is significant for the Board, Ownership and BSize 
specifications with coefficients (t-stats) of -0.056 (t = -1.82), -0.060 (t = -2.02) and -
0.057 (t = 1.75), respectively.  The coefficient for 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 is also 
significant for the Ownership variable indicating that this variable requires further 
analysis; this will be done later in section 6.5.  It is also important to note that, based 
on the results from the Wald tests included at the end of Table 6.1, the coefficients for 
the loss sample (i.e. that 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 = 0) are significant for 
each of the Board, Diversity, Ownership and BSize specifications. 
 
Thus, this study rejects the null hypothesis H6.1 in favour of the alternative that low 
corporate governance has a material impact on the association between the reporting 
of an initial loss and changes in abnormal accruals — in certain specifications, initial 
loss firms with low corporate governance decrease abnormal accruals (i.e. reverse 
abnormal accruals or increase negative abnormal accruals) by more than the control 
sample.   
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Table 6.1 Testing the Effect of an Initial Loss Event on Abnormal Accruals 
Conditioned by Corporate Governance Characteristics
∆ AB_ACCR = β 0  + δ 1 D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 + δ 2 D LOSS t  * D MIDGOV t -1
+ δ 3 D LOSS t  * D HIGHGOV t -1 + β j ∆ Controls  + ε
Panel A Test Period ∆1
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.005
(0.35) (0.37) (0.33) (0.40) (0.33)
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 -0.056 -0.023 -0.039 -0.060 -0.057
(-1.82)* (-0.70) (-1.47) (-2.02)** (-1.75)*
D LOSS t * D MIDGOV t -1 -0.014 -0.087 -0.018 0.031 -0.053
(-0.36) (-2.39)** (-0.34) (0.77) (-1.61)
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 -0.049 -0.037 -0.073 -0.066 -0.022
(-1.57) (-1.21) (-1.90) (-2.11)** (-0.67)
Δ LMV 0.015 0.012 0.018 0.015 0.018
(0.55) (0.45) (0.63) (0.55) (0.66)
Δ CFO -0.538 -0.538 -0.537 -0.536 -0.537
(-5.95)*** (-5.97)*** (-5.94)*** (-5.98)*** (-5.94)***
Δ LEV -0.045 -0.059 -0.067 -0.055 -0.055
(-0.40) (-0.53) (-0.59) (-0.50) (-0.50)
Δ GROWTH 0.021 0.017 0.023 0.034 0.026
(0.55) (0.44) (0.60) (0.87) (0.67)
n 274 274 274 274 274
R 2 13.50% 13.99% 13.53% 14.91% 13.48%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1
0.85 0.70 0.38 0.87 0.38
D LOSS t *D LOWGOV t -1 + Intercept  = 0
0.05 0.56 0.10 0.03 0.07
D LOSS t *D HIGHGOV t -1 + Intercept  = 0
0.11 0.23 0.05 0.02 0.57
(Continued)
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Table 6.1 Continued
Variable Definitions:
∆ AB_ACCR = the change in signed abnormal accruals during the test period (i.e. ∆1 or ∆2). The 
abnormal accrual model used is the DeFond and Park (2001) model.  The method of 
calculating the abnormal accruals in any year from which the changes in abnormal 
accruals are then calculated is as follows:
where WC is the non-cash working capital.  S is sales. TA is total assets.
DLOSS t = a dummy variable equal to one for firms that report a loss, and zero otherwise.  
DLOWGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value below the 
mean in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise
DHIGHGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a governance value above 
the mean in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise.  
∆ LMV = the change in the natural log of market value.  
This table reports the effect of an initial loss on the change in abnormal accruals 
conditioned by corporate governance characteristics.  For each (test or control) firm,  the  test period is the 
year before the loss event, t-1,  to either the year of the loss (∆1) or the year  the loss firm returns to 
profitability (i.e. either  year t+1 or t+2) (∆2); for those firms that liquidate or are acquired the window is
from year t-1 to t+1.  The test (loss sample) consists of 137 (∆1) and 114 (∆2) firms which reported a loss in 
year t following two years of reporting a profit and the control sample consists of  the same number of  firms  
matched for industry and market value which reported a profit in ach of year t-2 to t+2.  The difference in 
the sample sizes in test periods ∆1 and ∆2 is firms (loss or control being acquired in the period t to t+1.  The 
construction of the  governanc co structs is exp a ed in Chapter 3.    T e sample is partitioned based upon 
sample mean values of Board, Chair, Diversity, Ownership  and BSize, which are (because Board, Chair and 
Ownership were normalised in the construction process) 0, 0, 0, 0 and 6, respectively.  Firms with ex-ante 
corporate governance values in the bottom two quintiles are in the LOWGOV group, firms in the middle 
quintile are in the MIDGOV group, and firms in the top two quintiles are in the HIGHGOV group. Financial 
information is obtained from Datastream/Worldscope.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers.  Estimated coefficients are followed by t-statistics ().  
Significance levels at 10%, 5%, a d 1% are indicated by  *, **, ***, respectively.
Variable Definitions:
∆ AB_ACCR = th  cha ge in signed abnormal accruals during the t st period (i.e. ∆1 or ∆2).  The 
bnormal accrua  model used is a modified DeFond and Park (2001) model d t iled 
pr viously in Chapter 3. 
DLOSS t = a dummy variable eq al to one for firms that report a loss during the event window, 
and zero otherwise.
DLOWGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the bottom 
two quintiles mean in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise
DMIDGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the middle 
quintile in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise
DHIGHGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the top two 
quintiles in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise.  
∆ LMV = the change in the natural log of market value.  
∆ CFO = the change in the cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total assets.  
∆ LEV = the change in the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
∆ GROWTH = the change in the book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value divided by the market 
value. 
 
6.2.2 Robustness Tests 
 
In order to test the robustness of the results in Table 6.1, equation 6.1 is 
reestimated using unwisnorised variables. The results in Table 9.9 in the Appendix 
indicate that the results are the same for 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 in the Board 
specification and for 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 in the Ownership specification.  The 
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other significant variables in the winsorised results in Table 6.1 are no longer 
significant, indicating the importance of winsorization. 
 
6.3 The Effect of an Initial Loss Event Conditioned by Both 
Corporate Governance Characteristics and the Severity of the 
Loss on Abnormal Accruals 
 
The previous sections merged the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 by swapping 
the conditioning variables in each chapter with the other.  For completeness, and 
academic curiosity, this section goes further still, combining the quality of corporate 
governance and the severity of the loss conditioning variables to test whether both in 
combination have a mitigating role to play on the change in signed abnormal accruals 
in response to the initial loss.   
 
The hypothesis to perform this analysis, stated in the null form, is: 
 
H6.2:  ex-ante corporate governance quality and the severity of the initial loss 
in combination have no effect on the association between the reporting 
of an initial loss and changes in abnormal accruals. 
 
Before testing the combined mitigating impact of both conditioning variables it is 
important to verify that there are sufficient numbers in each category to make the 
results of the analysis worthwhile; the results of the distributions of the initial loss 
firms by both corporate governance and the severity of the loss (included in Table 
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9.10 in the Appendix) indicates a good spread of initial loss firms across the nine 
potential categories.  
 
In addition, previous analyses in Chapter 5 and in section 6.2 of this chapter only 
found evidence for the significance of results for severe losses (i.e. large/bad) and for 
low quality corporate governance in the Board and BSize specifications and for both 
low and high quality corporate governance in the Ownership specification.  Therefore 
it is the analysis of these specific categories that are most worthwhile in this section, 
i.e. high severity loss and low quality corporate governance for Board, Ownership 
and BSize, and high severity loss and high quality corporate governance for 
Ownership.  It is also noted from Table 9.10 that some of the initial loss subgroups 
are of insufficient size to deliver meaningful results for those subgroups and so this 
more focused approach is appropriate.   
 
6.3.1  Empirical Results 
 
To perform the analysis in this section in a meaningful way this study 
estimates the following equation: 
 
∆𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 = 𝛽0 +  𝜑1𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1                                 +  𝜑2𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1                                 + 𝜑3𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽𝑗∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝜀 
6.2 
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where the intercept 𝛽0, once again, captures the change during the test period for the 
entire control sample, the dummy variables 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡, 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿, 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 and 
𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 are as previously outlined, and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 represent the control variables  (i.e. LMV, CFO, LEV and GROWTH).  The interpretation of the 𝐷𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅 variable 
depends on whether it is the Board and BSize specifications or the Ownership 
specification which is being considered.  If it is Board and BSize then 𝐷𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅 has a 
value of 1 those loss firms not in the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 subgroup, otherwise 0 
and if it is Ownership then 𝐷𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅 has a value of 1 for those loss firms not in either 
of the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 and 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 subgroups, otherwise 
0.  The key coefficients of interest then are 𝜑1 in all specifications (Board, Ownership 
and BSize) and 𝜑2 for the Ownership specification.  These coefficients capture the 
difference in the change in signed abnormal accruals between the entire control 
sample and the initial loss sample conditioned by both low quality corporate 
governance and high severity loss (𝜑1) and the loss sample conditioned by both high 
quality corporate governance and high severity loss (𝜑2).   
 
The results for this analysis are included in Table 6.2 where it is evident that the 
coefficient on 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 is significant in the Board specification for 
initial loss firms for the bad/average/good and large/medium/small severity of loss 
specifications at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively, with coefficients of -0.110 (t-
stat = -2.55) and -0.081 (t-stat = -1.73), respectively indicating that the lower the 
board quality when the loss is severe (i.e. bad/large), the more an initial loss firm 
unwinds positive prior year accruals  The coefficient on 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 is 
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significant in the BSize specification for initial loss firms for only the 
large/medium/small severity of loss specification at the 10% level, with a coefficient 
of -0.085 (t-stat = -1.94) and -0.081 (t-stat = -1.73), indicating that the smaller the 
board when the loss is severe (i.e. large), the more an initial  loss firm unwinds 
positive prior year accruals.  The coefficient for 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 is 
significant for the Ownership specification for both severity of loss specifications at 
the 1% level with coefficients -0.114 (t-stat = -2.72) and -0.117 (t-stat = -3.02), 
respectively, indicating that the higher the quality of corporate governance when the 
initial loss is severe (i.e. bad/large), the more an initial loss firm unwinds positive 
prior year accruals.  This can be preliminarily interpreted (based on the construction 
of the Ownership variable in Chapter 3) as initial loss firms with higher outside 
ownership and/or lower insider ownership being more honest about the extent of the 
loss.  Obviously this interpretation is valid if it is shown, via a loss reporting model, 
that initial loss firms with high quality ownership do not have higher prior year 
abnormal accruals; if not then this result is anomalous.  The loss reporting analysis 
necessary to tease out these difficult to interpret Ownership results will be examined 
further in the next section. 
 
Overall, there is some evidence to reject H:6.2 and this study can conclude that, in 
combination, ex-ante corporate governance quality and the severity of the loss have 
an effect on the association between the reporting of an initial loss and changes in 
abnormal accruals. 
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Table 6.2
Panel A Bad/Average/Good
Independent Variables Board Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.008 0.009 0.006
(0.51) (0.52) (0.38)
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D LOWGOV t -1 -0.110 -0.071 -0.072
(-2.55)** (-1.60) (-1.60)
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D HIGHGOV t -1 -0.114
(-2.72)***
D LOSS t * D OTHER -0.033 -0.024 -0.040
(-1.36) (-0.93) (-1.62)
Δ LMV 0.002 0.002 0.013
(0.06) (0.07) (0.45)
Δ CFO -0.533 -0.528 -0.533
(-5.93)*** (-5.87)*** (-5.89)***
Δ LEV -0.055 -0.036 -0.057
(-0.50) (-0.32) (-0.52)
Δ GROWTH 0.019 0.022 0.019
(0.50) (0.58) (0.48)
n 274 274 274
R 2 14.25% 14.73% 13.28%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D OTHER
0.07 0.30 0.47
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D HIGHGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D OTHER
0.03
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D HIGHGOV t -1
0.42
(Continued)
Testing the Effect of an Initial Loss Event on Abnormal Accruals 
Conditioned by Both Corporate Governance Characteristics
and the Severity of the Loss
∆ AB_ACCR = β 0  + ϕ1 D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D LOWGOV t -1
ϕ2 D LOSS t  * D LOWQUAL * D HIGHGOV t -1+ ϕ3D LOSS t  * D OTHER + β j ∆ Controls  + ε
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Table 6.2 Continued
Panel B Large/Medium/Small
Independent Variables Board Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.006 0.007 0.005
(0.37) (0.40) (0.32)
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D LOWGOV t -1 -0.081 -0.023 -0.085
(-1.73)* (-0.046) (-1.94)*
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D HIGHGOV t -1 -0.117
(-3.02)***
D LOSS t * D OTHER -0.040 -0.027 -0.037
(-1.63) (-1.05) (-1.49)
Δ LMV 0.013 0.014 0.017
(0.46) (0.51) (0.63)
Δ CFO -0.540 -0.533 -0.537
(-5.98)*** (-5.94)*** (-5.95)***
Δ LEV -0.046 -0.029 -0.044
(-0.42) (-0.26) (-0.40)
Δ GROWTH 0.021 0.028 0.019
(0.55) (0.73) (0.48)
n 274 274 274
R 2 13.45% 15.00% 13.58%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D LOWGOV t-1 = D LOSS t * D OTHER
0.36 0.93 0.27
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D HIGHGOV t-1 = D LOSS t * D OTHER
0.02
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D HIGHGOV t -1
0.09
(Continued)
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Table 6.2 Continued
Variable Definitions:
∆ AB_ACCR = the change in signed abnormal accruals during the test period (i.e. ∆1 or ∆2). The 
abnormal accrual model used is the DeFond and Park (2001) model.  The method of 
calculating the abnormal accruals in any year from which the changes in abnormal 
accruals are then calculated is as follows:
where WC is the non-cash working capital.  S is sales. TA is total assets.
DLOSS t = a dummy variable equal to one for firms that report a loss, and zero otherwise.  
DLOWGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value below the 
mean in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise
DHIGHGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a governance value above 
the mean in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise.  
∆ LMV = the change in the natural log of market value.  
∆ CFO = the change in the cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total assets.  
This table reports the effect of an initial loss on the change in abnormal accruals 
conditioned by corporate governance characteristics and the severity of the loss.  For each (test or control) 
firm,  the  test period is the year before the loss event, t-1,  to the year of the loss (∆1).  The test (loss 
sample) consists of 137 (∆1) firms which reported a loss in year t following two years of reporting a profit 
and the control sample consists of  the same number of  firms  matched for industry and market value which 
reported a profit in each of year t-2 to t+2.   The construction of the corporate governance constructs is
explained in Chapter 3.    The sample is partitioned based upon ex-ante corporate governance values.  Firms 
with ex-ante corporate governance values in the bottom two quintiles are in the LOWGOV group, firms in 
the middle quintile are in the MIDGOV group, and firms with governance values in the top two quintiles are 
in the HIGHGOV group.  The sample is also partitioned based upon the severity of loss; an initial loss firm 
with a 12-month return around the loss event (6-months before, 6-months after) in the bottom two quintiles 
of all (loss and control) such returns or a scaled loss in the top two quintiles of all losses is a bad loss 
(LOWQUAL), in the middle quintile is a medium loss (MIDQUAL), and in the top two quinitles is a good 
loss (HIGHQUAL).  Financial information is obtained from Datastream/Worldscope.  All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers.  Estimated 
coefficients are followed by t-statistics ().  Significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by  *, **, 
***, respectively.
Variable Definitions:
∆ AB_ACCR = t  change in sign d a n rmal accruals uring the test p riod.  The abnormal accrual 
model used is a modified DeFond and Park (2001) model detailed previously in Chapter 5. 
DLOSS t = a dummy variable equal to one for firms that report a loss uring the event window, 
and zero otherwise.
DLOWGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the bottom 
two quintiles in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise.
DMIDGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the middle 
quintile in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise.
DHIGHGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the top two 
quintiles in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise. 
DLOWQUAL = a dummy variable equal to 1 if the quality of the firms loss in is the bottom two quintiles, 
and zero otherwise.
DHIGHQUAL = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a the quality of the loss is in the top two quintiles, and zero 
otherwise
DOTHER = a dummy variable equal to 1 for all other subgroups not included in the regression, and 
zero otherwise.
∆ LMV = the change in the natural log of market value.  
∆ CFO = the change in the cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total assets.  
∆ LEV = the change in the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
∆ GROWTH = the change in the book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value divided by the market 
value. 
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6.3.2 Robustness Tests  
 
In order to test the robustness of the results in Table 6.2, equation 6.2 is 
reestimated using unwinsorised variables.  The results in Table 9.11 in the Appendix 
indicate that the results are the essentially the same such that the conclusions 
regarding the joint impact of corporate governance characteristics and loss severity 
are the same. 
 
6.4 Abnormal Accruals, Corporate Governance Characteristics and 
Initial Loss Reporting 
 
The next analysis in this chapter examines the mitigating impact of corporate 
governance characteristics on the likelihood of a firm reporting a loss.  As discussed 
in Chapter 5, there is evidence that firms systematically manage earnings to avoid 
reporting losses (Brown & Caylor, 2005; Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et 
al., 1999; Holland & Ramsay, 2003; Yang & Mulcahy, 2013).  Indeed, the results in 
Chapter 5 for the unconditioned loss reporting analysis indicate that the higher are 
signed abnormal accruals, the more likely is a firm to report an initial loss in the 
following year.  This section conditions this analysis on corporate governance to test 
whether high or low quality governance has a mitigating impact on this observed 
relationship to test whether the way corporate governance is organised is important to 
prevent aggressive accounting manipulation.  The expectation is that the ability of 
prior year abnormal accruals to predict a loss is exacerbated by low quality corporate 
governance. 
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The hypothesis for this analysis, stated in the null form, is: 
 
H6.4:  corporate governance has no effect on the association between prior 
year signed abnormal accruals and loss avoidance. 
 
6.4.1  Empirical Results 
 
The logit model used to test whether initial loss reporting is affected by a 
firm’s signed abnormal accruals conditioned by corporate governance quality in the 
year prior to the loss year (plus a set of controls for firm size, leverage, and growth 
that may affect the likelihood of reporting losses) is as follows: 
 
𝑃(𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 = 1)= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗  𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1+ 𝛽2𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1+ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀 
6.3 
where 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 = dummy variable = 1 if firm subsequently reports negative income 
before extraordinary items in year t, 0 otherwise and all other variables are as defined 
previously in the chapter.  The coefficient of interest is 𝛽1 which tests the 
exacerbating effect of low quality corporate governance on the ability of prior year 
abnormal accruals to predict the initial loss.  However, given the anomalous result 
relating to Ownership in the previous section, the coefficient on the 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 
 
 
 
 
 
  - 244 - 
 
 
variable, 𝛽3, is also of interest for the Ownership specification.  If this variable is 
insignificant, the result will rule out the change in abnormal accruals for this 
subgroup in the previous section being due to abnormally high prior year accruals.   
 
The loss reporting analysis is reported in Table 6.3 for five logistic models testing 
each of the five conditioning corporate governance variables where the significance 
levels of the individual coefficients are based on two-tailed p-values for asymptotic z-
statistics.  Although referred to as a loss reporting analysis here, it could equally be 
referred to as a loss avoidance analysis because it attempts to assess the degree to 
which corporate governance exacerbates the propensity of initial loss firms to 
avoid/defer that loss via the use of prior year abnormal accruals.   
 
The results indicate that the coefficients on the 𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 variable 
are significant for each of the Board, Diversity, Ownership and BSize with 
coefficients (z-stats) of 6.650 (z = 2.92), 4.538 (z = 2.86), 2.90 (z = 1.94), and 4.720 (z 
= 2.32), respectively.  None of the coefficients on 𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 or 
𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 are significant for any specification and for Board and 
Diversity the propensity for corporate governance to exacerbate the probability of an 
initial loss decreases monotonically.  The results of the two-tailed tests of 
significance included at the end of Table 6.4 indicate that not only are the results for 
firms in the 𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 group significantly different from zero, but 
that these results are also different from those firms in the 𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗
𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 group in the Board and Diversity specifications.  Specifically, the 
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hypothesis that 𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 = 𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 has p-
values of <0.01 and 0.01 for Board and Diversity, respectively.   
 
As mentioned above, also noteworthy is the insignificance of the 𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗
𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 variable for the Ownership specification which confirms the 
preliminary interpretation regarding the significant  𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗
𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 variable in the previous section.  In other words, the reason initial loss 
firms with high quality ownership were shown to change (reduce) abnormal accruals 
in response to/anticipation of the loss is because they are more honest about the loss 
when it does occur, not because they had higher prior year abnormal accruals in the 
first place. 
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Table 6.3
 
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership Bsize
(z -stat) (z -stat) (z -stat) (z -stat) (z -stat)
Intercept -0.946 -0.907 -0.864 -0.884 -0.900
(-1.89)* (-1.85)* (-1.76)* (-1.81)* (-1.84)*
AB_ACCR  t -1* D LOWGOV t -1 6.650 2.012 4.539 2.900 4.720
(2.92)*** (1.11) (2.86)*** (1.94)* (2.32)**
AB_ACCR  t -1* D MIDGOV t -1 2.336 4.493 1.020 0.676 -0.609
(1.09) (1.47) (0.36) (0.23) (-0.27)
AB_ACCR  t -1* D HIGHGOV t -1 -2.183 2.292 -4.569 2.695 2.316
(-1.01) (1.32) (-1.37) (1.10) (1.09)
LMV t -1 0.045 0.031 0.026 0.033 0.036
(0.63) (0.44) (0.37) (0.47) (0.51)
LEV t -1 0.454 0.577 0.533 0.514 0.510
(0.83) (1.07) (0.97) (0.96) (0.94)
GROWTH t -1 0.753 0.715 0.731 0.716 0.739
(2.94)*** (2.87)*** (2.89)** (2.88)*** (2.95)***
n 274 274 274 274 274
R 2 5.80% 3.61% 5.43% 3.58% 4.32%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
AB_ACCR  t -1* D LOWGOV t -1 = AB_ACCR  t -1* D HIGHGOV t -1
<0.01 0.91 0.01 0.94 0.42
Testing the Effect of Abnormal Accruals Conditioned by Corporate
Governance Characteristics for Initial Loss Reporting
+ β 3 AB_ACCR t -1* D HIGHGOV t -1 + β j Controls t -1 + ε
P (D LOSS t  = 1) =  β 0  + β 1 AB_ACCR t -1* D LOWGOV  t -1 + β 2 AB_ACCR t-1 * D MIDGOV t -1
This table reports the coefficient estimates for probability of reporting an initial loss.  The 
test (initial loss) sample consists of 137 firms which reported a loss in year t following two years of 
reporting a profit and the control sample consists of  137 firms  matched for industry and market value 
which reported a profit in each of year t-2 to t+2.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated 
with *,**, and ***, respectively.    The sample is partitioned based upon ex-ante governance values.  Firms 
with ex-ante corporate governance values in the bottom two quintiles are in the LOWGOV group, firms in 
the middle quintile are in the MIDGOV group, and firms in the top two quintiles are in the HIGHGOV
group.  Financial information is obtained from Datastream/Worldscope.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers.  Estimated coefficients are 
followed by z-statistics ().  
(Continued)
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Table 6.3    Continued
Variable Definitions:
AB_ACCR = the signed abnormal accruals.  The abnormal accrual model used is the DeFond and 
Park (2001) model.  
DLOSS t = a dummy variable equal to one for loss firms that report a loss and zero otherwise.
DLOWGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the bottom 
two quintiles mean in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise
DMIDGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the middle 
quintile in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise
DHIGHGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the top two 
quintiles in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise.  
LMV = the natural log of market value.  
LEV = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets .  
GROWTH  = the book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value divided by the market value.
 
Overall there is evidence that corporate governance characteristics have a mitigating 
impact on the association between prior year signed abnormal accruals and loss 
reporting.  This study concludes that firms with high quality corporate governance are 
less likely than firms with low quality corporate governance to report an initial loss as 
prior year signed accruals increase and so H6.3 can be rejected.  These results are 
also robust to the exclusion of the control variables (results not reported here). 
 
6.4.2  Alternative Model Specification 
 
The logit model used in the previous section does not include the ex-ante 
corporate governance quality variables as main effects.  Consistent with the previous 
analyses in this study, equation 6.3 can be supplemented to include these main 
effects.   The equation is supplemented as follows: 
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𝑃(𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 = 1)= 𝜗1𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 +  𝜔1𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗  𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1+ 𝜗2𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 +  𝜔2𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗  𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1+ 𝜗3𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 +  𝜔3𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗  𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1+ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀 
6.4 
where all of the variables are as defined previously and the intercept is excluded to 
avoid perfect linear collinearity.   
 
The results from estimating equation 6.4 are included in Table 6.4.  Similar to those 
in Table 6.3, the results indicate that 𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 is significant for all 
corporate governance specifications.  None of the coefficients on 𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗
𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1and 𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1are significant in any specification.  
Also of interest are the significantly negative 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 coefficients in the in the 
Board, Chair, Diversity and Ownership specifications indicating that in the absence 
of ex-ante high abnormal accruals, firms with low quality corporate governance are 
less likely to report a loss, perhaps because they are content to build  abnormal 
accruals to defer/avoid it.    
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Table 6.4
 
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership Bsize
(z -stat) (z -stat) (z -stat) (z -stat) (z -stat)
D LOWGOV t -1 -0.963 -1.005 -0.906 -1.145 -0.809
(-1.91)* (-2.01)** (-1.80)* (-2.27)** (-1.59)
AB_ACCR  t -1* D LOWGOV t -1 6.733 2.056 4.557 3.267 4.645
(2.93)*** (1.12) (2.86)*** (2.08)** (2.28)**
D MIDGOV t -1 -0.843 -0.840 -0.904 -0.975 -0.748
(-1.45) (-1.52) (-1.26) (-1.70)* (-1.30)
AB_ACCR  t -1* D MIDGOV t -1 2.306 4.464 1.034 0.718 -0.584
(1.07) (1.46) (0.36) (0.24) (-0.26)
D HIGHGOV t -1 -0.772 -0.525 -0.640 -0.392 -0.537
(-1.34) (-0.97) (-1.10) (-0.75) (-0.77)
AB_ACCR  t -1* D HIGHGOV t -1 -2.141 2.252 -4.825 3.436 2.259
(-0.99) (1.31) (-1.41) (1.38) (1.07)
LMV t -1 0.028 0.002 0.026 0.029 -0.001
(0.36) (0.03) (0.34) (0.41) (-0.02)
LEV t -1 0.431 0.579 0.503 0.448 0.448
(0.79) (1.07) (0.91) (0.83) (0.82)
GROWTH t -1 0.752 0.695 0.737 0.757 0.717
(2.95)*** (2.77)*** (2.91)*** (2.98)*** (2.85)***
n 274 274 274 274 274
(Continued)
Testing the Effect of Abnormal Accruals Conditioned by Corporate
Governance Characteristics for Initial Loss Reporting:
+ ω 2 AB_ACCR t -1* D MIDGOV t -1 + ϑ 3 D HIGHGOV t -1 + ω 3 AB_ACCR t -1* D HIGHGOV t -1
P (D LOSS t  = 1) =  ϑ1 D LOWGOV  t-1 + ω1 AB_ACCR t -1* D LOWGOV  t -1 + ϑ2 D MIDGOV t -1 
An Alternative Specification
+ β j Controls t -1 + ε
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Table 6.4    Continued
Variable Definitions:
AB_ACCR = the signed abnormal accruals.  The abnormal accrual model used is the DeFond and 
Park (2001) model.  
DLOSS t = a dummy variable equal to one for loss firms that report a loss and zero otherwise.
DLOWGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the bottom 
two quintiles mean in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise
DMIDGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the middle 
quintile in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise
DHIGHGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the top two 
quintiles in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise.  
LMV = the natural log of market value.  
LEV = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets .  
GROWTH  = the book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value divided by the market value.
This table reports the coefficient estimates for probability of reporting an initial loss.  The test 
(initial loss) sample consists of 137 firms which reported a loss in year t following two years of 
reporting a profit and the control sample consists of  137 firms  matched for industry and market 
value which reported a profit in each of year t-2 to t+2.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
are indicated with *,**, and ***, respectively.    The sample is partitioned based upon ex-ante
governance values.  Firms with ex-ante corporate governance values in the bottom two quintiles are 
in the LOWGOV group, firms in the middle quintile are in the MIDGOV group, and firms in the top 
two quintiles are in the HIGHGOV group.  Financial information is obtained from 
Datastream/Worldscope.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to 
mitigate the influence of outliers.  Estimated coefficients are followed by z-statistics ().  
Variable Definitions:
AB_ACCR = the signed abnormal accruals . The ab ormal accrual model used is the DeFond and 
Park (2001) model.  The method of calculating the abnormal accruals in any year is
as foll ws: 
where WC is the non-cash working capital.  S is sales. TA is total assets.
DLOSS t = a dummy variable equal to one for loss firms that report a los in the following year 
and zero otherwise.
DLOWGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the 
bottom two quintiles in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise
DMIDGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the 
middle quintile in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise
DHIGHGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the 
top two quintiles in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise.  
LMV = the natural log of market value.  
LEV = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
GROWTH = the book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value divided by the market value.
 
 
6.4.3  Robustness Tests  
 
In order to test the robustness of the results presented so far, equation 6.3 is 
calculated using unwinsorised data to verify the findings are not significantly affected 
by the winsorisation process.  The evidence reported in Table 9.12 in the Appendix 
indicates that with coefficients (z-stats) of 6.653 (z = 2.82), 3.314 (z = 2.26) and 4.375 
(z = 2.11) on 𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1, the results are the same for Board, 
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Diversity and BSize, respectively, such that the conclusions regarding the 
conditioning impact of these corporate governance characteristics are the same.  As 
before, the results of the two-tailed tests of significance included at the end of Table 
9.12 indicate that the coefficients on 𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 are also 
significantly different from those on 𝐴𝐵_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 in the Board and 
Diversity specifications with p-values of <0.01 and 0.03, respectively.   
 
6.5 The Effect of an Initial Loss Event Conditioned by the Severity of 
the Loss on Corporate Governance 
 
This section rounds out the DID analyses in this thesis by formally testing the 
significance of the mitigating role the severity of the loss plays on the impact of the 
initial loss event on corporate governance changes at loss firms.  The literature 
analysed in Chapter 2 affirms that the severity of the shock can have a conditioning 
role to play on the relationship being tested.  The prediction in this section is that 
initial loss firms with more severe losses will improve corporate governance most in 
response to the initial loss.  The reasoning is that if the initial loss is viewed as more 
severe (i.e. as being relatively large or one with a relatively low contemporaneous 
market return) then it is likely that corporate governance will be under more scrutiny 
and so more likely to change than if the initial loss is viewed as less severe (i.e. a 
small business driven event or one with a relatively high contemporaneous market 
return). 
 
The hypotheses to perform this analysis, stated in the null form, is: 
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H6.5:  the severity of the loss has no effect on the association between the 
reporting of an initial loss and changes in corporate governance. 
 
6.5.1  Empirical Results 
 
The same difference-in-difference research design detailed previously is 
employed and the control variable is the all-encompassing Return variable as a 
compound control variable.  To test H6.5, the mitigating impact of corporate 
governance on the association between the reporting of an initial loss event and 
changes in abnormal accruals versus the control sample, this study estimates the 
following equation: 
 
∆𝐺𝑂𝑉 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿1𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝛿2𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿                        + 𝛿3𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝜃𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 +  𝜀 
6.5 
where the dummy variables 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡, 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿, 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 and 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 are the loss 
and quality of loss dummies previously outlined.  The intercept 𝛽0 captures the 
change during the test period for the entire control sample.  The key coefficient of 
interest is then 𝛿1 which captures the difference in the change in corporate 
governance between the high severity loss subsample and the control sample.  
 
Table 6.5 reports the results of estimating equation 6.5 for the large/medium/small 
severity of loss conditioning variable and Table 6.6 includes those results for the 
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bad/average/good severity of loss conditioning variable.  Given the ex-ante 
expectation that it is initial loss firms with severe losses that will increase corporate 
governance most, the coefficient of interest in both cases is on 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡* 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿, 
which captures the difference between those firms with a severe initial loss versus the 
entire control sample.   
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Table 6.5 Testing the Effect of an Initial Loss Event on Corporate Governance
Conditioned by the Severity of the Loss: Large/Medium/Small
Panel A Test Period ∆1
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept -0.025 0.053 0.009 0.104 -0.006
(-0.57) (1.56) (1.32) (3.91)*** (-0.06)
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL 0.141 -0.089 0.014 0.104 -0.105
(1.78)* (-1.47) (1.18) (2.19)** (-0.60)
D LOSS t *  D MIDQUAL 0.122 -0.022 0.005 0.080 0.151
(1.19) (-0.28) (0.31) (1.30) (0.66)
D LOSS t  * D HIGHQUAL 0.083 0.004 0.010 -0.004 -0.517
(1.08) (0.06) (0.89) (-0.09) (-0.30)
Return 0.043 -0.103 0.002 -0.110 0.060
(0.61) (-1.89)* (0.17) (-2.59)*** (0.38)
n 274 274 274 274 274
R 2 1.47% 1.60% 1.00% 5.50% 1.00%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL = D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL
0.53 0.19 0.79 0.05 0.79
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL + Intercept = 0
0.08 0.47 0.02 <0.01 0.45
D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL + Intercept = 0
0.37 0.26 0.05 0.01 0.69
(Continued)
∆ GOV = β 0  + δ 1 D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL + δ 2 D LOSS t  * D MIDQUAL
+ δ 3 D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL  + θ Return  + ε
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Table 6.5 Continued
Panel B Test Period ∆2
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.017 0.052 0.002 0.205 -0.146
(0.26) (0.83) (0.23) (4.67)*** (-1.09)
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL 0.242 0.064 0.036 0.049 -0.233
(2.09)** (0.57) (2.05)** (0.61) (-0.96)
D LOSS t *  D MIDQUAL 0.059 0.106 0.019 -0.068 -0.088
(0.39) (0.72) (0.83) (-0.66) (-0.28)
D LOSS t  * D HIGHQUAL 0.124 0.069 -0.004 0.028 -0.014
(1.13) (0.65) (-0.23) (0.37) (-0.06)
Return 0.030 -0.040 0.006 -0.079 0.070
(0.52) (-0.71) (0.73) (-2.02)** (0.58)
n 238 238 238 238 238
R 2 1.99% 0.73% 2.24% 2.35% 0.67%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL = D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL
0.38 0.97 0.05 0.82 0.44
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL + Intercept = 0
<0.01 0.23 0.01 <0.01 0.07
D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL + Intercept = 0
0.13 0.18 0.91 <0.01 0.41
This table reports the effect of an initial loss event on the change in corporate 
governance conditioned by severity of the loss.  For each (test or control) firm,  the  test period
is the year before the loss event, t-1,  to either the year of the loss (∆1) or the year after the loss 
event (∆2).  The test (loss sample) consists of 137 (∆1) and 119 (∆2) firms which reported a loss 
in year t following two years of reporting a profit and the control sample consists of  the same 
number of  firms  matched for industry and market value which reported a profit in each of year 
t-2 to t+2.  The difference in the sample sizes in test periods ∆1 and ∆2 is firms (loss or control 
being acquired in the period t to t+1.  The construction of the corporate governance constructs is
explained in Chapter 3.    The sample is partitioned based upon the severity of the loss; a scaled
(by market value) loss in the top two quintiles is a large loss (LOWQUAL), in the middle 
quintile is a medium loss (MIDQUAL), and in the bottom two quinitles is a small loss 
(HIGHQUAL).  Financial information is obtained from Datastream/Worldscope.  All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers.  
Estimated coefficients are followed by t-statistics ().  Significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
are indicated by  *, **, ***, respectively. (Continued)
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Table 6.5 Continued
Variable Definitions:
∆ GOV = the change in governance during the test period (i.e. ∆1 or ∆2). 
DLOSS t = a dummy variable equal to one for firms that report a loss, and zero otherwise.  
DLOWQUAL = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a scaled (by market value) loss 
in the top two quintiles, and zero otherwise
DMIDQUAL = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a scaled (by market value) loss 
in the middle quintile, and zero otherwise
DHIGHQUAL = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a scaled (by market value) loss 
in the bottom two quintiles, and zero otherwise.  
Return = the stock market return over the test period calculated for test period ∆1 as:
where is the twelve month forward dividend yield and for test period ∆2 as:
where
 
The results for test periods ∆1 and ∆2 in Panels A and B of Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show 
that Board improves consistently for severe loss firms for both test periods regardless 
of how the severity of the loss is defined, i.e. the coefficient for 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 is 
significant in all panels indicating that the more severe the loss the more corporate 
governance (as represented by Board) improves in response to the loss.  This is 
supplemental to the analysis in Chapter 4 that board quality improves, on average (i.e. 
unconditioned), for all loss firms in response to/anticipation of the loss event.  The 
results are also robust to the exclusion of Return as a control variable.   
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Table 6.6 Testing the Effect of an Initial Loss Event on Corporate Governance
Conditioned by the Severity of the Loss: Bad/Average/Good
Panel A Test Period ∆1
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept -0.045 0.049 0.007 0.104 -0.032
(-1.02) (1.40) (1.12) (3.83)*** (-0.32)
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL 0.202 -0.008 0.015 0.062 0.085
(2.55)** (-0.13) (1.29) (1.28) (0.48)
D LOSS t *  D MIDQUAL 0.230 -0.089 0.019 0.018 0.052
(2.28)** (-1.14) (1.31) (0.29) (0.23)
D LOSS t  * D HIGHQUAL -0.057 -0.043 -0.000 0.065 -0.218
(-0.65) (-0.64) (-0.02) (1.23) (-1.12)
Return 0.134 -0.084 0.007 -0.114 0.175
(1.65) (-1.33) (0.58) (-2.30)*** (0.96)
n 274 274 274 274 274
R 2 3.91% 1.60% 1.03% 4.30% 1.00%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL = D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL
0.02 0.68 0.34 0.96 0.22
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL + Intercept = 0
0.01 0.39 0.01 <0.01 0.69
D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL + Intercept = 0
0.22 0.94 0.56 <0.01 0.18
(Continued)
∆ GOV = β 0  + δ 1 D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL + δ 2 D LOSS t  * D MIDQUAL
+ δ 3 D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL  + θ Return  + ε
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Table 6.6 Continued
Panel B Test Period ∆2
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.005 0.062 0.001 0.198 -0.131
(0.08) (0.98) (0.11) (4.44)*** (-0.97)
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL 0.215 0.014 0.027 0.060 -0.232
(1.91)* (0.13) (1.59)* (0.78) (-0.98)
D LOSS t *  D MIDQUAL 0.262 0.039 0.010 0.037 -0.087
(1.82)* (0.28) (0.46) (0.37) (-0.29)
D LOSS t  * D HIGHQUAL 0.021 0.168 0.004 -0.046 0.023
(0.17) (1.40) (0.21) (-0.54) (0.09)
Return 0.053 -0.061 0.009 -0.064 0.038
(0.88) (-1.03) (0.94) (-1.52) (0.30)
n 238 238 238 238 238
R 2 2.45% 1.21% 1.14% 2.38% 1.00%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL = D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL
0.19 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.41
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL + Intercept = 0
0.01 0.38 0.04 <0.01 0.05
D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL + Intercept = 0
0.82 0.04 0.77 0.05 0.65
This table reports the effect of an initial loss event on the change in corporate 
governance conditioned by severity of the loss.  For each (test or control) firm,  the  test period
is the year before the loss event, t-1,  to either the year of the loss (∆1) or the year after the loss 
event (∆2).  The test (loss sample) consists of 137 (∆1) and 119 (∆2) firms which reported a loss 
in year t following two years of reporting a profit and the control sample consists of  the same 
number of  firms  matched for industry and market value which reported a profit in each of year 
t-2 to t+2.  The difference in the sample sizes in test periods ∆1 and ∆2 is firms (loss or control 
being acquired in the period t to t+1.  The construction of the  corporate governance constructs 
is explained in Chapter 3.    The sample is partitioned based upon the severity of loss; a loss
firm with a 24-month return around the loss event in the bottom two quintiles is a bad loss 
(LOWQUAL), in the middle quintile is a medium loss (MIDQUAL), and in the top two quinitles 
is a good loss (HIGHQUAL).  Financial information is obtained from Datastream/Worldscope.  
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of 
outliers.  Estimated coefficients are followed by t-statistics ().  Significance levels at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% are indicated by  *, **, ***, respectively. (Continued)
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Table 6.6 Continued
Variable Definitions:
∆ GOV = the change in governance during the test period (i.e. ∆1 or ∆2). 
DLOSS t = a dummy variable equal to one for firms that report a loss, and zero otherwise.  
DLOWQUAL = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a 24-month return around the loss 
event (18-months before, 6-months after) in the bottom two quintiles, and zero otherwise
DMIDQUAL = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a 24-month return around the loss 
event (18-months before, 6-months after) in the middle quintile, and zero otherwise
DHIGHQUAL = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a 24-month return around the loss 
event (18-months before, 6-months after) in the bottom two quintiles, and zero otherwise.  
Return = the stock market return over the test period calculated for test period ∆1 as:
where is the twelve month forward dividend yield and for test period ∆2 as:
where
and and are the twelve month forward dividend yields.
 
Of the other governance specifications Ownership is significant for the 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗
𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 variable for the large/medium/small severity of loss conditioning criterion.  
The only other significant 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 variable is Diversity for the 
bad/average/good severity of loss conditioning criterion across the ∆2 test period 
indicating that initial loss firms reporting a large loss increase the percentage of 
females on the board in response to the loss.   
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6.5.2  Alternative Model Specification 
 
The model used in the previous section does not include the severity of the 
loss in each of the subsamples in the bad/average/good specification as main effects.  
Consistent with the previous analyses in this study, equation 6.5 can be supplemented 
to include these main effects.   The equation is supplemented as follows: 
 
∆𝐺𝑂𝑉 = 𝜗1𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 +  𝜔1𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝜗2𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿                    + 𝜔2𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝜗3𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝜔3𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿+  𝜃𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 +  𝜀 
6.6 
where all of the  variables are as previously outlined and, once again,  the intercept is 
excluded to avoid perfect linear collinearity.   Table 6.6 reports the results of 
estimating equation 6.6.  Given the ex-ante expectation that it is initial loss firms with 
severe losses that will increase corporate governance most, the coefficient of interest 
is on 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡* 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿, which captures the difference in the change in corporate 
governance between low return initial loss firms and low return control firms.   
 
The results for test periods ∆1 and ∆2 in Panels A and B of Tables 6.7 in the 
alternative specification are the same for Board across the two test periods.  Thus, 
when considered in conjunction with the results in Tables 6.5 and 6.6, this study 
rejects the null hypothesis H6.5 in favour of the alternative that, especially for the 
Board specification, the more severe the loss, the more corporate governance 
improves for loss firms over and above the control sample.   
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Table 6.7 Testing the Effect of an Initial Loss Event on Corporate Governance
Conditioned by the Severity of the Loss: Bad/Average/Good:
An Alternative Specification
Panel A Test Period ∆1
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
D LOWQUAL -0.085 -0.111 0.004 0.031 -0.398
(-0.83) (-1.40) (0.30) (0.49) (-1.74)*
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL 0.234 0.140 0.018 0.132 0.431
(2.00)** (1.54) (1.06) (1.85)* (1.64)*
D MIDQUAL -0.116 0.060 0.022 0.149 0.130
(-1.30) (0.87) (1.64) (2.74)*** (0.65)
D LOSS t *  D MIDQUAL 0.304 -0.096 0.005 -0.025 -0.101
(2.38)** (-0.97) (0.26) (-0.33) (-0.35)
D HIGHQUAL -0.001 0.104 0.002 0.113 0.038
(-0.01) (2.24)** (0.27) (3.09)*** (0.28)
D LOSS t  * D HIGHQUAL -0.087 -0.075 0.004 0.063 -0.248
(-0.96) (-1.06) (0.27) (1.14) (-1.22)
Return 0.102 -0.137 0.009 -0.129 0.086
(1.17) (-2.03)** (0.74) (-2.41)*** (0.44)
n 274 274 274 274 274
R 2 4.97% 3.76% 5.35% 15.60% 1.96%
(Continued)
∆ GOV = ϑ 1 D LOWQUAL + ω2 D LOSS t  * D LOWQUAL
+ ϑ 2 D MIDQUAL + ω 2 D LOSS t * D MIDQUAL + ϑ 3 D HIGHQUAL + ω 3 D LOSS t  * D HIGHQUAL
+ θ Return  + ε
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Table 6.7 Continued
Panel B Test Period ∆2
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
D LOWQUAL -0.111 -0.036 -0.007 0.064 -0.858
(-0.71) (-0.23) (-0.31) (0.59) (-2.65)***
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL 0.333 0.135 0.036 0.187 0.543
(1.86)* (0.76) (1.30) (1.51) (1.46)
D MIDQUAL -0.080 0.072 0.009 0.228 0.016
(-0.65) (0.59) (0.46) (2.66)*** (0.06)
D LOSS t *  D MIDQUAL 0.356 0.009 0.004 -0.001 -0.249
(1.98)** (0.05) (0.14) (-0.01) (-0.66)
D HIGHQUAL 0.078 0.016 0.004 0.207 -0.092
(0.93) (0.19) (0.30) (3.48)*** (-0.53)
D LOSS t  * D HIGHQUAL -0.044 0.149 0.003 -0.047 -0.117
(-0.34) (1.17) (0.15) (-0.52) (-0.43)
Return 0.057 0.051 0.008 -0.094 0.260
(0.46) (0.41) (0.42) (-1.09) (1.01)
n 238 238 238 238 238
R 2 5.61% 2.36% 2.43% 17.18% 5.48%
This table reports the effect of an initial loss event on the change in corporate 
governance conditioned by severity of the loss.  For each (test or control) firm,  the  test period
is the year before the loss event, t-1,  to either the year of the loss (∆1) or the year after the loss 
event (∆2).  The test (loss sample) consists of 137 (∆1) and 119 (∆2) firms which reported a loss 
in year t following two years of reporting a profit and the control sample consists of  the same 
number of  firms  matched for industry and market value which reported a profit in each of year 
t-2 to t+2.  The difference in the sample sizes in test periods ∆1 and ∆2 is firms (loss or control 
being acquired in the period t to t+1.  The construction of the  corporate governance constructs 
is explained in Chapter 3.    The sample is partitioned based upon the severity of loss; a loss
firm with a 24-month return around the loss event in the bottom two quintiles is a bad loss 
(LOWQUAL), in the middle quintile is a medium loss (MIDQUAL), and in the top two quinitles 
is a good loss (HIGHQUAL).  Financial information is obtained from Datastream/Worldscope.  
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of 
outliers.  Estimated coefficients are followed by t-statistics ().  Significance levels at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% are indicated by  *, **, ***, respectively. (Continued)
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Table 6.7 Continued
Variable Definitions:
∆ GOV = the change in governance during the test period (i.e. ∆1 or ∆2). 
DLOSS t = a dummy variable equal to one for firms that report a loss, and zero otherwise.  
DLOWQUAL = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a 24-month return around the loss 
event (18-months before, 6-months after) in the bottom two quintiles, and zero otherwise
DMIDQUAL = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a 24-month return around the loss 
event (18-months before, 6-months after) in the middle quintile, and zero otherwise
DHIGHQUAL = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a 24-month return around the loss 
event (18-months before, 6-months after) in the bottom two quintiles, and zero otherwise.  
Return = the stock market return over the test period calculated for test period ∆1 as:
where is the twelve month forward dividend yield and for test period ∆2 as:
where
and and are the twelve month forward dividend yields.
 
6.6  A Further Examination of Ownership 
 
Ownership has provided mixed results over the course of this study due in no 
small part to the opposite signs of the inside and outside ownership variables used in 
its construction in Chapter 3.  Chapter 4 explored this complication in the context of 
corporate governance changes by focusing in on total director and professional 
ownership (i.e. % Tot. Dir. Own. and % Tot. Prof. Own.) statistics as being 
representative of inside and outside ownership, respectively, to test for their differing 
conditional impact on any subsequent changes in corporate governance.  This section 
performs a similar analysis for the change in signed abnormal accruals by retesting 
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equation 6.1 using, for completeness, all of the variables that make up Ownership 
(i.e. % Tot. Dir. Own., % Top Dir. Own., % Tot. Prof. Own., % Top Prof. Own., # 
Prof. Own. and % Tot. Blk. Own.) in an attempt to better understand the significance 
of the Ownership results in Table 6.1 
 
The results in Table 9.13 in the Appendix show that the significance of the 
Ownership variable in Table 6.1 cannot be explained individually by any of the six 
governance variables from which Ownership is constructed.  Similarly, the results in 
Table 9.13 in the Appendix show that there is no uniform relationship among the high 
and low quality corporate governance variables that easily explains the relationships 
observed in Table 6.1.  For instance, the variables # Prof. Own. and % Tot. Blk. Own. 
are both significant for 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1 and % Tot. Dir. Own., % Tot. Prof. 
Own. and % Top Prof. Own. are significant for 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝑡−1.  This suggests 
that the construction of the Ownership variable from the principal components 
analysis in Chapter 3 (and the reason this method was chosen to construct the 
corporate governance variables) provides real insights about an unobservable 
underlying structure of corporate governance pertaining to general ownership of a 
company’s shares that cannot be easily explained by the individual variables from 
which it is distilled.   
 
6.7  Summary and Conclusions 
 
The empirical analysis in this Chapter combines elements previously 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 and examines the impact of corporate governance 
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characteristics and the severity of the loss on abnormal accruals in a variety of 
circumstances. 
 
The first analysis builds on the results presented in Chapter 5 by examining whether 
the observed relationship between the initial loss event and changes in abnormal 
accruals is further accentuated when the quality of corporate governance is used as a 
conditioning variable.  The evidence is that initial loss firms with lower quality ex-
ante corporate governance decrease abnormal accruals in the loss year and that this 
decrease is in fact the unwinding of the positive abnormal accruals that were used in 
an attempt to avoid (and ultimately succeeded in only deferring) the loss.  A 
supplemental model is also used to amalgamate this analysis with that in Chapter 5 to 
examine the combined impact of high severity losses and low quality corporate 
governance on abnormal accruals behaviour of initial loss firms.  The evidence is 
that, when losses are severe and corporate governance is of low quality then the 
abnormal accruals decrease for initial loss firms (versus the entire control sample) is 
greatest.  The only corporate governance specification which seems to provide 
anomalous result is Ownership.  In both the analyses detailed above, there is also 
evidence that initial loss firms with high quality Ownership also decrease abnormal 
accruals by more than the control sample.  This could indicate, counter intuitively, 
that initial loss firms with higher quality Ownership engage in positive abnormal 
accruals behaviour in the year before the loss that is subsequently unwound.  This 
quandary is solved by an the loss reporting analysis conditioned by corporate 
governance which finds evidence that the ability of higher pre-period abnormal 
accruals to predict an initial  loss in the following year is, in almost all specifications 
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(i.e. Board, Diversity, Ownership and BSize) increasing in low quality corporate 
governance.  Notable is that the coefficients for the high quality corporate governance 
conditioned variables are not significant for any specification.  Therefore this study 
can conclude that the decrease in abnormal accruals for initial loss firms with high 
quality Ownership discussed above is not the unwinding of positive abnormal 
accruals created by these firms in an attempt to avoid the loss, but rather an honest 
indication about the extent of the loss.   
 
While focusing on the absence of significance for the high quality Ownership 
subgroup is useful in helping to properly contextualise the anomalous results from the 
difference in difference analysis for this group, it is the almost universal significance 
(Chair is an exception) of the low quality corporate governance subgroups which is of 
primary concern.  Indeed, the significance of the conditioning impact of these low 
quality corporate governance variables in the loss reporting firms is, perhaps, the 
most important set of results (and hence one of the most important contributions) of 
this thesis.  That is, Chapter 5 found evidence that firms with high prior year signed 
abnormal accruals are more likely to report an initial loss.  This chapter goes further 
still, conditioning this already novel analysis on corporate governance quality and 
finds evidence of the exacerbating role that low quality corporate governance plays 
for loss avoidance — the corollary of which is the relative mitigating role that high 
quality corporate governance plays for loss reporting.  In other words pre-period 
abnormal accruals only help to predict the initial loss for those firms with low quality 
corporate governance, i.e. the earnings manipulators.  Firms with high quality 
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corporate governance do not manipulate their pre-period abnormal accruals and so 
these don’t help to predict the initial loss for these firms.   
 
These results are related to the univariate signed abnormal accruals analysis in 
Chapter 5 where it was observed that, on average, initial loss firms had abnormal 
accruals significantly higher than control firms in the year before the loss and the 
contention that it is these abnormal accruals which unwind in the initial loss year.  
That is, it is the avoidance (deferral) of the loss at time (t – 1) via the use of abnormal 
accruals which is the primary driver of the relationship.   
 
For completeness, a final analysis in this chapter tests whether the relationship 
between the initial loss event and changes in corporate governance observed in 
Chapter 4 is further accentuated when the severity of the loss is used as a 
conditioning variable.  The evidence is that the more severe the initial loss the more 
corporate governance changes in anticipation of/in response to the loss, especially for 
Board.  Similar to the conclusions in Chapter 4, the significance of these results 
should not be underestimated.  Notwithstanding the inherent stickiness and 
uniformity of corporate governance, the fact that this chapter finds (supplemental to 
the results in Chapter 4) evidence that the more severe the loss the more corporate 
governance unsticks (improves) is another significant incremental contribution to the 
existing literature. 
 
In conclusion, the analyses in this chapter build on the significant results and 
contributions documented previously in Chapters 4 and 5 to perform a deeper, 
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compound analysis of the interaction between initial losses, abnormal accruals and 
corporate governance.  Based on the results presented in this chapter, and robust to 
both alternative interaction specifications of the difference in differences model and 
the winsorisation process, this study concludes, inter alia, that corporate governance 
has a statistically significant impact on earnings quality for initial loss firms.  The 
analyses conducted to come to this conclusion are, in addition to those results already 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, significant additional and novel contributions that 
further synthesise the loss, earnings management and corporate governance 
literatures.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
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This study is a robust synthesis of the loss, corporate governance and earnings 
management literatures focusing on the impact of an initial loss event on changes in 
corporate governance and earnings management behaviour.   
 
The extant research provides evidence of management changes as a result of poor 
performance and governance changes following accounting misstatements or fraud.  
There is also evidence that corporate governance influences the relation between 
management turnover and performance.  This study is different in that it examines 
corporate governance changes associated with unambiguous evidence of 
underperformance — the reporting of an initial loss.   
 
This study investigates the nuanced role of initial losses as a troubled situation 
requiring remedial action and one which, potentially, may evolve to become a crisis. 
One way for initial loss firms to signal that the loss is not terminal is to demonstrate 
that the company is well governed.  Accordingly, any firm that incurs or is about to 
incur a loss will ensure that its governance is of a sufficiently high standard to signal 
its ability to continue as a going concern.  There is also evidence that firms can 
anticipate incurring and reporting a loss and on occasion can even manage earnings to 
defer/avoid the loss.  It is axiomatic that a sample of loss firms comprises firms that 
could not avoid incurring losses.  It is also likely that these firms will have anticipated 
the loss before it is announced and evidence of same will be exhibited in the 
abnormal accrual choices of these firms.  It is also likely that these choices will 
depend on the relative severity of the loss event.  An alternative strategy to managing 
earnings to avoid the consequences of an initial loss is disclosure and timely 
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information management.  Thus, it is likely that loss firms will make any necessary 
corporate governance improvements before announcing the initial loss.   
 
What is obvious is that the reporting of an initial loss should have implications for the 
corporate governance and earnings management behaviour at those firms.  Given the 
lack of a cohesive literature that extensively explores the intersection between the 
loss, corporate governance and earnings management literatures, to the best of the 
author’s knowledge, this is the first study that comprehensively combines the three to 
investigate several gaps in the literature. 
 
To gather evidence and answer the research questions, a sample of initial loss firms in 
the UK is collected over a three year period from 2004–2006.  A control sample 
matched on industry class and size is also collected.  Using these samples a univariate 
and difference-in-difference analyses are used to test if incurring an initial loss has 
implications for corporate governance and earnings management at those firms.  First 
of all factor analysis is used to distil corporate governance information into three 
primary constructs: Board, Chair and Ownership.  The use of amalgamations in this 
manner is justified because underlying corporate governance is made up from a 
number of individual and interrelated mechanisms which function together.  Board 
Size and Diversity are also used as corporate governance variables throughout the 
study.   
 
A multivariate difference-in-difference analysis which conditions the analysis by the 
quality of corporate governance in place before the initial loss, shows that there are 
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clear changes in corporate governance in the initial loss subsamples where relative 
corporate governance weakness existed beforehand relative to the entire control 
sample with respect to all aspects of corporate governance considered.  In addition 
Board size regresses toward its mean following an initial loss.  The results of 
multivariate analyses which condition by loss severity also show that relatively more 
severe losses motivate corporate governance to improve.  These results contribute to 
the literature which asserts that although a firm’s corporate governance equilibrium 
can be sticky and slow to change it is not entirely fixed and responds to negative 
shocks.   
 
The study also investigates earnings management around initial losses.  Studies that 
have examined the kink in the earnings distribution around zero have focused on 
deferred or avoided losses.  This study analyses the earnings management behaviour 
of initial loss firms who are unable to defer the loss or unwilling to manage earnings 
to do so.   The sample of initial loss firms in this study clearly could not avoid 
incurring the loss such that an analysis of the quality of earnings in the year before 
the initial loss can be used to directly test for evidence of earnings management.  The 
results from a univariate analysis, confirmed by a logit analysis, indicate that initial 
loss firms have significantly higher abnormal accruals in the year before the loss — 
i.e. clear evidence of earnings management to avoid the zero benchmark.  The results 
from a multivariate DID analysis indicate that the loss motivates an unwinding of 
these abnormal accruals among initial loss firms, particularly where loss is relatively 
severe, although no evidence of big-bath behaviour is found.  To the best of the 
author’s knowledge, this is the first time that the role of abnormal accruals previous 
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to and around a shock event have been analysed in this manner and so the results 
represent a significant, comprehensive and novel contribution to both the earnings 
management and loss literatures. 
 
The final part of this research investigates, inter alia, the mitigating impact that the 
quality of corporate governance has on the analysis of the earnings management 
behaviour of initial loss firms discussed above.  The evidence is that initial loss firms 
with a prior weakness in corporate governance decrease abnormal accruals by an 
amount significantly greater than prior year abnormal accruals alone — initial loss 
firms with low quality corporate governance are more likely to take the opportunity 
to make a bad situation worse.  Indeed, the unwinding of abnormal accruals is 
greatest when corporate governance is weak and the loss is relatively severe.  There 
is also evidence that the ability of pre-period abnormal accruals to predict an initial 
loss is dependent on corporate governance quality, i.e. it is those initial loss firms 
with weak corporate governance that are most likely to manipulate earnings.  The 
results from these conditioned analyses represents a significant additional 
contribution to the loss, corporate governance and earnings management literatures. 
 
These findings should be of interest to companies that may wish to promulgate the 
relative improvement in the quality of their corporate governance or the quality of 
their earnings and the perception of both of these by investors.  They should also be 
of interest to analysts and investors in their effort to value companies by giving them 
clues as to how well governed a firm is and how reliable are its accounting numbers 
for valuation purposes.  Finally it should be of interest to regulators who may wish to 
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adjust particular aspects or recommendations of the regulatory code to mitigate the 
loss in information content when the governance of all firms is uniform. 
 
In conclusion, firms are sensitive to how an initial loss will be interpreted and, despite 
the fact that it can be sticky and slow to change, adjust their corporate governance to 
signal that the initial loss is temporary.  The weaker the corporate governance and the 
more severe the loss the more likely it is that initial loss firms will make such 
adjustments.  Initial loss firms also attempt to defer the loss by using abnormal 
accruals, the weaker the corporate governance the more likely they are to do so.  In 
combination, the results in the empirical chapters of this thesis represent a significant 
contribution to the loss, corporate governance and earnings management literatures 
synthesising elements of all three to conclude that initial losses can now be added to 
accounting misstatements, fraud and the revelation of ICMWs as a type of event that 
may influence and precipitate a changes in corporate governance and earnings 
management behaviour.   
 
Readers should be aware of some limitations for the research.  Academic research is 
by its nature driven by what went before and, as a result of the investigative process 
involved, is designed to contribute to what comes after.  While research questions are 
formulated and tested and results are documented, the academic research process 
often throws up as many questions as it answers.  Even though every research thesis 
has some parameters imposed by the specificity of the research undertaken that 
enables the research at some point to be “complete”, that doesn’t mean the research 
process is complete.  This is because the questioning involved in the research process 
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brings a deeper understanding of the subject matter and motivates incremental 
improvements in the information collected, different constructions of the variables 
used and different specifications of the models implemented.  In essence a research 
study such as this one provides a potential roadmap for an on-going research process 
into the future. 
 
The first problem for any empirical study in the social sciences is the complexity of 
the real world system under investigation.  While the natural sciences have 
established methodological processes such that associations between variables can be 
tested to the exclusion of any other confounding effects in controlled experiments, the 
social sciences are beset by such confounding problems — the omitted variables 
problem is omnipresent.  This study attempts to control for these implicit problems by 
structuring the methodological approach to minimise the adverse impact of 
confounding events and omitted variables.  Specifically, a DID approach is used 
throughout such that relationships between variables can be appropriately tested.  
While this research methodology (effectively a natural experiment) is much cleaner 
than simple difference models, much of the extent literature uses such simple 
difference models to draw conclusions.  In that regard, the results in this study are not 
directly comparable to those from simple difference studies. 
 
Another problem is the lack of comprehensive theoretical frameworks to inform the 
research process.  For this study the lack of a universal agreement on the subject of 
corporate governance is an example.  Corporate governance as an area for academic 
research is relatively new.  Despite the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
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and Fama et al. (1983), corporate governance has only really come into sharp focus 
since the turn of the century and can be traced to the various high profile corporate 
scandals where shortcomings in corporate governance has been a recurring theme.  
Because academic research is driven by what went before and, in this case, is 
restricted by the fact that the issues under investigation (corporate governance and 
earnings quality) are still open to debate, formulating specific research questions and 
determining appropriate models is difficult.   
 
The appropriate variables to use for the measurement of corporate governance is also 
a source of on-going debate in the extant literature, and even when there is agreement 
that (say) board quality is important, how that quality is captured is another point of 
debate.  While this study attempts to avoid imposing preconceived ideas of what 
constitutes an appropriate corporate governance measure, this approach also 
introduces its own problems, i.e. the alternative signs on the outside and inside 
ownership variables makes the Ownership variable in this study difficult to interpret.  
So, while on balance it is believed that the factoring of the governance information 
into amalgamations is appropriate, there is a potential opportunity in future research 
to also test each of the governance variables individually to tease out specific 
relationships. 
 
Another problem for this study is what constitutes earnings quality.  The extant 
research is replete with measures of earnings quality; the magnitude of signed 
abnormal accruals, the likelihood of reporting a loss and earnings conservatism have 
all been used as measures of earnings quality as have the market’s interpretation of 
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those earnings.  In other words there is any number of ways to measure managerial 
choice as it pertains to earnings quality.  This study chooses one measure of abnormal 
accruals and tests for robustness with a second (related) measure.  An obvious avenue 
for future research is to include additional measures of earnings quality.  In reality, 
given the complexity of the analysis already undertaken in this thesis, the 
investigation of any additional measures or an investigation of the market’s 
interpretation of those measures is, in effect, a separate research study with altogether 
different research questions. 
 
The findings presented here also stimulate some interesting questions for future 
research.  First of all, the sample could be extended to include additional loss years.  
This research was restricted to three years because each loss year required the 
collection of four years of corporate governance data for the initial loss firms and the 
control sample.  Now that the dynamics of corporate governance changes and the 
earnings management behaviour around the initial loss event are understood, a more 
restricted data collection process focusing on the prior year and the loss year would 
make the inclusion of additional loss years worthwhile.  Secondly, a less restricted 
sample using all losses rather than initial losses could be used to analyse abnormal 
accruals behaviour (general and specific) in the year before the loss.  Thirdly, this 
study is focused on the UK which has a legal system based on common law.  The 
analysis here could be extended to other code law jurisdictions to test whether the 
changes in corporate governance and the earnings management behaviour in response 
to the initial loss is the same for both jurisdictions. The mitigating role of corporate 
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governance on earnings management in such a code law setting would be an 
interesting comparison.   
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Table 9.1        
Panel A: All Periods Combined
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
Board 1,002 0.000 0.885 0.017 -2.178 2.299 -0.167 2.612 0.000
Chair 1,002 0.000 0.900 0.273 -1.094 0.954 0.172 1.279 0.000
Diversity 1,002 0.088 0.135 0.000 0.000 0.500 1.153 2.935 0.000
Ownership 1,002 0.000 0.776 0.056 -2.587 2.086 -0.494 3.251 0.000
BSize 1,002 6.663 2.306 6.000 1.000 15.000 0.859 4.078 0.000
%Tot.Prof.Own. 1,002 0.310 0.199 0.296 0.000 0.947 0.324 2.492 0.000
%Tot.Dir.Own. 1,002 0.150 0.194 0.065 0.000 0.945 1.595 4.852 0.000
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
Board 492 0.053 0.883 0.089 -2.178 2.044 -0.237 2.656 0.002
Chair 492 0.092 0.898 0.273 -1.094 0.954 -0.343 1.335 0.000
Diversity 492 0.101 0.146 0.000 0.000 0.500 1.020 2.583 0.000
Ownership 492 0.114 0.766 0.218 -2.010 2.086 -0.453 3.046 0.000
BSize 492 6.637 2.064 6.000 1.000 13.000 0.365 2.840 0.002
%Tot.Prof.Own. 492 0.335 0.205 0.329 0.000 0.890 0.228 2.463 0.000
%Tot.Dir.Own. 492 0.125 0.177 0.042 0.000 0.710 1.648 4.735 0.000
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
Board 510 -0.051 0.885 -0.067 -2.178 2.299 -0.100 2.597 0.004
Chair 510 -0.089 0.894 0.273 -1.094 0.954 -0.011 1.267 0.002
Diversity 510 0.076 0.123 0.000 0.000 0.480 1.251 3.176 0.000
Ownership 510 -0.110 0.770 -0.046 -2.587 1.776 -0.559 3.402 0.000
BSize 510 6.688 2.519 6.000 2.000 15.000 1.093 4.365 0.000
%Tot.Prof.Own. 510 0.286 0.191 0.280 0.000 0.947 0.394 2.511 0.000
%Tot.Dir.Own. 510 0.174 0.207 0.088 0.000 0.945 1.510 4.615 0.000
(Continued)
Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Governance Variable Levels
Combined Initial Loss and Control Samples
Initial Loss Sample
Control Sample
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Table 9.1        Continued
Panel B: Pre-Period (t  - 1)
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
Board 138 -0.037 0.777 -0.067 -2.178 1.665 -0.228 2.868 0.367
Chair 138 0.060 0.891 0.273 -1.094 0.954 -0.281 1.350 0.231
Diversity 138 0.091 0.142 0.000 0.000 0.480 1.177 2.914 0.000
Ownership 138 -0.033 0.758 -0.001 -2.010 2.085 -0.367 3.300 0.208
BSize 138 6.725 2.177 6.000 2.000 13.000 0.582 2.663 0.002
%Tot.Prof.Own. 138 0.294 0.192 0.282 0.000 0.890 0.441 2.834 0.011
%Tot.Dir.Own. 138 0.142 0.189 0.054 0.000 0.701 1.532 4.294 0.000
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
Board 138 -0.063 0.853 -0.080 -2.178 2.299 -0.086 2.718 0.505
Chair 138 -0.108 0.903 '0.273 -1.094 0.954 0.037 1.251 0.462
Diversity 138 0.071 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.480 1.261 3.189 0.000
Ownership 138 -0.189 0.785 -0.178 -2.587 1.657 -0.340 3.301 0.126
BSize 138 6.623 2.594 6.000 3.000 15.000 1.214 4.559 0.000
%Tot.Prof.Own. 138 0.266 0.193 0.241 0.000 0.808 0.541 2.595 0.000
%Tot.Dir.Own. 138 0.185 0.210 0.102 0.000 0.945 1.502 4.737 0.000
(Continued)
Initial Loss Sample
Control Sample
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Table 9.1        Continued
Panel C: Initial Loss Year (t )
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
Board 138 0.051 0.837 0.089 -2.178 1.842 -0.260 2.684 0.024
Chair 138 0.064 0.901 0.273 -1.094 0.954 -0.273 1.321 0.070
Diversity 138 0.108 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.927 2.380 0.000
Ownership 138 0.114 0.791 0.221 -1.845 2.086 -0.404 2.966 0.006
BSize 138 6.708 2.122 6.000 2.000 13.000 0.460 2.893 0.000
%Tot.Prof.Own. 138 0.337 0.207 0.333 0.000 0.890 0.261 2.463 0.000
%Tot.Dir.Own. 138 0.127 0.184 0.048 0.000 0.710 1.693 4.763 0.000
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
Board 138 -0.078 0.860 -0.067 -2.178 1.765 -0.263 2.605 0.143
Chair 138 -0.078 0.904 0.272 -1.094 0.954 -0.020 1.250 0.458
Diversity 138 0.080 0.123 0.000 0.000 0.444 1.073 2.605 0.000
Ownership 138 -0.110 0.768 -0.092 -2.484 1.418 -0.515 3.393 0.021
BSize 138 6.630 2.494 6.000 2.000 15.000 1.068 4.296 0.000
%Tot.Prof.Own. 138 0.284 0.193 0.282 0.000 0.740 0.447 2.423 0.001
%Tot.Dir.Own. 138 0.170 0.206 0.084 0.000 0.893 1.614 4.999 0.000
(Continued)
Initial Loss Sample
Control Sample
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Table 9.1        Continued
Panel D: Post-Period (t  + 1)
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
Board 114 0.115 0.967 0.200 -2.178 2.006 -0.188 2.436 0.534
Chair 114 0.171 0.900 0.614 -1.094 0.954 -0.517 1.485 0.044
Diversity 114 0.104 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.950 2.470 0.000
Ownership 114 0.161 0.762 0.262 -1.791 1.693 -0.500 2.836 0.024
BSize 114 6.632 1.979 7.000 1.000 12.000 0.093 2.891 0.992
%Tot.Prof.Own. 114 0.348 0.209 0.341 0.000 0.835 0.047 2.247 0.034
%Tot.Dir.Own. 114 0.118 0.169 0.030 0.000 0.696 1.639 4.759 0.000
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
Board 124 -0.054 0.908 -0.102 -2.178 1.842 -0.053 2.601 0.294
Chair 124 -0.113 0.893 0.273 -1.094 0.954 0.028 1.274 0.436
Diversity 124 0.076 0.127 0.000 0.000 0.480 1.354 3.501 0.000
Ownership 124 -0.070 0.761 0.019 -2.419 1.776 -0.603 3.638 0.009
BSize 124 6.653 2.541 6.000 2.000 15.000 1.058 4.418 0.000
%Tot.Prof.Own. 124 0.298 0.187 0.294 0.000 0.947 0.444 3.082 0.017
%Tot.Dir.Own. 124 0.173 0.205 0.089 0.000 0.857 1.454 4.308 0.000
(Continued)
Initial Loss Sample
Control Sample
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Table 9.1        Continued
Panel E: Post-Period (t + 2)
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
Board 102 0.109 0.978 0.164 -2.178 2.044 -0.405 2.522 0.055
Chair 102 0.085 0.912 0.273 -1.094 0.954 -0.343 1.335 0.197
Diversity 102 0.102 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.500 1.022 2.612 0.000
Ownership 102 0.260 0.722 0.398 -1.693 1.677 -0.623 3.255 0.011
BSize 102 6.431 1.932 6.000 2.000 11.000 0.022 2.578 0.875
%Tot.Prof.Own. 102 0.376 0.208 0.385 0.000 0.85 0.077 2.518 0.191
%Tot.Dir.Own. 102 0.106 0.160 0.018 0.000 0.640 1.672 4.867 0.000
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
Board 110 -0.000 0.940 -0.003 -2.178 1.842 -0.030 2.392 0.161
Chair 110 0.050 0.880 0.273 -1.094 0.954 -0.103 1.318 0.420
Diversity 110 0.075 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.469 1.321 3.422 0.000
Ownership 110 -0.055 0.768 0.055 -2.426 1.249 -0.854 3.494 0.000
BSize 110 6.882 2.452 7.000 3.000 15.000 1.018 4.146 0.000
%Tot.Prof.Own. 110 0.302 0.189 0.293 0.000 0.731 0.111 2.096 0.026
%Tot.Dir.Own. 110 0.170 0.209 0.068 0.000 0.866 1.461 4.322 0.000
(Continued)
Initial Loss Sample
Control Sample
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Table 9.1 Continued
Panel A of this table provides detailed descriptive statistics for the corporate governance variables for the initial loss and control 
samples as well as combined panel of both initial loss and control samples for four year test period from (t - 1) to (t + 2).  
Descriptive statitics for the loss and control firms in each of the time periods (t - 1) (Panel B: Preperiod), t (Panel C: Loss Year) 
and (t + 1) (Panel D: Postperiod) and (t + 2) (Panel E: Postperiod) are also included.  Time t includes panel data from years 
2004, 2005 and 2006. The collection and matching of the initial loss and control samples  is detailed in hapter 3.  The decrease 
in the number of firms (initial loss and control) across time is due to firms liquidating or being acquired.  Board, Chair and 
Ownership are corporate governance amalgamations, the construction of which is according to a principal components analysis 
the workings of which are included in Table 3.11.  BSize is the size of the board.  %Tot. Prof. Own. and %Tot. Dir. Own. are 
the percentage owned by professionals and directors, respectively.  Diversity is a measure of gender diversity (also known as 
the Blau Index) calculated according to the formula:
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 1−�𝑃𝑖2𝑛
𝑖=1
= 1− 𝑃𝑓2 + 𝑃𝑚2
where 𝑃𝑖 is the proportion in each category (female, f, or male, m).
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Table 9.2
Panel A: All Periods Combined
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
AB_ACCR 787 -0.005 0.162 0.001 -1.869 0.498 -5.880 69.991 0.000
LMV 824 4.031 1.913 3.919 -0.186 9.494 0.494 3.144 0.000
CFO 785 0.078 0.116 0.076 -0.350 0.504 0.020 5.490 0.000
LEV 785 0.537 0.293 0.523 0.056 2.755 2.733 18.790 0.000
GROWTH 798 0.599 0.744 0.524 -6.569 2.816 -3.734 37.870 0.000
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
AB_ACCR 388 -0.008 0.176 0.001 -1.869 0.498 -6.102 65.734 0.000
LMV 412 3.862 1.937 3.798 -0.186 9.494 0.409 2.947 0.121
CFO 386 0.039 0.109 0.049 -0.350 0.503 -0.382 6.246 0.000
LEV 386 0.569 0.323 0.556 0.056 2.755 2.616 16.83 0.000
GROWTH 387 0.632 0.958 0.599 -6.569 2.816 -3.727 28.659 0.000
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
AB_ACCR 399 -0.002 0.146 -0.000 -1.869 0.498 -5.264 71.087 0.000
LMV 412 4.200 1.876 3.974 -0.186 9.494 0.618 3.306 0.007
CFO 399 0.116 0.11 0.106 -0.268 0.504 0.401 5.031 0.000
LEV 399 0.506 0.257 0.485 0.056 2..755 2.735 20.41 0.000
GROWTH 411 0.568 0.46 0.491 -1.537 2.227 0.217 7.350 0.000
(Continued)
Descriptive Statistics of Non-Corporate Governance Variable Levels
Combined Initial Loss and Control Samples
Initial Loss Sample
Control Sample
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Table 9.2 Continued
Panel B: Pre-Period (t  - 1)
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
AB_ACCR 137 0.016 0.095 0.008 -0.366 0.372 -0.034 6.926 0.000
LMV 137 3.922 1.824 3.966 0.588 9.131 0.525 3.132 0.000
CFO 137 0.060 0.107 0.063 -0.266 0.504 0.100 6.645 0.000
LEV 137 0.512 0.239 0.508 0.075 1.553 1.001 5.956 0.000
GROWTH 137 0.765 0.601 0.657 -1.231 2.227 -0.093 4.154 0.000
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
AB_ACCR 137 -0.011 0.130 -0.008 -0.505 0.372 -1.148 8.046 0.000
LMV 137 4.014 1.846 3.784 0.588 9.131 0.778 3.290 0.000
CFO 137 0.131 0.119 0.117 -0.266 0.504 0.606 4.719 0.000
LEV 137 0.502 0.238 0.477 0.075 1.553 1.438 7.267 0.000
GROWTH 137 0.589 0.476 0.494 -1.231 2.227 0.695 5.944 0.000
(Continued)
Initial Loss Sample
Control Sample
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Table 9.2 Continued
Panel C: Initial Loss Year (t )
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
AB_ACCR 137 -0.030 0.257 -0.003 -1.869 0.498 -5.327 39.48 0.000
LMV 137 3.829 1.971 3.780 -0.105 9.195 0.367 2.744 0.000
CFO 137 0.018 0.108 0.031 -0.350 0.312 -1.190 6.046 0.000
LEV 137 0.567 0.255 0.575 0.068 1.787 0.704 5.657 0.000
GROWTH 137 0.748 0.708 0.604 -1.537 2.816 0.296 4.960 0.000
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
AB_ACCR 137 0.000 0.194 0.006 -1.869 0.498 -6.299 64.824 0.000
LMV 137 4.215 1.873 4.049 -0.105 9.195 0.573 3.348 0.000
CFO 137 0.109 0.108 0.095 -0.212 0.427 0.433 4.608 0.000
LEV 137 0.503 0.247 0.472 0.068 1.787 2.135 11.794 0.000
GROWTH 137 0.527 0.419 0.477 -1.537 1.774 0.954 10.156 0.000
(Continued)
Initial Loss Sample
Control Sample
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Table 9.2 Continued
Panel D: Post-Period (t + 1)/(t + 2)
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
AB_ACCR 113 -0.010 0.123 -0.007 -0.474 0.390 -0.988 8.265 0.000
LMV 136 3.835 2.026 3.598 0.186 9.494 0.373 2.947 0.121
CFO 112 0.040 0.109 0.045 -0.276 0.399 -0.037 5.430 0.000
LEV 111 0.642 0.452 0.575 0.056 2.755 2.664 12.368 0.000
GROWTH 111 0.322 1.417 0.464 -6.569 2.174 -3.561 17.113 0.000
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Normality
AB_ACCR 123 0.006 0.090 -0.001 -0.218 0.390 1.329 7.617 0.000
LMV 137 4.369 1.906 4.199 -0.186 9.494 0.513 3.360 0.007
CFO 123 0.108 0.01 0.100 -0.268 0.399 -0.204 5.480 0.000
LEV 123 0.515 0.288 0.522 0.056 2.755 3.890 30.98 0.000
GROWTH 136 0.589 0.483 0.497 -1.463 2.174 0.472 6.480 0.000
Initial Loss Sample
Control Sample
Panel A of this table provides detailed descriptive statistics for the abnormal accruals and control variables for the initial loss 
and control samples as well as combined panels of both the initial loss and control samples.  Detailed statistics for the initial 
loss and control samples time periods t -1 (Preperiod), t (Loss Year) and (t + 1)/(t + 2) (Postperiod) are included in Panels B, C 
and D, respectively.  Time t includes panel data from years 2004, 2005 and 2006. The collection and matching of the initial 
loss and control samples  is detailed in Chapter 3.  The decrease in the number of firms (initial loss and control) across time is 
due to firms liquidating or being acquired.  The variable  AB_ACCR is the signed abnormal accruals calculated according to the 
DeFond and Park ((2001) model, LMV is the natural log of market value, CFO is the cash flow from operating activities scaled 
by lagged total assets, LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, and GROWTH is the book-to-market ratio, defined as the 
book value divided by the market value.  
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Table 9.3 Testing the Average Effect of an Initial  Loss Event on 
Corporate Governance: A Further Examination of Ownership
∆ Gov  = β + δD LOSS t  + θReturn + ε
Panel A Test Period  ∆1
Independent Variables Ownership % Tot.Dir.Own. % Tot.Prof.Own.
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.104 -0.017 0.034
(3.93)*** (-4.23)*** (3.66)***
D LOSS t 0.054 0.001 -0.003
(1.51) (0.22) (-0.23)
Return -0.114 0.011 -0.009
(-2.67)*** (1.60) (-0.58)
n 276 276 276
R 2 4.0% 1.0% 4.0%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
Intercept + D LOSS t = 0 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Panel B Test Period  ∆2
Independent Variables Ownership % Tot.Dir.Own. % Tot.Prof.Own.
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.205 -0.034 0.059
(4.68)*** (-5.12)*** (3.62)***
D LOSS t 0.017 0.017 -0.003
(0.30) (1.83)* (-0.13)
Return -0.079 0.010 0.003
(-2.03)** (1.81)* (0.19)
n 238 238 238
R 2 1.9% 3.0% 0.0%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance: 
Intercept + D LOSS t = 0 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
The information about the data collected and variables constructed in this appendix is the same as 
that in Table 4.2. 
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Table 9.4
Panel A Test Period ∆1
Independent Variables Ownership %Tot.Dir.Own. %Tot.Prof.Own.
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.105 -0.017 0.034
(3.97)*** (-4.25)*** (3.68)***
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 0.092 -0.009 0.003
(2.14)** (-1.11) (0.22)
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 0.013 0.005 -0.011
(0.30) (0.92) (-0.68)
Return -0.117 0.011 -0.009
(-2.75)*** (1.64) (-0.62)
n 276 276 276
R 2 5.0% 2.0% 4.0%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 + Intercept = 0
<0.01 0.01 <0.01
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 + Intercept = 0
<0.01 <0.01 0.07
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1
0.10 0.08 0.42
(Continued)
Governance Conditioned by Corporate Governance
Characteristics: A Further Examination of Ownership
Testing the Effect of an Initial Loss Event on Corporate
∆ Gov  = β + δ1 D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 + δ2 D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 + θReturn + ε
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Table 9.4 Continued
Panel B Test Period ∆2
Independent Variables Ownership %Tot.Dir.Own. %Tot.Prof.Own.
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.206 -0.035 0.059
(4.81)*** (-5.17)*** (3.61)***
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 0.150 0.006 0.005
(2.16)** (0.47) (0.19)
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 -0.122 0.021 -0.013
(-1.73)* (2.13)** (-0.47)
Return -0.082 0.011 0.003
(-2.14)** (1.91)* (0.18)
n 238 238 238
R 2 6.5% 3.2% 0.0%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 + Intercept = 0
<0.01 0.08 <0.01
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 + Intercept = 0
0.15 0.02 0.06
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1
<0.01 0.27 0.56
The information about the data collected and variables constructed in this 
appendix is the same as that in Table 4.4. 
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Table 9.5
∆ Gov  = β + δ1 D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 + δ 2 D LOSS t * D MIDGOV t -1
+ δ3 D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 + θReturn + ε
Panel A Test Period ∆1
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept -0.027 0.048 0.008 0.106 -0.006
(-0.62) (1.46) (1.31) (4.01)*** (-0.07)
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 0.221 0.022 0.014 0.084 0.172
(2.88)*** (0.35) (1.42) (1.83)* (0.96)
D LOSS t * D MIDGOV t -1 0.021 0.116 0.012 0.131 0.248
(0.21) (1.67)* (0.64) (2.11)** (1.36)
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 0.046 -0.173 -0.001 -0.017 -0.529
(0.58) (-3.01)*** (-0.10) (-0.36) (-2.91)***
Return 0.053 -0.083 0.002 -0.121 0.060
(0.74) (-1.55) (0.20) (-2.83)*** (0.39)
n 276 276 276 276 276
R 2 3.1% 6.7% 1.0% 6.1% 5.4%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 + Intercept = 0
<0.01 0.20 <0.01 <0.01 0.29
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 + Intercept = 0
0.77 0.01 0.60 0.02 <0.01
D LOSS t *D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1
0.06 <0.01 0.32 0.07 <0.01
(Continued)
Testing the Effect of an Initial Loss Event on Corporate
Governance Conditioned by Corporate Governance
Characteristics: An Alternative Conditioning Specification
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Table 9.5 Continued
Panel B Test Period ∆2
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.016 0.052 0.003 0.207 -0.132
(0.25) (0.88) (0.30) (4.80)*** (-1.05)
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 0.282 0.424 0.033 0.144 0.556
(2.62)*** (3.79)*** (2.40)** (1.91)* (2.39)**
D LOSS t * D MIDGOV t -1 0.060 0.145 0.009 0.039 0.219
(0.40) (1.15) (0.31) (0.40) (0.87)
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 0.048 -0.244 -0.047 -0.137 -1.016
(0.41) (-2.37)** (-2.11)** (-1.75)* (-4.44)***
Return 0.032 -0.041 0.005 -0.083 0.039
(0.56) (-0.77) (0.60) (-2.16)** (0.35)
n 238 238 238 238 238
R 2 2.9% 11.0% 5.6% 5.7% 13.3%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 + Intercept = 0
<0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.04
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 + Intercept = 0
0.53 0.03 0.03 0.29 <0.01
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1
0.08 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
The information about the data collected and variables constructed in this appendix is 
the same as that in Table 4.4, except that now
DLOWGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the bottom 
two quintiles mean in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise
DMIDGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the middle 
quintile in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise
DHIGHGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the top two 
quintiles in the year before the loss, and zero otherwise.  
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Table 9.6 Testing the Effect of an Initial Loss Event on Abnormal Accruals 
Panel A Test Period ∆1
Independent Variables Large/Med./Small Large/Med./Small
by Mkt. Value by Sales
(t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.007 0.005
(0.40) (0.28)
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL -0.068 -0.104
(-2.10)** (-3.32)***
D LOSS t *  D MIDQUAL -0.076 -0.019
(-1.91)* (-0.48)
D LOSS t  * D HIGHQUAL -0.012 -0.006
(-0.41) (-0.18)
Δ LMV 0.010 0.016
(0.37) (0.59)
Δ CFO -0.540 -0.566
(-6.00)*** (-6.31)***
Δ LEV -0.037 -0.006
(-0.33) (-0.05)
Δ GROWTH 0.019 0.015
(0.48) (0.40)
n 274 274
R 2 14.22% 15.87%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL = D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL 0.13 <0.01
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL + Intercept = 0 0.03 <0.01
(Continued)
∆ AB_ACCR = β 0  + δ 1 D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL + δ 2 D LOSS t  * D MIDQUAL
+ δ 3 D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL  + β j ∆ Controls  + ε
Conditioned by the Severity of the Loss: Alternative
Large/Medium/Small Specifications
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Table 9.6 Continued
Panel B Test Period ∆2
Independent Variables Large/Med./Small Large/Med./Small
by Mkt. Value by Sales
(t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.031 0.017
(1.27) (0.56)
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL -0.069 -0.118
(-1.41) (-2.04)**
D LOSS t  * D MIDQUAL 0.038 0.014
(0.62) (0.25)
D LOSS t  * D HIGHQUAL 0.009 -0.005
(0.19) (-0.08)
Δ LMV -0.008 -0.002
(-0.68) (-0.27)
Δ CFO -0.349 -0.357
(-2.49)** (-2.19)**
Δ LEV -0.296 -0.186
(-3.96)*** (-3.60)***
Δ GROWTH -0.016 0.023
(-0.63) (0.84)
n 228 228
R 2 11.54% 14.98%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL = D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL 0.17 0.17
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL + Intercept = 0 0.29 0.05
This table reports the effect of an initial loss on the change in abnormal 
accruals conditioned by the severity of the loss.  For each firm,  the  window is the year before 
the initial loss event, t-1,  to either the year of the loss (∆1) or the year  the loss firm returns to 
profitability (∆2); for those firms that liquidate or are acquired the window is from year t-1 to 
t+1.  The test (loss sample) consists of 137 (∆1) and 114 (∆2) firms which reported a loss in 
year t following two years of reporting a profit and the control sample consists of  the same 
number of  firms  matched for industry and market value which reported a profit in each of 
year t-2 to t+2.  The difference in the sample sizes in test periods ∆1 and ∆2 is firms (loss or 
control) being acquired in the period t to t+1.  Loss firms are partitioned based whether the loss 
is small/medium/large or good/average/bad.  A small loss is one where the scaled (by market 
value) loss is in the bottom two quintiles of ranked scaled losses, a medium loss is in the 
middle quintile and a big loss is one in the top two quintiles.  A good loss is one with a 12-
month return around the financial year end of the loss year (6-months before and after) in the 
bottom two quintiles of  ranked 12-month returns, an average loss is in the middle quintile and 
a bad loss is in the top two quintiles.  
(Continued)
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Table 9.6 Continued
Financial information is obtained from Datastream/ Worldscope.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers.  Estimated coefficients 
are followed by t-statistics ().  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated with 
*,**, and ***, respectively. 
Variable Definitions:
∆ AB_ACCR= the change in signed abnormal accruals during the test period (i.e. ∆1 or ∆2).  
The abnormal accrual model used is a modified DeFond and Park (2001) model
detailed previously in the Chapter 3. 
DLOSS t = a dummy variable equal to one for firms that report a loss during the event
window, and zero otherwise.
DLOWQUAL = a dummy variable equal to one for  loss firms that report a high severity loss,
and zero otherwise.
DMIDQUAL = a dummy variable equal to one for  loss firms that report a medium severity loss, 
and zero otherwise.
DHIGHQUAL = a dummy variable equal to one for  loss firms that report a low severity loss, and
zero otherwise.
∆ LMV = the change in the natural log of market value.  
∆ CFO = the change in the cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total 
assets.  
∆ LEV = the change in the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
∆ GROWTH = the change in the book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value divided by the 
market value. 
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Table 9.7
Panel A Test Period ∆1
Independent Variables Large/Medium/Small Bad/Average/Good
(t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept -0.005 -0.004
(-0.27) (-0.24)
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL 0.004 -0.005
(0.13) (-0.16)
D LOSS t *  D MIDQUAL -0.021 0.053
(-0.53) (1.52)
D LOSS t  * D HIGHQUAL 0.039 0.028
(0.99) (0.83)
Δ LMV 0.061 0.060
(2.16)** (2.00)**
Δ CFO -0.568 -0.558
(-6.26)*** (-6.10)***
Δ LEV 0.057 0.064
(0.51) (0.57)
Δ GROWTH 0.067 0.070
(1.66)* (1.73)*
n 274 274
R 2 16.95% 16.34%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL = D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL 0.13 0.42
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL + Intercept = 0 0.99 0.73
D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL + Intercept = 0 0.03 0.44
(Continued)
∆ AB_ACCR = β 0  + δ 1 D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL + δ 2 D LOSS t  * D MIDQUAL
+ δ 3 D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL  + β j ∆ Controls  + ε
Testing the Effect of an Initial Loss Event on Abnormal Accruals
Conditioned by the Severity of the Loss:
An Alternative Abnormal Accruals Measure
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Table 9.7 Continued
Panel B Test Period ∆2
Independent Variables Large/Medium/Small Bad/Average/Good
(t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.037 0.038
(1.54) (1.61)
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL -0.082 -0.096
(-1.67)* (-2.05)**
D LOSS t  * D MIDQUAL 0.027 0.013
(0.45) (0.26)
D LOSS t  * D HIGHQUAL 0.005 0.032
(0.12) (0.67)
Δ LMV -0.003 -0.007
(-0.28) (-0.55)
Δ CFO -0.389 -0.387
(-2.82)*** (-2.84)***
Δ LEV -0.236 -0.234
(-3.21)*** (-3.20)***
Δ GROWTH -0.011 -0.006
(-0.46) (-0.23)
n 228 228
R 2 10.03% 11.03%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t *  D LOWQUAL = D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL 0.13 0.03
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL + Intercept = 0 0.30 0.15
D LOSS t * D HIGHQUAL + Intercept = 0 0.26 0.10
The information about the data collected and variables constructed in this 
appendix is the same as that in Table 5.3 except that abnormal accruals are now calculated using 
a modified Francis and Wang (2008) model.
 
 
 
 
 
 - 331 - 
 
 
Table 9.8
Independent Variables Coefficient
(z -value)
Intercept -0.895
(-1.81)*
AB_ACCR  t -1 1.681
(1.68)*
LMV t -1 0.032
(0.45)
LEV t -1 0.534
(0.99)
GROWTH t -1 0.707
(2.82)***
n 274
Pseudo R 2 2.87%
Testing the Effect of Abnormal Accruals for Initial Loss Reporting: 
P(D LOSS t  = 1) =  β 0  + β 1 AB_ACCR t -1+ β j Controls t -1 + ε
An Alternative Abnormal Accruals Measure
The information about the data collected and variables constructed in this 
appendix is the same as that in Table 5.4.
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Table 9.9 Testing the Effect of a Loss Event on Abnormal Accruals 
∆ AB_ACCR = β 0  + δ 1 D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 + δ 2 D LOSS t  * D MIDGOV t -1
+ δ 3 D LOSS t  * D HIGHGOV t -1 + β j ∆ Controls  + ε
Panel A Test Period ∆1
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept -0.009 -0.011 -0.012 -0.010 -0.012
(-0.33) (-0.39) (-0.40) (-0.34) (-0.41)
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 -0.101 -0.067 -0.030 -0.065 -0.093
(-1.84)* (-1.15) (-0.65) (-1.22) (-1.62)
D LOSS t * D MIDGOV t -1 -0.004 -0.095 0.008 0.048 -0.058
(-0.06) (-1.46) (0.09) (0.66) (-0.99)
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 -0.031 -0.015 -0.146 -0.092 -0.003
(-0.55) (-0.27) (-2.14)** (-1.65)* (-0.05)
Δ LMV 0.036 0.043 0.047 0.042 0.050
(0.73) (0.86) (0.95) (0.86) (1.01)
Δ CFO -0.722 -0.721 -0.721 -0.720 -0.723
(-4.49)*** (-4.48)*** (-4.50)*** (-4.49)*** (-4.50)***
Δ LEV -0.115 -0.140 -0.151 -0.113 -0.114
(-0.58) (-0.71) (-0.76) (-0.57) (-0.58)
Δ GROWTH 0.047 0.040 0.049 0.060 0.054
(0.69) (0.58) (0.71) (0.86) (0.79)
n 274 274 274 274 274
R 2 9.12% 8.91% 9.53% 9.51% 9.02%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1
0.27 0.44 0.10 0.67 0.19
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 + Intercept  = 0
0.02 0.12 0.25 0.09 0.04
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 + Intercept  = 0
0.41 0.57 0.01 0.03 0.77
(Continued)
Conditioned by Corporate Governance Characteristics: Unwinsorised Variables
The information about the data collected and variables constructed in this 
appendix is the same as that in Table 6.1 except that all continuous variables are unwinsorised.
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Table 9.10
Corporate Governance Bad Average Good Total Large Medium Small Total
Board Low 33 11 14 58 20 13 25 58
Mid 13 6 9 28 7 8 13 28
High 24 10 18 52 28 6 18 52
Total 70 27 41 138 55 27 56 138
Ownership Low 30 10 17 57 17 12 28 57
Mid 10 5 11 26 7 7 12 26
High 30 12 13 55 31 8 16 55
Total 70 27 41 138 55 27 56 138
BSize Low 22 9 16 47 22 10 15 47
Mid 27 7 12 46 16 11 19 46
High 21 11 13 45 17 6 22 45
Total 70 27 41 138 55 27 56 138
Distributions of Initial Loss Firms by Corporate Governance Quality and Severity of Loss Characteristics: 
Severity of Loss Severity of Loss
Partitioning by Quintiles
This table shows the partitioning of the initial loss ample by ex-ante corporate governance quality and the severity of the 
loss.  An initial loss firm in each category (Board, Ownership, BSize)  has low quality corporate governance if  governance in that 
category  is in the bottom two quintiles in the year before the loss,  mid governance if in the middle quintile and high governance if in 
the top two quintiles.  A loss is bad if the 24-month return around the loss event (18 before, 6 after) is in the bottom two quintiles of all 
(loss and control) 24-month returns around the loss event, average if in the middle quintile of all 24-month returns and good if in the top 
two quintiles of all 24-month returns.  A loss is large if the scaled loss is in the top two quintiles, medium if in the middle quintile and 
small if in the bottom two quintiles.
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Table 9.11
Panel A Bad/Average/Good
Independent Variables Board Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.013 0.012 0.008
(0.47) (0.42) (0.28)
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D LOWGOV t -1 -0.196 -0.108 -0.122
(-2.73)*** (-1.44) (-1.62)
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D HIGHGOV t -1 -0.128
(-1.81)*
D LOSS t * D OTHER -0.004 0.005 -0.016
(-0.09) (0.12) (-0.40)
Δ LMV -0.029 -0.020 -0.004
(-0.67) (-0.46) (-0.09)
Δ CFO -0.424 0.417 -0.417
(-4.97)*** (-4.85)*** (-4.84)***
Δ LEV -0.678 -0.675 -0.693
(-4.74)*** (-4.65)*** (-4.80)***
Δ GROWTH 0.049 0.052 0.046
(1.35) (1.42) (1.26)
n 274 274 274
R 2 20.16% 19.27% 18.51%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D OTHER
<0.01 0.14 0.15
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D HIGHGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D OTHER
0.06
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D HIGHGOV t -1
0.83
(Continued)
Testing the Effect of an Initial Loss Event on Abnormal Accruals 
Conditioned by Both Corporate Governance Characteristics
and the Severity of the Loss: Unwinsorized Variables
∆ AB_ACCR = β 0  + ϕ1 D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D LOWGOV t -1 +
ϕ2 D LOSS t  * D LOWQUAL * D HIGHGOV t -1+ ϕ3D LOSS t  * D OTHER + β j ∆ Controls  + ε
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Table 9.11 Continued
Panel B Large/Medium/Small
Independent Variables Board Ownership BSize
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.007 0.007 0.004
(0.27) (0.25) (0.16)
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D LOWGOV t -1 -0.117 0.049 -0.138
(-1.46) (0.59) (-1.87)*
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D HIGHGOV t -1 -0.144
(-2.20)**
D LOSS t * D OTHER -0.020 -0.012 -0.011
(-0.49) (-0.28) (-0.27)
Δ LMV -0.003 0.000 0.009
('-0.06) (0.01) (0.23)
Δ CFO -0.425 -0.439 -0.439
(-4.93)*** (-5.11)*** (-5.08)***
Δ LEV -0.679 -0.673 -0.668
(-4.66)*** (-4.63)*** (-4.60)
Δ GROWTH 0.048 0.051 0.044
(1.32) (1.41) (1.22)
n 274 274 274
R 2 18.36% 19.54% 18.79%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D OTHER
0.21 0.47 0.09
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D HIGHGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D OTHER
0.05
D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D LOWQUAL * D HIGHGOV t -1
0.04
(Continued)The information about the data collected and variables constructed in this 
appendix is the same as that in Table 6.2 except that all continuous variables are unwinsorised.
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Table 9.12
 
Independent Variables Board Chair Diversity Ownership Bsize
(z -stat) (z -stat) (z -stat) (z -stat) (z -stat)
Intercept -0.878 -0.841 -0.779 -0.802 -0.822
(-1.81)* (-1.77)* (-1.64)* (-1.71)* (-1.74)*
AB_ACCR  t -1* D LOWGOV t -1 6.653 '0.992 3.314 2.061 4.375        
(2.82)*** (0.65) (2.26)** (1.53) (2.11)**
AB_ACCR  t -1* D MIDGOV t -1 1.125      4.570 0.812 -0.049 -1.042
(0.73) (1.50) (0.40) (-0.02) (-0.55)
AB_ACCR  t -1* D HIGHGOV t -1 -2.163 1.652 -4.725 2.040 1.802
(-1.06) (1.20) (-1.40) (0.99) (1.00)
LMV t -1 0.035 0.021 0.012 0.023 0.026
(0.50) (0.31) (0.17) (0.33) (0.37)
LEV t -1 0.552 0.672 0.650 0.591 0.591
(1.17) (1.43) (1.36) (1.27) (1.25)
GROWTH t -1 0.634 0.602 0.601 0.602 0.628
(2.65)*** (2.57)*** (2.55)** (2.58)*** (2.66)***
n 274 274 274 274 274
R 2 5.35% 3.20% 4.45% 3.04% 4.01%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
AB_ACCR  t -1* D LOWGOV t -1 = AB_ACCR  t -1* D HIGHGOV t -1
<0.01 0.75 0.03 0.99 0.35
Testing Abnormal Accruals Conditioned by Corporate Governance 
Characteristics and Loss Reporting: Unwinsorised Variables
+ β 3 AB_ACCR t -1* D HIGHGOV t -1 + β j Controls t -1 + ε
P(D LOSS t  = 1) =  β 0  + β 1 AB_ACCR t -1* D LOWGOV t -1 + β 2 AB_ACCR t -1* D MIDGOV t -1
The information about the data collected and variables constructed in this appendix is the 
same as that in Table 6.3 except that all continuous variables are unwinsorised.
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Table 9.13
Panel A Test Period ∆1
Independent Variables %Tot.Dir.Own. %Top.Dir.Own. %Tot.Prof.Own. %Top.Prof.Own. # Prof.Own. %Tot.Blk.Own.
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
Intercept 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.007
(0.33) (0.29) (0.21) (0.33) (0.36) (0.43)
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 -0.052 -0.013 -0.042 -0.045 -0.070 -0.052
(-1.73)* (-0.31) (-1.52) (-1.43) (-2.09)** (-1.69)*
D LOSS t * D MIDGOV t -1 -0.037 -0.058 0.023 -0.032 -0.028 -0.064
(-0.88) (-1.80)* (0.59) (-1.04) (-0.90) (-2.09)**
D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1 -0.039 -0.046 -0.056 -0.066 -0.038 0.009
(-1.25) (-1.54) (-1.74)* (-1.71)* (-1.11) (0.22)
Δ LMV 0.017 0.020 0.014 0.017 0.015 0.008
(0.63) (0.72) (0.52) (0.63) (0.55) (0.29)
Δ CFO -0.538 -0.539 -0.533 -0.538 -0.536 -0.528
(-5.95)*** (-5.95)*** (-5.91)*** (-5.92)*** (-5.93)*** (-5.85)***
Δ LEV -0.061 -0.055 -0.057 -0.057 -0.060 -0.052
(-0.54) (-0.49) (-0.51) (-0.52) (-0.54) (-0.47)
Δ GROWTH 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.024 0.023 0.018
(0.59) (0.54) (0.53) (0.60) (0.59) (0.46)
(Continued)
Testing the Effect of an Initial Loss Event on Abnormal Accruals 
Conditioned by Corporate Governance Characteristics: A Further Analysis of Ownership
∆ AB_ACCR = β 0  + δ 1 D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 + δ 2 D LOSS t  * D MIDGOV t -1
+ δ 3 D LOSS t  * D HIGHGOV t -1 + β j ∆ Controls  + ε
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Table 9.13 Continued
Independent Variables %Tot.Dir.Own. %Top.Dir.Own. %Tot.Prof.Own. %Top.Prof.Own. # Prof.Own %Tot.Blk.Own.
(t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat) (t -stat)
n 274 274 274 274 274 274
R 2 13.24% 13.51% 13.46% 13.39% 13.59% 14.03%
Two-Tailed p -values for Tests of Significance:
D LOSS t * D LOWGOV t -1 = D LOSS t * D HIGHGOV t -1
0.70 0.76 0.70 0.87 0.28 0.74
This table reports the effect of an initial loss on the change in abnormal accruals conditioned by ownership characteristics.
For each (test or control) firm, the  test period is the year before the loss event, t-1,  to the year of the loss (∆1).  The test (loss sample) 
consists of 137 firms which reported a loss in year t following two years of reporting a profit and the control sample consists of  the same 
number of  firms  matched for industry and market value which reported a profit in each of year t-2 to t+2.  The ownership variables are 
explained in Chapter 3.    The sample is partitioned based upon quinitle values of each of %Tot. Dir. Own., %Top. Dir.Own., %Tot. Prof. 
Own., %Top. Prof. Own., #Prof. Own, and %Tot. Blk. Own.   For %Tot. Prof. Own., %Top. Prof. Own., #Prof. Own, and %Tot. Blk. Own., 
firms with ex-ante values in the bottom two quintiles are in the LOWGOV group, firms in the middle quintile are in the MIDGOV group, and 
firms in the top two quintiles are in the HIGHGOV group. For %Tot. Dir. Own. and  %Top. Dir. Own.,firms with ex-ante values in the 
bottom top quintiles are in the LOWGOV group, firms in the middle quintile are in the MIDGOV group, and firms in the bottom two 
quintiles are in the HIGHGOV group. Financial information is obtained from Datastream/Worldscope.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers.  Estimated coefficients are followed by t-statistics ().  Significance 
levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by  *, **, ***, respectively.
(Continued)
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Table 9.13 Continued
Variable Definitions:
∆ AB_ACCR= the change in signed abnormal accruals during the test period (i.e. ∆1 or ∆2).  The abnormal accrual model used is a
modified DeFond and Park (2001) model detailed previously in Chapter 5. 
DLOSS t = a dummy variable equal to one for firms that report a loss during the event window, and zero otherwise.
DLOWGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the bottom two quintiles mean in the year before 
the loss, and zero otherwise
DMIDGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the middle quintile in the year before the loss, and 
zero otherwise
DHIGHGOV t-1 = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm (loss or control) has a GOV value in the top two quintiles in the year before the loss, 
and zero otherwise.  
∆ LMV = the change in the natural log of market value.  
∆ CFO = the change in the cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total assets.  
∆ LEV = the change in the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
∆ GROWTH = the change in the book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value divided by the market value. 
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